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ABSTRACT 
 
VARIABLES IN NATURAL LANGUAGE 
 
FEBRUARY 2006 
 
MEREDITH LIZABETH LANDMAN 
 
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Barbara H. Partee  
 
 
A central goal of generative linguistics is to determine what constitutes a possible gram-
mar of a natural language. This thesis works toward that goal in positing a constraint on 
the possible semantic types of variables in natural language. Specifically, I argue here 
that the logical forms (LFs) of natural languages do not contain higher-type variables, 
i.e., variables of a type higher than that of an individual, type e (see Chierchia (1984) and 
Baker (2003) for similar proposals). I refer to this constraint as the No Higher-Type Vari-
ables constraint (NHTV).  
Assuming that the domain of individuals, D, includes at least objects, kinds, 
events, event-kinds, degrees, situations, worlds, times, and locations, all of which have 
been independently argued to be necessary members of D, what NHTV predicts not to 
occur are object language expressions that vary over, e.g., generalized quantifiers, rela-
tions, or properties. While NHTV thus predicts a very restricted inventory of variable de-
noting expressions, I argue that it accounts for a surprisingly wide range of data in char-
acterizing which variable-denoting expressions do and do not occur.   
 vii 
I motivate NHTV based primarily on data from English, and to a lesser extent, 
German and Polish. I focus empirically on two types of expressions that are commonly 
analyzed as involving variables: (i) (overt) pro-forms, and (ii) A’-movement gaps. In par-
ticular, I look closely at pro-forms and gaps that have the syntactic distribution of items 
that are commonly taken to be of a higher-type, namely, APs, AdvPs, VPs, and NPs. 
While all of these expressions are commonly taken to denote properties of individuals, I 
argue that pro-forms and gaps that have the distribution of these categories should not be 
analyzed as property variables, but instead either (i) vary over individuals, or (ii) do not 
involve variables at all. 
The bulk of the thesis is devoted to backing up NHTV by (i) showing that hypo-
thetical higher-type variables are systematically missing, and (ii) looking closely at po-
tential counterexamples on a case-by-case basis. 
 viii 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
POSSIBLE VARIABLES 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
A central goal of generative linguistics is to determine what constitutes a possible gram-
mar of a natural language. This thesis works toward that goal in positing a constraint on 
the possible semantic types of variables in natural language. Specifically, I will argue 
here that the logical forms (LFs) of natural languages do not contain higher-type vari-
ables, i.e., variables of a type higher than that of an individual, type e, so that the follow-
ing constraint holds (see Chierchia (1984) and Baker (2003) for similar proposals, as dis-
cussed in Section 2 below):  
 
(1) The No Higher-Type Variables Constraint (NHTV) 
Variables in the LFs of natural languages are of type e.   
 
I will motivate NHTV based primarily on data from English, and to a lesser extent Ger-
man and Polish. I consider it a potential semantic universal, but careful investigation of 
unrelated languages will be necessary to test whether it holds cross-linguistically. 
To make clear the predictions of NHTV, it is first necessary to make clear both (i) 
my assumptions about what counts as an individual, and (ii) what it means to be a vari-
able in the syntactic representation, that is, how variables are represented and interpreted 
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at LF.1 Regarding (i), I take the domain of individuals, De (henceforth, D) to include at 
least objects, kinds, events, event-kinds, degrees, situations, worlds, times and locations, 
all of which have been independently argued to be necessary members of D (for argu-
ments for construing kinds as individuals, see Carlson 1977b and references therein; for 
analyses that assume an ontology that includes degrees, see Klein 1980, 1991, von 
Stechow 1984, Heim 1985 among others, based on Cresswell 1976; for events, see Da-
vidson 1967 and others; on event-kinds, see Barwise and Perry 1983, Chierchia 1984, 
Hinrichs 1985, Landman and Morzycki 2003; on situations as individuals, see Kratzer 
1989; on worlds, see Cresswell 1990 and Percus 2000). Thus, what NHTV predicts not to 
occur are object language expressions that vary over, e.g., generalized quantifiers, rela-
tions, or properties. With respect to properties, this prediction is complicated by the pos-
sibility that certain properties correspond to individuals (Chierchia 1984, Chierchia and 
Turner 1988); I address this issue in Section 1.2.1 below.  
Regarding (ii), I take object language variables to be those LF objects that receive 
their denotation solely from an assignment function. More precisely, I assume here a 
framework in which a variable is syntactically represented as (associated with) an index 
that receives its semantic value from an assignment function.2 Take, for example, the per-
sonal pronoun he, which may be analyzed as a variable as in (2); here, it is associated 
                                                 
1I will use the phrases “in the syntactic representation”, “at LF”, and “in the object language” interchangea-
bly here. 
 
2 It is an interesting issue how and if this constraint might be formulated in a variable-free semantics (Quine 
1960, Cresswell 1990, Jacobson 2002, 2000, 1999). I postpone discussion of this issue to Chapter 4. 
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syntactically with the index i, and receives its denotation from the variable assignment g, 
with g mapping i to some particular individual in D.3  
 
(2) ||hei||
g = g(i)  
 
In the case of he, the variable intuitively varies over individuals; I will, however, 
incorporate NHTV into the semantic component so that all variables range over individu-
als. That is, I will implement NHTV as a restriction on the variable assignment, by re-
stricting its range to individuals in D, as in (3). 
  
(3) A variable assignment is a partial function from |N into D. 
 
In effect, object language variables necessarily denote in D.  
Having made clear my assumptions about both (i) what counts as an individual, 
and (ii) how variables are represented and interpreted at LF, I turn now to the empirical 
motivation for NHTV, which is the main topic of this thesis. Before looking at the par-
ticular phenomena I will focus on here, however, it will be useful to first reflect on the 
question of how it is we know whether a variable occurs in the syntactic representation. 
In addressing this issue, I aim to clarify both my reasons for focusing on the particular 
data I will look at here, as well as my position towards a certain set of potential counter-
examples to NHTV that I will not be looking at in detail, but do not see as fatal for my 
constraint.  
                                                 
3 I abstract away here from further information about the PHI features of a pronoun, e.g., masculine gender 
on he has been proposed to contribute a presupposition that the value of the variable be male.  
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Arguably, a key point in motivating the presence of a variable in the object lan-
guage is to show that the alleged variable has bound instances. Consider, for instance, the 
debate from the 1970s over whether natural language needs the full expressive power of 
quantification over times, which I will briefly summarize here (see Massey 1969, Kamp 
1971, Vlach 1973, Partee 1973, Parsons 1973, Stalnaker 1973, van Benthem 1977, 
Saarinen 1979, and especially Cresswell 1990 and Kusumoto 1999). In Priorian tense 
logic, it had been assumed that a single tense index t was provided as a parameter on the 
interpretation function (Prior 1967). Tense operators, making reference to t, were then 
responsible for the interpretation of sentences with tense information such as past or fu-
ture. Work by Kamp (1971) and Vlach (1973), however, showed that natural languages 
can keep track of time points different from t, and a second parameter on the interpreta-
tion function was proposed to store intermediate times. Building on Kamp and Vlach’s 
work, it was then shown that in principle an indefinite number of indices would be 
needed to account for the expressive power of natural language (Gabbay 1974; Saarinen 
1979; Cresswell 1990); this in turn was shown to be equivalent in expressive power to 
explicit quantification over times in the object language (Cresswell 1990).4 Importantly, it 
was the bound uses of these variables that was most telling about their status in the object 
language.  
To determine whether a variable occurs in the syntactic representation, then, a 
first point is to determine whether the alleged variable has bound instances. The fact 
alone that an expression shows some context dependency is not a sufficient reason for 
positing a variable: If the expression appears to just have an indexical use, that is, if we 
                                                 
4 The same argument can be made for worlds (Cresswell 1990), and possibly situations (Kratzer 2004).  
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do not find bound instances of that expression, it is entirely possible to represent this in-
formation via a separate parameter on the assignment function. A second point is to show 
that apparent bound uses are not due to bound situation arguments (as Kratzer 2004 
points out). To illustrate this latter point, consider the use of higher-type variables to ac-
count for contextual restrictions on quantifier domains (Westerstahl 1984, von Fintel 
1994, Stanley and Szabo 2000, Stanley 2002, Martí 2003). Quantifiers are context de-
pendent in that the interpretation of a sentence in which in they occur varies depending 
on the context in which they are uttered. For example, consider an utterance of (4) in the 
context of a family at the dinner table (based on an example from von Fintel 1998):  
 
(4) Everyone is so quiet.    
 
Under a natural reading of this sentence, the universal quantifier does not quantify over 
all individuals in the world, but rather is taken to quantify over all individuals at the table; 
that is, the domain of quantification appears to be contextually restricted. This narrowing 
of the domain of quantification has been accounted for by positing a higher-type variable 
in the syntactic representation, which effects a restriction on the domain of the quantifier 
(there are several proposals for how to implement this idea, see references above). We 
may ask, then: Do these variables show bound instances? There are indeed examples in 
which these variables appear to co-vary with a higher quantifier (von Fintel 1994, Heim 
1991), as (5) illustrates (from Kratzer 2004):  
 
(5) Every girl finished every task (she was supposed to do.) 
 6 
In (5), the universal quantifier in the second DP, every task, seems to quantify over the 
set of tasks specific to each girl. This thus appears to be a bound use of the domain re-
striction variable on the second quantifier. However, as Kratzer (2004) points out, these 
readings can be accounted for by a bound variable reading of an independently motivated 
– and syntactically represented – situation variable (the reader is referred to that work for 
further specifics of that account). Kratzer in addition presents some independent prob-
lems for the higher-type variable approach to domain restrictions, questioning, for in-
stance, why these variables are covert across languages.5 I will not look further at the use 
of covert higher-type variables to account for context dependencies, but hope to have 
made clear that it is a challenge for such accounts to show that the alleged variables have 
bound instances, and that these instances cannot be accounted for by bound situation 
variables, which are independently motivated. I thus do not seem them as necessarily pre-
senting counterexamples to my claim. 
I turn now to the cases I will focus on in this thesis. In search of higher-type vari-
ables, I will look at two types of expressions that are commonly analyzed as involving 
variables: (i) (overt) pro-forms, and (ii) movement gaps. In particular, I will look for pro-
forms and gaps that have the syntactic distribution of items that are commonly taken to 
be of a higher-type.6 Consider, for instance, the following candidate higher-type pro-
forms in English, which have the distribution of adjectival phrases (APs), adverbial 
                                                 
5 See also Carlson and Storto, to appear, who question the use of these higher-type variables to account for 
contextual dependencies, but propose a very different alternative account of the same phenomena. 
 
6 This is, at least, my starting strategy in searching for higher-type variables. However, as will become clear 
in looking at specific phenomena below, surface pro-forms and traces are not always in a one-to-one corre-
spondence with variables at LF. For example, the surface trace of a pied-piped constituent may at LF con-
tain more semantic material than just a variable; the surface trace then at LF may be of a higher-type, while 
the variable it contains is just an individual. I will discuss this issue explicitly when it arises below. 
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phrases (AdvPs), verb phrases (VPs), and noun phrases (NPs, assuming the DP hypothe-
sis), respectively:7  
 
(6) Those littlei cars look good, but few suchi cars are safe.   AP 
(7) You have to dance this dance with a definite sense of pride and haughtinessi, and 
if danced soi/thusi, the dance will be beautiful.
8   AdvP 
(8) Whenever Sophie starts laughingi, Bill does soi too.   VP 
(9) I thought she would be happyi, but she certainly doesn’t seem soi. AP 
(10) I’ll wash the big dishesi, if you’ll wash the little onesi.   NP 
 
While each of these expressions (the latter underlined expression in each of the above) 
has the syntactic distribution of a higher-type expression, I will argue that a close look at 
their semantics shows that they do not behave like property-variables. Rather, they fall 
into two types: they either (i) vary over individuals, or (ii) do not involve variables at all.9  
The cases in (6)-(9) – such, thus, do so, and so – are instances of the first type: 
Each of these expressions, I will argue, is associated at LF with a variable that ranges 
                                                 
7 I set aside for the immediate discussion instances of VP and NP ellipsis, for example, alongside (8) and 
(10) are (i) and (ii) below (I use Ø to represent ellipsis):  
 
(i) Whenever Sophie starts laughingi, Bill does Øi too.   VP 
(ii) I’ll wash these dishesi, if you’ll wash those Øi.    NP 
  
I will address this issue directly in Chapter 3, where I will argue (as others have) that at least these cases of 
ellipsis are not interpreted as higher-type variables, but rather are represented at LF as having fully articu-
lated internal syntactic structure. 
 
8 From: http://www.cluich.net/HDsolowomen.htm. 
 
9 In the case of one(s)-anaphora, I will not have a strong case against a property-variable, but will only be 
able to show that a property-variable analysis is not necessary. Thus, at its weakest, my claim will be that 
there are no natural language expressions that necessitate the use of higher-type variables in the object lan-
guage. 
 8 
over individuals. More specifically, building on Carlson (1977b), I will argue that such 
varies over individuals that are either kinds or individuals that instantiate kinds. Such thus 
does not vary over properties, as Siegel (1994) proposes. I will show that treating such in 
this way accounts for its behavior with respect to its complement clauses and ellipsis. 
Further, this account of such explains its parallel behavior with its colloquial paraphrase, 
like that, as well as its similarities with degree morphemes such as that and –so as used, 
in e.g., that tall or so tall. In the spirit of Landman and Morzycki (2003), I will then ex-
tend this analysis of such to thus (7), do so (8), and so (9), arguing that these too do not 
vary over properties, but instead vary over individuals that either are kinds or instantiate 
kinds. 
The case in (10), so-called one(s)-anaphora (Ross 1967, Stockwell, Schachter and 
Partee 1973, Jackendoff 1977, Hornstein and Lightfoot 1981, among others), I will treat 
as an instance of the second type: following Llombart-Huesca (2002), I will analyze 
one(s)-anaphora as an instance of NP Ellipsis.10 Further, I will follow those researchers 
that have argued that at least this case of ellipsis is syntactically articulated at LF, and 
thus not interpreted as a higher-type variable (see Chapter 3 for references and detailed 
discussion of ellipsis.)  
NHTV also predicts a restricted typology of movement constructions that at LF 
produce variable-binding structures (i.e., those that necessarily involve variables).11 I will 
argue that if we look at the kinds of variables that may be abstracted over at LF, the same 
                                                 
10 Alternatively, it may be the case that one(s)-anaphora is purely indexical, as it does not appear to have 
bound instances. See Section 3.3 for discussion of this point. 
 
11 Again, I will briefly discuss variable-free frameworks, which do not posit binding of variables as a prod-
uct of movement, in Chapter 4.  
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restrictions seem to hold as were observed for pro-forms. Consider, for example, the 
types of wh-movement possible in English. I assume that these phenomena are repre-
sented by structures in which a wh-phrase moves to the Specifier of CP, and binds a vari-
able in the trace position, as illustrated in (11a-b): (11a) is a wh-question, and (11b) a re-
strictive relative clause, and both can be taken to involve abstraction over an individual in 
the position corresponding to the displaced DP.12  
 
(11) a. Whati did Mary make ti?      
 b.  I liked the movie [CP whi that Mary made ti]. 
 
Neither of these constructions (wh-questions nor restrictive clauses), I will argue, ever 
create structures in which there is abstraction over higher-type variables. For instance, 
there is no wh-word in English that has the distribution of a VP, as (12a) shows.13 Instead, 
to form wh-questions for VPs, what appears to be a nominal wh-phrase combines with 
main verb do (Ross 1972), as (12b) shows. Similarly, restrictive clauses with VP gaps do 
not occur, as (12c) shows (see Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of what such 
clauses might mean, if they were possible, and where syntactically we might expect them 
to occur; and see also Baker (2003) for similar examples, as discussed in Section 1.2.2.2 
below):  
 
                                                 
12 As mentioned above, for the cases of reconstruction (or pied-piping), the variable posited at LF will not 
directly correspond to the surface gap.  
 
13 I will make similar arguments for APs in Chapter 4. 
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(12) a.  *Whati did you make Mary ti?  (Cf. I made Mary [VP type].) 
 b.  Whati did you make Mary do ti? 
 c.  *I made Mary type [CP whi that you made her ti ]. 
 
The absence of wh-questions and restrictive clauses with VP gaps is expected given 
NHTV, since these constructions would require abstraction over VP meanings, usually 
taken to be properties of individuals. Note that the ungrammaticality of (12a) is not obvi-
ously due to an alternative restriction that only syntactically nominal expressions may 
wh-move, as the wh-words where, when, and how in the wh-questions in (13) and restric-
tive clauses in (14) are not obviously nominal, and yet are well-formed: 
 
(13) a.  Wherei did you put the keys ti? 
 b.  Wheni did you arrive ti? 
 c.  Howi did you travel ti? 
 
(14) a.  Matthew works [CP wherei you work ti ]. 
 b. Matthew laughs [CP wheni you laugh ti ].    
 c. Matthew sings [CP howi you sing ti ]. 
 
I will argue in Chapter 4 that wh-movement of these particular adverbials is possible be-
cause they produce structures in which there is abstraction over individuals: locations in 
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(13a) and (14a), times in (13b) and (14b), and event-kinds (following Landman and 
Morzycki 2003) in (13c) and (14c).14  
Further, there are structures in which VPs do appear to move, as the following 
fronting (or topicalization) structure illustrates: 
 
(15) … and [VP won the election], Mary did __.     
   
However, in just these fronting structures (as well as certain other movement structures, 
as discussed in Chapter 4), these phrases have been argued to syntactically occupy their 
unmoved position at LF, that is, they have been argued to syntactically reconstruct, based 
on their behavior with respect to Principle C (Cinque 1984; Barss 1986, 1988; Huang 
1993; Lebeaux 1990, Heycock 1995, Frampton 1999; Romero 1990, Fox 1999, among 
others). I will review the arguments for syntactic reconstruction for these cases in Chapter 
4, but note here that obligatory syntactic reconstruction for higher-type phrases would be 
expected if higher-type variables were disallowed at LF (as proposed in slightly different 
terms in Heycock 1995; see also Fox 1999, p. 171, fn. 41 with respect to how many-
questions, as well as Beck 1996). In this context, I will also review in Chapter 4 an alter-
native account of reconstruction that uses higher-type variables to interpret a moved 
higher-type constituent in its base position, i.e., semantic reconstruction (Rullman 1995, 
                                                 
14 I will look at non-restrictive relatives (Sells 1985, Potts 2002a, 2002b) and as-parentheticals (Potts 
2002a, 2002b), which both permit both AP and VP gaps, as (i) and (ii) below illustrate, in Chapter 4. 
 
(i) a. She was fond of her boy, which Theobald never was __.  (Sells 1985) 
 b. I can make words, which you cannot __.    
          
(ii) a. Ali was energized, as his trainer suggested he might be __. (Potts 2002a,b) 
 b. She could see the finish line, as Joan could __ too.    
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Cresti 1995, von Stechow 1991, among others), and more generally review the arguments 
for favoring syntactic reconstruction over semantic reconstruction.    
To sum up, this thesis posits a constraint on the possible semantic types of vari-
ables in the LFs of natural languages, in the form of NHTV. The bulk of the thesis will be 
devoted to backing up this claim by (i) showing that hypothetical higher-type variables 
are systematically missing, and (ii) looking closely at potential counterexamples on a 
case-by-case basis.  
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I review two 
precedents to NHTV, namely, Chierchia (1984) and Baker (2003). In Section 1.3, I spell 
out my basic theoretical assumptions for this thesis. Section 1.4 summarizes the chapter.  
In Chapter 2, I look closely at the syntax and semantics of a set of pro-forms that 
have the syntactic distribution of modifiers, in particular, APs and AdvPs. I start with an 
analysis of such as varying over individuals, following Carlson (1977b) (Section 2.2), 
and extend this analysis to analogous adverbial pro-forms, following Landman and 
Morzycki (2003) for German so and Polish tak, as well as to adnominal and adverbial like 
that in English (Sections 2.3 and 2.4). I then suggest similar analyses of predicative so 
(Section 2.5) and the VP pro-form, do so (Section 2.6). Section 2.7 concludes the chapter. 
In Chapter 3, I turn to VP and NP Ellipsis, reviewing the arguments against (and 
for) treating these cases as involving higher-type variables (Sections 3.2 and 3.3). I also, 
following Llombart-Huesca (2002), review and present some arguments for treating 
one(s)-anaphora as an instance of ellipsis (Section 3.4), and briefly review the e-type 
analysis of pronouns as involving deletion (as proposed in Elbourne 2002) (Section 3.5). 
Section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
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Finally, in Chapter 4, I support my claim that movement does not produce struc-
tures in which there is abstraction over higher-type, and that this restricts the types of 
movement constructions possible in English. I start by reviewing work on reconstruction 
(Section 4.1), to make clear what exactly is abstracted over at LF. I then look closely at 
the types of variables that may occur in wh-constructions (Section 4.2). Section 4.3 con-
cludes the chapter and the thesis.  
 
1.2 Precedents 
Both Chierchia (1984) and Baker (2003) propose constraints similar to NHTV. In the fol-
lowing sections, I will present the main points of each, and try to make clear the ways in 
which their proposals differ from my own. 
 
1.2.1 Property Theory and the ‘No Functor Anaphora’ Constraint 
The constraint proposed here, NHTV, can be viewed as a stricter version of the ‘no func-
tor anaphora’ constraint of Chierchia (1984). Chierchia’s constraint follows from the 
logic of the interpretive system he develops, which permits only variables ranging over 
individuals (type e) and predicates (type <e, t>). This has consequences for what vari-
able-denoting expressions are possible in a grammar, as Chierchia points out in the fol-
lowing:  
 
Saying that there are no variables of a certain logical type amounts to saying that we can-
not refer to arbitrary entities of that type. On the assumption that anaphoric processes in-
volve a capacity to refer to arbitrary entities in a given domain (formally represented by a 
notation with variables ranging over that domain) our system predicts that functors do not 
enter anaphoric processes in natural languages. Hence, we should expect that processes 
such as pronominalization, VP-deletion, wh-movement etc. never involve determiners, 
prepositions, adverbials, etc. It seems to me that there is something basically right about 
this generalization. For instance, in general determiners, prepositions, complementizers, 
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etc. do not undergo wh-movement and have no pro-forms. Similarly there is no analogue 
of VP-deletion or one-anaphora for these items. [Chierchia 1984: pp. 83-84] 
 
The main difference between Chierchia’s constraint and the one I am proposing here is 
that his allows for variables of type <e, t>, while mine does not. How, then, might the 
two constraints differ in their empirical predictions? There are some difficulties in trying 
answer this. In particular, in some interpretation systems (including Chierchia’s) certain 
properties correspond systematically to individuals (see the property theory of Chierchia 
1984, Chierchia and Turner 1986; see also Cresswell 1973). Under such a system, it 
could be hard to tell whether a given occurrence of an expression denotes a property or its 
individual correlate, and accordingly, whether a given occurrence of a variable denotes a 
property or its individual correlate. However, given that certain properties do not corre-
spond to individuals, one way of comparing the predictions of the two constraints is to try 
to test whether just those properties that do not correspond to individuals may bind or co-
refer with variable-denoting expressions. I will present two cases as arguments that these 
properties may not in fact bind variables. To spell this out more precisely, let me at this 
point review in more detail the basics of Chierchia’s system.  
In Chierchia’s system, properties may be systematically mapped to their individ-
ual correlates via a nominalization function, namely, the ‘down’ operator,  . Individuals 
may likewise be mapped to their corresponding properties via the inverse, predicator 
function: the ‘up’ operator, ⌦. The ‘down’ operator nominalizes, while the ‘up’ operator 
predicativizes.15 Thus, in this type of system, properties can be looked at from two differ-
ent points of view:  
 
                                                 
15 I postpone the formal definition of these operators that I will adopt here until Section 3.2.2 below. 
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Qua predicable entities, they appear to be essentially incomplete or “unsaturated” struc-
tures. Something like runs cannot stand by itself: it is a structure with a gap in it… So 
properties as predicables should be conceived as intrinsically incomplete, “gapped”, or 
“functional” structures… Properties, however can be “nominalized” and nominalized 
predicative expressions can be subjects in predication acts. This strongly suggests that the 
unsaturated structures associated with predicative expressions can somehow be “pro-
jected” as individuals, or have individual counterparts, which is what nominalized predi-
cative expressions refer to. So on this view, properties have two modes of being: one as 
“intrinsically functional” entities, the other as individuals systematically correlated to 
those entities. [Chierchia 1984, pp. 54-55]  
 
Take, for example, the property be nice. Used as a predicate, it can be taken to be of type 
<e, t>, mapping an individual to a truth value:  
 
(16) John is nice.       
 
Used as a subject, however – a gerund, for example – it may be taken to refer to an (ab-
stract) individual, the nominalization of be nice, so that itself may be predicated of an <e, 
t> type predicate:  
 
(17) Being nice is nice.      (Chierchia 1984) 
  
The system offers an elegant account of nominalization, as it makes possible a uniform 
treatment of predication: subjects are (generally) individuals, and predicates are (gener-
ally) properties. Further, this view of nominalization explains why certain expressions 
may not occur as subjects, e.g., I’, as in (18); if I’ necessarily denotes a property, and not 
an individual, the ill-formedness of this example follows. 
 
(18) *Is nice is nice.      (Chierchia 1984)  
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Returning to the issue at hand (i.e., whether properties that do not correspond to 
individuals may bind variables), a first example comes from I’. If an I’ necessarily corre-
sponds to a property, as (18) suggests, it then follows from NHTV that it should also have 
no corresponding pro-form, which appears to be the case, as (19) shows (I use that to rep-
resent a hypothetical, but non occurring pro-form):16  
 
(19) *John is being nicei, and Mary thati too. 
 
This, however, is admittedly not a very strong argument, since independent factors may 
certainly rule out pro-forms like the hypothetical that in (19). Further, I’s certainly may 
be unpronounced in many languages (e.g., English John is being nice, and Mary too), and 
these cases might be analyzed as variables, depending on whether or not there is evidence 
for treating them as cases of ellipsis. It would be interesting, though, to see whether any 
language uses overt pro-forms for I’. 
A second, and stronger example of a class of properties that do not correspond to 
individuals, nor bind variables, comes from the nominal domain: Carlson (1977b) ob-
serves that certain properties do not seem to have individual correlates, that is, they do 
not seem to correspond to kinds. The bare plurals in (20) are a case in point: 
                                                 
16 This is admittedly not a very strong argument, since independent factors may certainly rule out pro-forms 
like the hypothetical na in (19). Further, I’s certainly may be unpronounced in many languages (e.g., Eng-
lish John is being nice, and Mary too), and these cases might be analyzed as variables, depending on 
whether or not there is evidence for treating them as cases of ellipsis. It would be interesting to see whether 
any language uses overt pro-forms for I’. 
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(20) a. parts of that machine             (Carlson 1977b)             
 b. people in the next room 
 c. books that John lost yesterday 
 d. bears that are eating (now) 
 
These properties pick out classes of objects that “refer to a finite set of things… that must 
exist at a certain time in a given world.” Like I’s, they seem not to be in the domain of 
nominalization function,  . As Carlson observes, exactly these properties may not ante-
cede the pro-form such, a putative property-anaphor (see Chapter 2 for a more detailed 
discussion of such): 
 
(21) People in the next room… ??such people (are obnoxious) (Carlson 1977b)                      
 
Thus, it appears that the antecedents for such form the natural class of properties that 
have individual correlates. This falls out naturally from NHTV, and we would not expect 
the opposite state of affairs to hold, that is, to find a pro-form that could only be ante-
ceded by properties that do not correspond to kinds/individuals. Again, a constraint like 
Chierchia’s, which allows for property variables, would not rule out such pro-forms.  
A second strategy for teasing apart the predictions of the two constraints, as stated 
in the introduction, is to try to identify syntactic positions that must be occupied by prop-
erty-denoting expressions (but not their individual correlates), and to check whether pro-
forms or gaps may occupy those positions. I will note, here, however, that it is a problem 
for this strategy that even if a particular syntactic node can be assumed to require a prop-
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erty-denoting interpretation, there might still be a syntactic layer below that node which 
is individual-denoting, and sister to some covert functional structure which maps indi-
viduals to their corresponding predicates. For example, Kratzer (2005), following Krifka 
(1995) and Yang (1991) (and, originally, Carlson (1977b)), assumes that noun roots, 
stripped of their inflectional morphology, are kind-denoting. She further proposes, in the 
spirit of Krifka (1995) and Borer (2005), that English has an ambiguous, non-overt classi-
fier, which may map a kind-denoting noun root into a property of individuals that realize 
that kind, as illustrated in (22): 
 
(22) [NP  classifier  [N zebra]] 
 
Thus, “predicative count nouns are syntactically constructed from names of kinds with 
the help of classifiers” (Kratzer 2005, p. 7). This is relevant here, because even if NPs can 
be assumed to be property-denoting, a pro-form or trace with the syntactic distribution of 
an NP might itself not necessarily be property-denoting; the pro-form or trace might be 
individual-denoting, occupying some lower position in an NP, which is mapped to a 
predicate by a covert classifier. With such possibilities for covert functional structure, it 
is difficult to determine whether a pro-form is at heart individual-denoting or property-
denoting. I have no good solution for this difficulty at this time, except to keep it in mind 
when looking at pro-forms or gaps that have the distribution of higher-type constituents. 
In sum, NHTV may be seen as a stricter version of Chierchia’s ‘no functor 
anaphora’ constraint, as the latter permits variables ranging over individuals and proper-
ties, while the former permits only object language variables ranging over individuals. I 
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motivate this stricter constraint based on data that show that properties that do not corre-
spond to individuals may not bind variables, e.g., properties that do not correspond to 
kinds may not antecede the pro-form such. 
 
1.2.1.1 The ‘Problem of Adverbs’, and a Solution 
It is interesting that Chierchia suggests that only certain adverbs provide a counterexam-
ple to the No Functor Anaphora constraint:  
 
Items that might constitute a serious problem for the present hypothesis are obviously ad-
verbs. Adverbs seem to enter various anaphoric processes such as wh-movement or com-
parative formation, and to have pro-forms (thus, so)… 
 
 
Chierchia goes on to point out that only three types of adverbials are problematic: manner 
adverbials, locatives, and temporal modifiers correspond to pro-forms (thus, there, and 
then), while adverbs like again and almost do not. Building on Landman and Morzycki 
(2003), I will argue below that this is because it is exactly these three types of adverbials 
that correspond to individuals. Specifically, thus, there, and then denote variables event-
kinds, locations, and times, respectively.  
 
1.2.2 Baker (2003) 
Baker (2003) also proposes a restriction on possible pro-forms and gaps, namely, that 
only nouns (and their phrasal projections) can participate in anaphoric relations, that is, 
they alone may antecede or occur as pronouns or gaps (for Baker, traces):17  
 
                                                 
17 In Fall 2004, I was excited to find that Mark Baker independently came to similar conclusions about re-
strictions on pro-forms and traces in his 2003 book, Lexical Categories. It has since been very illuminating 
to think about the differences between his constraint and my own.  
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I therefore predict that there should be no such thing as “pro-adjectives” or “pro-verbs” in 
languages of the world that take part in anaphoric relationships with APs and VPs in the 
same way that pronouns enter into anaphoric relationships with NPs. Prima facie, this 
seems to be true: virtually every grammar has an index entry for pronouns, but very few 
mention pro-adjectives or pro-verbs. It is also perfectly possible to work on a language 
like Mohawk or Edo hard for more than five years and never encounter anything one is 
tempted to analyze in this way. (Edo is rich in proverbs, but that is another story.) [Baker 
2003, p. 129] 
 
Baker’s main interests lie in articulating the core differences among lexical categories; 
nouns, he argues, have a unique semantic property that permits them alone to antecede 
pronouns and traces. Following Geach (1962) and Gupta (1980), he takes nouns to differ 
from all other categories in having a criterion of identity: “the idea in a nutshell is that 
only common nouns have a component of meaning that makes it legitimate to ask 
whether some X is the same (whatever) as Y…” [Baker, p. 97]. To illustrate this point, he 
presents the contrast between the examples in (23) and those in (24), which show that 
nouns (whether singular, plural, mass, or abstract) may be used in the frame “X is the 
same __ as Y”, while adjectives and verbs (or their phrasal projections) may not (Geach 
1962): 
 
(23) a. That is the same man as you saw yesterday.  (Baker 2003) 
 b. Those are the same women as we saw last night. 
 c. That is the same water as was in the cup this morning. 
 d. We want to have the same liberty as they have. 
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(24) a. #That is the same long as this.    (Baker 2003) 
 b. #She is the same intelligent as he is. 
 c. #I saw Julia the same sing as Mary did. 
 d. #I watched Nicholas the same performs a stunt as Kate performed. 
  
He contends that although the examples in (24) would be ruled out on syntactic grounds, 
as only nouns may follow a determiner and adjective, these examples are further “seman-
tically incoherent”, as only nouns have a criterion of identity. Analyzing nouns in this 
way, he argues, explains those properties that set them apart from the other lexical cate-
gories. In particular, this explains why nouns alone: (i) support individuation and count-
ing (and thus may occur with number marking); (ii) may occur with quantifiers and de-
terminers; (iii) may antecede or occur as pronouns, reflexives and traces; and (iv) may 
serve as arguments of predicates. I will restrict the discussion here to the third property of 
nouns, i.e., that they alone participate in anaphora. Before looking at Baker’s empirical 
arguments for this position, a few comments can be made to compare his proposal to my 
own. The differences between the two proposals, I think, are subtle – the two in large part 
overlap in predictions – but they do differ. On the empirical side, his constraint predicts 
the absence of pro-forms that are syntactically non-nominal, while mine does not, and it 
does seem that such expressions do occur (e.g., adverbial thus). On the conceptual side, 
our proposals are alike in that they both attribute the potential to participate in anaphora 
as being tied to individual-hood, his via the criterion of identity. Our proposals differ, 
however, in that I do not assume that individuals are not necessarily linked to nominal 
meanings. For example, events – which are commonly used to model verbal meanings – 
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can be counted (Krifka 1992, Landman 1996), quantified (Berman, von Fintel 1994 and 
others), provide the reference for pro-forms and traces, and may serve as arguments of 
predicates (Chierchia 1984 and others). The situation is similar for degrees, which may 
also be counted, quantified, provide the reference of a pro-form or trace, and may serve 
as arguments of predicates, without necessarily being introduced by nouns. I will try to 
illustrate these points more clearly in the next sections by reviewing the empirical evi-
dence presented to support Baker’s view, concentrating here on the predictions his ac-
count makes for anaphora and movement. 
 
1.2.2.1 Anaphora 
Baker proposes that the fact that nouns have a criterion of identity is represented syntacti-
cally by indexing, so that nouns are the only lexical category to bear an index. As a result, 
only nouns may antecede pro-forms. He presents (25) and (29) to illustrate this: although 
both genitive nominals and nationality adjectives can express the agent in a nominaliza-
tion, as the examples in (25) show, only the genitive can antecede a pronoun, as the ex-
ample in (26) shows (Kayne 1984). 
 
(25) a. Abania’s resistance      (Baker 2003) 
 b. the Albanian resistance 
 
 (26) a. Albaniai’s destruction of itselfi grieved the expatriate community. 
 b. *The Albaniani destruction of itselfi grieved the expatriate community. 
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These sorts of examples come from Kayne (1984) (as Baker points out) who concluded 
from them that adjectives cannot bind pro-forms of a different syntactic category; this 
conclusion seems to me plausible here, and would be consistent with my own proposal. 
Baker, in contrast, suggests that these examples follow from his theory of nouns, since 
nouns alone may bear a referential index. However, to rule out Kayne’s type of explana-
tion, one would want to make sure that there are also no pro-forms which themselves 
have the distribution of adjectives and verbs, which Baker does claim to be the case. He 
looks in detail at two candidates in English, so, which appears to have the distribution of 
a predicate AP (Corver 1997), as (27) shows, and VP Ellipsis, which appears to have the 
distribution of a VP, as (28) shows, and argues that neither in fact present counterexam-
ples to his proposal.  
 
(27) a. Chris is bravei, and Pat seems soi too.   (Baker 2003)  
  b. I consider Chris intelligenti, and Mary considers Pat soi. 
 
(28) Chris will solve the problemi, and Pat will Øi too.  (Baker 2003) 
 
So, he argues, is not actually an AP pro-form, as it does not quite have the distribution of 
an AP. In particular, unlike APs, so may not occur as a resultative secondary predicate:18 
 
                                                 
18 He also points out that adjectives can be pre-nominal, whereas so cannot, as (i) shows, but it likely that in 
these cases so alternates as such (see Chapter 2.)  
 
(i) *Mary is an intelligent woman, and John is a so man. 
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(29) a. ??John beat the iron flati and Mary beat the copper soi. (Baker 2003) 
 b. ?*The chair is already cleani, and Chris will wipe the table soi too. 
 
He proposes instead that so functions a pro-PredP, where PredP is a functional projection 
that dominates an AP in examples like (29a) and (b) above.19 It is unclear from Baker’s 
discussion, however, how PredP would be nominal.  
Baker also argues that VP Ellipsis is not a pro-form at all, but instead has internal 
syntactic structure. As he points out, although there are parallels between VP Ellipsis and 
pronominal anaphora, there is evidence that VP Ellipsis should not be analyzed as a vari-
able over VP meanings. I will take this up again in Chapter 3.  
Baker does not look closely at some of the other potential non-nominal pro-forms 
mentioned above. Expressions such as adverbial so in English, whose analogue in Polish 
(tak), for example, does not inflect as a nominal (Landman and Morzycki 2003; see Sec-
tion 2.4 below), it seems would be problematic for his proposal, unless these pro-forms 
could be argued to be nominal  
 
1.2.2.2 Movement 
It follows from Baker’s theory of lexical categories that only NPs should be able to move, 
as only they can bind traces. In support of this, he observes that NPs can undergo certain 
movement operations that APs and VPs may not. For instance, restrictive relatives (30), 
                                                 
19 It is unclear to me that this ‘inverted’ use of so is actually a pro-form, and not something more like the 
expression too. The following examples suggest that the inverted so may be compatible with the pro-VP do 
so, suggesting that this so is more like too:  
 
(i) a. ?Chris is protesting, and so is Pat doing so. 
 b. Chris is protesting, and Pat is doing so, too.  
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clefts (31), and tough-movement (32), he observes, do not allow for gaps corresponding 
to APs or VPs (examples based on Baker’s): 
 
(30) Relative Clauses 
 a. *I am not cleveri that he is ti.     AP 
 b. *Mary will singi that Pat will ti.     VP 
 
(31) Clefts 
 a. ??It’s smarti that Chris is ti.     AP  
 b. *It’s singi that Mary will ti.     VP 
 
(32) Tough-Movement 
 a. ??Contenti is hard to be ti.      AP  
 b. *Solve this problemi is hard to make them ti.   VP 
 
In contrast, wh-questions, fronting, and so-called though-movement do seem to permit 
AP and VP gaps: 
 
(33) Wh-Questions 
 a. How talli is Chris ti?       AP 
 b. (none)        VP 
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(34) Fronting 
 a. …hard-workingi, he is ti.      AP 
 b. …and clean his roomi he did ti.     VP   
 
(35) Though-Movement 
 a. Hard-workingi though he is ti…     AP  
 b. Solve this problemi though he did ti…    VP 
 
Baker proposes explaining this contrast by distinguishing the syntax of these two sets of 
wh-constructions: the former involve null operator movement from the gap within the 
embedded clause, while the latter are instances of copy movement. In effect, only the 
former set of cases necessitate operator-variable binding structures, and since only NPs 
bear referential indices, no other category may correspond to the bindee in these struc-
tures. In contrast, copy movement, Baker assumes, does not require operator-variable 
binding, which is why AP and VP movement is permitted for the latter set of cases.  
My own explanation of these facts, as mentioned above, will be quite similar: 
those instances of movement that involve variable binding at LF do not permit binding of 
higher-type variables; this rules out, e.g., the examples in (30).20 I will, however, assume 
that wh-constructions may be analyzed as instances of copy-movement and be semanti-
cally interpreted as operator-variable structures (Chomsky 1995, Rullman and Beck 1998, 
Sauerland 1998, 2004, Fox 2000). Further, I will assume that examples like (33a) are 
cases of pied-piping, and involve reconstruction at LF, so that the variable abstracted 
                                                 
20 I will not look closely at clefts in this thesis, but hope to return to these important cases in future work. 
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over for such questions ranges over degrees, construed as individuals, and not AP mean-
ings (presumably, properties of individuals); wh-questions, then, for me, do involve op-
erator-variable binding.  
In sum, Baker and I propose similar constraints, which limit the types of pro-
forms and movement constructions expected to occur in natural language. Baker states 
his claim syntactically, i.e., no NP anaphora, but what follows from his semantic criterion 
of identity criterion may amount to the constraint I argue for here, NHTV.  
 
1.3 Theoretical Framework 
I will assume in large part the compositional, type-driven framework articulated in Heim 
and Kratzer (1998). In this system, the semantic component directly interprets phrase 
structure trees, or, more specifically, Logical Forms (LFs). LFs are disambiguated repre-
sentations, which, in addition to representing syntactic structure, mark anaphoric relations 
by co-indexing, and represent quantifier scope as the result of a rule of Quantifier Raising 
(QR). When QR occurs, an indexed trace occupies the base position of the moved con-
stituent, and an index binding that trace is adjoined to the sister of the moved constituent 
(but see discussion of reconstruction in Section 4.2 below). The LF of (36a), for example, 
is (minimally) that in (36b): 
 
(36) a. Maria described every guest. 
 b. LF: [IP [DP every guest] 1 [IP Maria [VP described t1]].  
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In the tradition of Montague, expressions are categorized by their semantic type: 
assuming as the two basic types individuals (type e) and truth values (type t), the inven-
tory of possible semantic types and their denotation domains can be defined recursively, 
as in (37). 
 
(37) Semantic Types 
 a. e and t are semantic types. 
 b. If a and b are semantic types, then <a,b> is a semantic type. 
 c. If a is a type, then <s, a> is a type. 
 d. Nothing else is a type.  
 
 Semantic Denotation Domains 
 a. De := D (the set of individuals). 
 b. Dt := {0,1}  (the set of truth values). 
 c. For any semantic types ⌃ and ⌥, D<⌃,⌥> is the set of all functions from D⌃ to D⌥.  
 
The interpretation function, || ||, assigns to each syntactic node of type a an ele-
ment of Da, with respect to a variable assignment, g. The interpretation function is de-
fined by the following rules of semantic composition, from Heim and Krazter (1998).  
 
(38) Lexical Terminals 
If ⇥ is a terminal node occupied by a lexical item, then ||⇥|| is specified in the 
lexicon. 
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(39) Non-Branching Nodes 
If ⇥ is a non-branching node, and ⇤ is its daughter, then, for any assignment g, ⇥ 
is in the domain of || ||g if ⇤ is. In this case, ||⇥||g = ||⇤||g. 
 
(40) Functional Application 
If ⇥ is a branching node and {⇤, ⌅} the set of its daughters, then, for any 
assignment g, ⇥ is in the domain of || ||g is both ⇤ and ⌅ are, and ||⇤||g is a function 
whose domain contains ||⌅||g. In this case, ||⇥||g = ||⇤||g(||⌅||g). 
 
(41) Predicate Modification 
If ⇥ is a branching node and {⇤, ⌅} the set of its daughters, then, for any 
assignment g, ⇥ is in the domain of || ||g if both ⇤ and ⌅ are, and ||⇤||g and ||⌅||g are 
both of type <e,t>. In this case, ||⇥||g = ⇧x : x ↵ D . and x is in the domain of ||⇤||g 
and ||⌅||g. ||⇤||g = ||⌅||g = 1.  
 
 (42) Predicate Abstraction 
Let ⇥ be a branching node whose daughters are ⇤ and ⌅, where ⇤ dominates a 
numerical index i or indexed wh-word, whi.  
Then, for any variable assignment g, ||⇥||g = ⇧x : x ↵D and ⌅ is in the domain of || 
||g[x/i] . ||⌅||g[x/i]. 
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These rules of composition, together with the assumption that phrase structure trees are at 
most binary branching, ensure an extensional, compositional, type-driven semantic inter-
pretation system.  
 
1.3.1 The Domain of Individuals 
Because my analysis rests on the assumption that D is multi-sorted, this section spells out 
in more detail my assumptions about what constitutes D. 
 
1.3.1.1 Plural Individuals 
Following Link (1983), I will assume that D contains both singular and plural individu-
als. That is, D forms a complete atomic join semi-lattice, ordered by the ‘part of’ relation, 
≤, as illustrated in (43). 
 
(43)          a+b+c   … 
       a+b          a+c   b+c  … 
  a b c  … 
 
In the structure above, a, b, and c are atomic (or singular) individuals, + is an individual 
sum operator, and the lines represent the part of relation. Expressions denoting atomic 
individuals include names of individuals such as John and Mary, as well as singular pro-
nouns like he or she. Expressions denoting plural individuals include plural definite de-
scriptions such as the boys and the girls, as well as plural pronouns like they or them. 
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1.3.1.2 Kinds as Individuals 
I will also assume that the domain of individuals, D, includes kinds (Carlson 1977b, 
Krifka et al. 1995, and references therein). Following Krifka et al. (1995), I will model 
kinds as pluralities, the sum of all instances of the kind. For example, the dog-kind, DOG, 
is the sum of all dogs.21 Kinds may be mapped to properties of individuals that instantiate 
them, via the predicativizing operator, ⌦, which can be defined as follows:  
 
(44) Predicativization 
Let k be a kind. Then, ⌦k = [⇧x . x ≤ k]. 
 
Similarly, properties may be mapped to kinds by the nominalizing operator,  , defined as 
follows:  
 
(45) Nominalization 
For any property P,  P = the largest member of P, if the largest member of P is a 
kind; undefined, otherwise. 
 
In line with Carlson (1977b) and Chierchia (1995), I will assume what qualifies as a kind 
is broad and often context-dependent:  
 
By ‘natural’ kinds, we do not necessarily mean… just biological ones or even ‘well-
established’ ones. Artifacts (like chairs or cars) or complex things (like intelligent stu-
dents or spots of ink) can qualify as kinds, to the extent that we can impute to them a suf-
ficiently regular behavior (cf. on this Carlson1977b, pp. 26ff. and Krifka et al. 1995). 
                                                 
21 This construal of kinds is a simplification, as dinds are almost certainly in fact intensional items; I believe 
that this does not matter for my purposes here. 
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What counts as kind is not set by grammar, but by the shared knowledge of a community 
of speakers. It thus varies, to a certain degree, with the context, and remains somewhat 
vague. Lexical nouns identify kinds. Complex nouns may or may not. [Chierchia 1998] 
 
Some complex nouns, then, may correspond to kinds, while others may not, depending 
on the context in which they are used. When a complex noun does not correspond to a 
kind, e.g., people in the next room, it can be assumed to be out of the domain of the down 
operator.  
 
1.4 Summary 
This concludes Chapter 1. In the following chapters, I will present a case for NHTV, by 
(i) looking at potential counterexamples on a case-by-case basis, and (ii) showing that 
hypothetical higher-type variables are systematically missing.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
PRO-FORMS AND VARIABLES: SUCH AND ITS KIN 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, I will look at the syntax and semantics of a set of pro-forms that have the 
syntactic distribution of higher-type expressions – adjectives and adverbs, in particular – 
and thus make good candidates for higher-type variables. The focus will be the English 
word such (Bolinger 1972, Bresnan 1973, Carlson 1977b, Siegel 1994, Wood 2002), and 
what are arguably related forms. These cases are illustrated in the following examples, 
repeated from (6) – (9) above:  
 
(46) Those littlei cars look good, but few suchi cars are safe.    AP 
(47) You have to dance this dance with a definite sense of pride and haughtinessi, and 
if danced thusi/soi, the dance will be beautiful.    AdvP 
(48) Whenever Sophie starts laughingi, Bill does soi too.    VP 
(49) I thought she would be happyi, but she certainly doesn’t seem soi.  AP 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I will argue that 
such is best analyzed as associated with a variable that ranges over individuals, following 
Carlson (1977b), and contra Siegel (1994), who analyzes such as a property variable. In 
Section 2.3, I will extend this analysis of such to the semantics of its informal paraphrase, 
adnominal like that.  
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In Section 2.4, following Landman and Morzycki (2003), I will also extend this 
analysis of such to its adverbial analogues in Polish and German, tak and so, with the re-
sult that these too vary over individuals. In Section 2.5, I will compare the semantics of 
tak and so to adverbial like that in English.  
Finally, in Sections 2.6 and 2.7, I will suggest that other instances of so in Eng-
lish, namely the so of do so, as well as predicative so (e.g., She seems so), also share a 
semantics with such, so that all of these cases receive a unified semantics. 
In each case, I re-examine the evidence for treating these expressions as higher-
type variables and conclude that they in fact instead vary over individuals.  
 
2.2 What’s Such?  
Such, at least at first sight, is a very good candidate for a higher-type variable. Syntacti-
cally, it appears to be adjectival, as it may occur between a determiner and a noun, a posi-
tion commonly taken to be reserved for adjectives (or adjectival projections): 
 
(50) Several/many/three/few/most/many such mistakes were found. 
 
Semantically, it appears to be able to pick up the reference of a preceding adjective, as 
the following examples illustrate:  
 
(51) a. Nicei people... suchi people... 
 b. Littlei dogs...  suchi dogs…             
 c. Strangei ideas... suchi ideas... 
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Assuming that adjectives like nice, tall, and strange – at least at the level of their maxi-
mal projections – denote properties, these examples suggest a treatment of such as a vari-
able ranging over properties. An analysis along these lines is in fact proposed in Siegel 
(1994). However, in the spirit of Carlson (1977b), I will look at evidence that such is not 
a property variable. Rather, it is associated at LF with a variable that varies over either (i) 
kinds (construed here as individuals) or (ii) object individuals that instantiate kinds.  
 
2.2.1 Setting aside the Ambiguity 
Before looking further at such, it will be useful to first set aside a use of such that I will 
not be concerned with here. The word such in English often gives rise to ambiguous sen-
tences (Bolinger 1972, Bresnan 1973), as (52) illustrates:  
 
(52) Hilda is such a scholar.     (Bresnan 1973) 
 
On one reading, (52) might be paraphrased as ‘Hilda is that kind of scholar’ or ‘Hilda is a 
scholar like that’, and on a second reading, as ‘Hilda is so much of a scholar’ or ‘Hilda is 
very much a scholar’. Following the terminology of Bresnan (1973), I will refer to the 
first use of such as ‘kind’ such, and the second as ‘degree’ such.22 I will for the most part 
only be concerned with kind such here, since that is the use on which such acts like an 
adjectival pro-form (i.e., varies depending on its linguistic environment). In order to iso-
late this use of such, it will be useful to point out some systematic differences between 
the two uses; the remainder of this section is devoted to this end.  
                                                 
22 Bolinger (1972) uses the terms ‘identifier’ such and ‘intensifier’ such, respectively. 
 36 
There are a number of properties that distinguish kind and degree such, and they 
are to some extent in complementary distribution. For instance, when such occurs with a 
that-clause, only its degree reading is available: 
 
(53) Hilda is such a scholar that all her work is impeccable.      (Bresnan 1973) 
 
In contrast, when such occurs with an as-clause, only its kind reading is available:  
 
(54) Hilda is such a scholar as you were speaking of just now.    (Bresnan 1973) 
 
The two uses also differ in the types of nominals they may modify: the degree use 
of such is only available when such modifies a gradable predicate, while the kind use of 
such is not subject to this restriction (Bolinger 1972).23 For example, compare the am-
biguous sentences in (55) with the unambiguous examples in (56).  
 
(55) a. Such strange theories have become quite popular.     
b. We have made such mistakes.   
 
(56) a. Such theories have become quite popular.  
b. We have found such evidence.  
 
                                                 
23 I assume a gradable nominal is one that either contains a gradable adjective, i.e., an adjective that may 
occur with degree morphemes like so, too, or as e.g., strange) or a gradable noun (e.g., mistake, loudmouth. 
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In (55a-b), such occurs with a gradable predicate, e.g., strange theories and mis-
takes, respectively, and as a result both readings are available. In contrast, in (56a-b), 
such occurs with a non-gradable nominal (e.g., theories, evidence), and only the kind 
reading is available.  
The two uses also differ with respect to the determiners with which they may co-
occur. Only identifier such may occur between a determiner and a noun, as the following 
unambiguous examples illustrate:  
 
(57) We have made {three/few/most/many} such mistakes. 
 
Both uses may, however, occur in bare, i.e., determinerless, DPs, e.g., such mistakes, and 
both uses may occur with the singular indefinite, e.g., such a scholar. In the latter case, 
both uses must (infamously) occur before the indefinite determiner a, a peculiar, and of-
ten observed, fact: 
 
(58) *Hilda is a such scholar. 
 
I will not attempt to account for this curious property of such in this work, except to note, 
as have many others, that DegP’s also display this distribution:24  
 
                                                 
24 Further, neither use of such can occur with a definite determiner (including possessives): 
 
(i) *the/those/john’s such mistake 
 
See further discussion in Section 2.2.7 below. 
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(59) a. Bill is that tall/too big/so boring/as smart a linguist.  
 b. *Bill is a that tall/too big/so boring/as smart linguist.  
 
The two uses are also pronounced differently: degree such always bears a pitch 
accent, while kind such may, but need not.  
Finally, kind such is of a formal register, while degree such is common in both in-
formal and formal speech. In informal speech, the expressions like that or of that kind are 
preferred in place of kind such, so that, for example, such theories could be more infor-
mally paraphrased as theories like that or theories of that kind. 
To sum up, the two uses of such can be distinguished by the following properties: 
(i) kind such takes a subordinate as-clause, while degree such takes a subordinate that-
clause; (ii) degree such only occurs with gradable nominals; (iii) kind such may occur 
between a determiner and a noun, while degree such may not; (iv) degree such bears a 
pitch accent, while kind such may not; and (v) kind such is of a formal register, while de-
gree such is not.  
Although I will only be analyzing the kind use of such, it is an interesting ques-
tion how these two uses of such are semantically related. The two uses are at least his-
torically related, with kind such predating intensifier such (Schiller and Need 1992; 
Roger Higgins, p.c.).25 I will set this issue aside here, however, and henceforth simply use 
such to refer to kind such (see, though, Landman and Morzycki (2003) for speculation on 
                                                 
25
 Bolinger sees the semantics of degree such as derived from kind such: “...the identifier has fallen out of 
many contexts except in formal register, giving way to the intensifier, probably because the ‘suchness’ of 
something is so likely to be an intensifiable characteristic. We begin by viewing it as pointed to, and end by 
viewing it as worthy of note, hence as enhanced.”  
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the connection between kind such and degree such, in the context of a concrete proposal 
for the semantics of kind such) 
 
2.2.2 Syntax of Such 
Carlson (1977b), building on Bresnan (1973), shows that such in many respects displays 
the distribution of a Deg~A sequence, e.g., so tall, where so is a Deg and tall is an A 
(other Degree words include e.g., that, too, so, as, how, and –er). I will follow Carlson 
and Bresnan in assigning to such the same syntax as these Deg~A sequences, which I will 
refer to as degree constructions.  
The syntax of degree constructions has received a good amount of attention in the 
literature, and a number of different analyses have been proposed to account for them. I 
will adopt here what Bhatt and Pancheva (2004) refer to as the classical view, according 
to which Degree words head a DegP that occupies the specifier of AP (see Chomsky 
1965, Selkirk 1970, Bresnan 1973, Heim 2000, and others, and cf. Abney 1987, Corver 
1990, 1997, Grimshaw 1991, Kennedy 1999, who take DegP to be the functional projec-
tion of AP):  
 
(60)   AP 
     3 
 DegP           A’ 
             4              4  
  that          tall 
 
I will adopt an analogous syntax for such. Specifically, I will posit for such the structure 
in (61), in which it is composed of two parts: the Degree word so – which is associated 
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with an index, reasons for which will be spelled out in the following section – and the 
adjective like:  
 
(61)   AP (= such) 
     3 
 DegP           A’ 
              4            4  
   soi         like 
 
Further, in line with Svenonius (1993), I assume that APs may adjoin to NP:  
 
(62)         DP 
                 wo 
            D                      NP 
                 g               wo 
             most         AP (=such)  NP 
           3     g 
       DegP     A’          attempts 
                       g               4  
           soi   like 
 
This syntax for such is in accord with its historical development, as such derives from the 
Germanic compound *swa+lk, “so-like” (Higgins, p.c.). My main justification for this 
decomposition of such is that it will put such compositionally on a par with other degree 
constructions (e.g., that tall, so tall, as tall); this, I will argue, explains certain syntactic 
and semantic parallels between such and other Degree expressions such as so, as, and –
er, and how. This construal of such will also help elucidate its relation to its more collo-
quial paraphrase, like that, as the demonstrative that and the posited so appear to make 
the same semantic contribution (see Section 2.3). I will motivate this syntax for such in 
the remainder of this section, by showing that such has the distribution of a degree con-
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struction; evidence that such has this internal structure will come from looking at its se-
mantics, which I will justify in Sections 2.2.2-2.2.5. I will note here, however, that this 
particular construal of such does not have bearing on the main claim of this thesis, which 
is that such varies over individuals; other accounts of the syntax of such could easily 
maintain that it varies over individuals, without positing the abstract decomposition in 
(61).    
Siegel (1994) argues against the complex AP syntax for such, proposing instead 
that such has the distribution of a simple adjective: 
 
(63)              DP 
                 wo 
            D                      NP 
                 g               wo 
             most          A   NP 
                 g                g 
             such          attempts 
 
I will, however, motivate the complex AP analysis here because (i) my intuitions are 
more in line with the data Carlson presents in favor of that analysis, than with Siegel’s 
counterarguments, as I will show in the remainder of this section, and (ii) as stated above, 
treating such as complex AP will make it possible to provide a semantic account of such 
parallel to that of other degree construction, as well as to its informal paraphrase, like 
that. The remainder of this section reviews the syntactic evidence for the complex AP 
analysis of such.  
There are several ways in which such behaves like a complex AP, and unlike a 
simple adjective. First, just as complex APs must precede all other modifiers of the head 
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noun, as (64) shows (i.e., the AP sicker must precede the modifier fat), so must such, as 
(65) shows.  
 
(64) a. He is a sicker fat boxer than I had remembered.  (Carlson 1977b) 
 b. *He is a fat sicker boxer than I had remembered 
 
(65) a. I prefer such Kiswahili textbooks. 
 b. *I prefer Kiswahili such textbooks. 
 
Simple adjectives, in contrast, may often precede or follow other modifiers (although 
there are some well-known restrictions on their ordering): 
 
(66) a. He is a sick fat boxer.     (Carlson 1977b) 
 b. He is a fat sick boxer. 
 
Second, just as complex APs may not co-occur with one another, as (67) shows, 
such cannot modify an NP that already contains another complex AP, as (68) shows. 
 
(67) a. *They are fat enough sicker boxers.   (Carlson 1977b) 
 b. *They are sicker fat enough boxers. 
 
(68) a. *They are quicker such rabbits.    (Carlson 1977b) 
 b. *They are such quicker rabbits. 
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Simple adjectives, in contrast, may co-occur with complex APs:  
 
(69) They are quicker brown rabbits.     
  
Third, like (at least some) other complex APs, such is positioned to the left of the 
indefinite determiner a:26 
 
(70) a. Bill is that tall/too big/so boring/as smart a linguist. 
 b. *Bill is a that tall/too big/so boring/as smart linguist. 
 
(71) a. Such a man was here earlier. 
 b. *A such man was here earlier. 
 
Simple adjectives of course do not occur in this position: 
 
(72) a. A well-dressed man was here earlier. 
b. *Well-dressed a man was here earlier. 
 
Fourth, such, like other DegPs, may not occur with the definite determiner, the 
(Bresnan 1973):27 
                                                 
26 I will not attempt an explanation of this puzzling property of such here. Roger Higgins (p.c.) suggests 
that the inversion (both for such as well as complex APs like so big) may due historically to the 
phonological ill-formedness of having two adjacent phonologically weak functional heads. For example, so 
big a boy would be a so big boy without inversion, which results in a and so being adjacent. See Section 
2.2.7 for a brief discussion of the semantics of this construction.  
 44 
(73) *Bill is the that tall/too big/so boring/as smart linguist. 
(74) *The such man was here earlier. 
 
Simple adjectives are fine with the definite determiner: 
  
(75) The young man was here earlier.  
 
Finally, such, like other Degree words, may take what appears to be an optional 
clausal complement that has the structure of a relative clause: 
 
(76) a. Bill is too tall a player for us to have on the team.          (Carlson 1977b) 
 b. Smarter men than we have seen today do exist. 
 c. Bill is as nice as Julie is. 
d. Such people as we have seen today should be given a second chance. 
 
To summarize, such is like a complex AP, and unlike a simple adjective, in that it 
(i) must precede other nominal modifiers, (ii) cannot co-occur with other complex APs, 
(iii) precedes the indefinite determiner, a, (iv) may not occur with the definite determiner 
the, and (v) occurs with an optional complement clause that has the structure of a relative 
clause.  
Siegel finds the sentences in (65b) and (68) acceptable, and concludes that such is 
a simple adjective. Although Carlson and Siegel disagree over sentences that are some-
                                                                                                                                                 
27 The incompatibility of DegPs with the definite determiner is probably a semantic issue, and not a syntac-
tic one, but the parallel still holds.  
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times rather hard to judge, I find my own intuitions more in line with Carlson’s, and so 
will adopt his syntax. Further, as stated above, this syntax will make possible a composi-
tional semantics for such straightforwardly parallel to degree constructions, as well as to 
its informal paraphrase, like that (as shown at the end of the next section, Section 2.2.3.)  
 
2.2.3 Semantics of Such 
As observed above, examples like the following (repeated from above) suggest an ac-
count of such as a property variable, as such appears to pick up the reference of a preced-
ing adjective:  
 
(51) a. Nice people... such people... 
 b. Little dogs...  such dogs…             
 c. Strange ideas... such ideas... 
 
In fact, as Carlson observes, such appears to be able to pick up the reference of virtually 
any sort of NP modifier, “be it adjective, PP, relative clause, or participle.” He provides 
the following examples:   
 
(77) a. Old ladies… such ladies…    (Carlson 1977b) 
 b. People owning dogs... such dogs... 
 c. Cats without tails… such cats… 
 d. People who eat fish… such people… 
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These examples suggest a treatment of such as a property variable, taking as its value a 
property that corresponds to an expression that may modify a nominal, e.g., an AP, PP, 
CP, or gerund.28  
There are, however, several empirical problems for this sort of approach, as both 
Carlson and Siegel observe. For one, such seems to be able to pick up the reference of 
constituents that are not modifiers. For example, in the following, such seems to refer 
back to whole DPs:  
 
(78) a. “Honest money lenders? There are no such people.” 
 b. “... with politicians, journalists, and other such important personages.” 
       (Carlson 1977b), attributed to Jespersen (1927) 
  
Examples like these, as both Carlson and Siegel conclude, suggest that whole DPs – and 
not just nominal modifiers – antecede such. Thus, in an example like (51a), repeated be-
low, the antecedent of such would be the whole DP nice people, and not just the modifier 
nice: 
 
(51) a. Nice people... such people... 
    
Carlson and Siegel, however, draw different conclusions about the semantics of such 
from these sorts of examples. Siegel argues that such is indeed a property variable, but 
                                                 
28 Note that since there is no formal way to distinguish properties denoted by modifiers (e.g., tall) from 
properties denoted by nominals (e.g, women), there is nothing here that would ensure that such would be 
assigned an adjectival property rather than a nominal property. This point will be relevant for the discussion 
of Siegel’s account of such below. 
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subject to the restriction that its syntactic antecedent must be a common noun phrase 
(here, an NP, given the DP hypothesis), and not an AP. NPs, like APs, are commonly 
taken to denote properties; thus, by Siegel’s account, such would be a property variable, 
but require an NP antecedent. For example, the antecedent for such in (78) and (51a) 
would be whatever corresponds to an NP in a bare plural (there are numerous proposals 
about the syntax of bare plurals, so this could be, e.g., either the bare plural itself, or 
some layer within a bare plural). Siegel supports this account of such with the contrast 
between (79a-b) below: (79b) would be judged bad because in it the NP tall men co-
refers with such, with the result that such women yields the intersection of ‘the contradic-
tory predicates woman, and tall man.’  
 
(79) a. All tall men believe that employers prefer such people. S., [28] 
 b. *All tall men believe that employers prefer such women.  
 
The main problem with this analysis, however, is that not just any nominal may antecede 
such, as Carlson observes. In particular, nominals denoting properties that do not corre-
spond to kinds do not make good antecedents for such, which suggests that such is ana-
phoric not to a property, but to a kind. Consider, for instance, the following examples, in 
which such is used infelicitously; note that intuitively, these examples are judged unac-
ceptable because the anteceding bare plurals do not provide enough information about a 
kind (of people, elephants, men, or quarters) to permit the use of such; for instance, (80a) 
is judged ungrammatical because people in the next room does not provide enough in-
formation about a kind of people to permit the use of such. 
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(80) a. People in the next room… ??such people (are obnoxious)   
 b. Elephants that are standing there… ??such elephants 
 c. Men that Jan fired this morning… ??such men 
 d. Quarters that I put in the meter yesterday… ??such quarters  
                (Carlson 1977b)                      
 
However, (80a) may in fact be judged acceptable if further information from the linguis-
tic or non-linguistic context makes salient a kind of people. Consider, for example, a con-
text in which the people in the next room happen to be making a lot of noise. The follow-
ing might then be uttered, in which such is used acceptably:29 
 
(81) I can’t stand the people in the next room. Such people are obnoxious.   
 
Importantly, in this context, people in the next room can be used to recover a kind from 
the context, namely, the kind LOUD PEOPLE, and as a result such may be used to pick out 
this kind of people. The important point here is that a kind of people cannot be made sali-
                                                 
29 Thanks to Angelika Kratzer for pointing out examples like (81), in which an instance of a kind appears to 
antecede such. She suggests based on these examples that such is associated with an object variable that 
instantiates a kind; see further discussion on this issue immediately below. Barbara Partee (p.c.) provides 
similar examples in which expressions denoting object individuals – and not kind -- appears to either ante-
cede or make salient a kind for such: 
 
(i) a. Two men came in. I had never seen such men before. 
 b. War and Peace, Gone With the Wind, and other such hefty classics… 
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ent just by virtue of their being in the next room. Rather, some kind of people must be 
made salient to permit the use of such.30  
Kinds, for Carlson, are modeled as a special type of individual in D (see again 
Section 1.3.1.2 for my assumptions about the representation of kinds). Linguistic expres-
sions that denote kinds – bare plurals, for example – have unique properties, which the 
bare plurals in (80) do not share. For instance, only kind-denoting bare plurals may occur 
as arguments to the so-called kind-level predicates, e.g., extinct, widespread, common, 
and rare. While bare plurals are generally fine as arguments to these predicates, as (82) 
shows, the bare plurals in (80) are odd, as (83) shows.  
 
(82) a. People are common. 
b. Elephants are extinct. 
 c. Men are widespread. 
 d. Quarters are rare. 
 
(83) a. ??Polar bears in the next room are extinct. 
b. ??Elephants that are standing there are widespread.  
c. ??Men that Jan fired this morning are common. 
d. ??Quarters that I put in the meter yesterday are rare. 
 
Carlson suggests that what blocks the bare plurals in (83) – those that may not antecede 
such – from denoting kinds is that they “refer to a finite set of things, which must exist at 
                                                 
30 Siegel judges these examples grammatical, and so sees such as denoting a semantically unrestricted prop-
erty variable. However, from her discussion, it seems that she finds these examples judged grammatical in 
exactly those contexts in which a kind would be made salient. 
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a certain time in a given world.” Such a closed class of individuals does not make for a 
good kind.  
In light of these facts, Carlson proposes analyzing such as a property of individu-
als that instantiate a free variable ranging over kinds, as (84) illustrates:31,32  
 
(84) ||suchi||
g = ⇧x . x ≤ g(i) 
 
Note that this denotation for such does not violate NHTV; although such itself is of a 
higher-type, the variable it contains is itself of type e, assuming that kinds are modeled as 
individuals. Such, thus, although of a higher-type, varies only over individuals. Given the 
semantics in (84), such may combine with the nominal it modifies by Predicate Modifi-
cation, yielding, e.g., in (85), a property of individuals that both instantiate a contextually 
salient kind and are dogs: 
 
(85) ||suchi dogs||
g = ⇧x . x ≤ g(i) & dogs(x) 
                                                 
31 I will decompose this semantics for such below, to fit the syntax in (61), where such is analyzed as the 
composition of so and like. However, at the level of AP, the semantics I adopt will be as stated here.   
 
32 Carlson’s semantics for such in fact includes a presupposition that I have left out here, specifically, under 
Carlson’s account, the value of the variable associated with such must be subkind of whatever kind corre-
sponds to the nominal such modifies. This is to account for the contrast in (i):  
 
(i) a. German Shepards… such dogs…    (Carlson 1977b) 
 b. #Dogs… such German Shepards… 
 
 (ib) is predicted to be a presupposition failure, since GERMAN SHEPARDS, the value assigned to such, is not 
subkind of the kind DOGS. I have chosen to leave out this pressuposition here, due to counterexamples like 
(ii): 
 
(ii) Longhaired dogs can be difficult to brush. Such cats are even worse. 
 
CATS of course could not be a subkind of DOGS, but the example nevertheless is grammatical. 
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Expressions occurring higher in the nominal projection (determiners, for example) may 
then combine semantically with this property:33,34  
 
(86) ||all such dogs||g = ⇧f<e,t> . for all x such that x is a dog, f(x) = 1.  
 
This account of such, in effect, explains the unacceptable examples in (80): be-
cause such contains a kind variable, it may not anteceded by a non-kind-denoting nomi-
nal, unless that nominal itself makes salient a kind, as in (81). 
Adopting the syntax for such in (87) below (repeated from above), I will derive 
this semantics of such as the result of combining so and like. Specifically, so denotes a 
variable over kinds or objects, as in (88), while like relates a kind and an individual – spe-
cifically, it maps a kind to the property of objects that instantiate that kind – as in (89) (I 
will motivate this semantics for like in Section 2.3). Combining these two expressions by 
functional application produces the semantics for such in (90), which is essentially the 
same as that proposed by Carlson in (84) above.35  
 
                                                 
33 See section 2.2.6 for discussion of restrictions on the types of determiners that may occur with such. 
 
34 Wilkinson (1991) proposes denotations semantically equivalent to the one for such above (and like that 
below) for (at least some uses of) the modifiers of that kind and that kind of, as in an animal of that kind 
and that kind of animal. Given that they might all receive the same semantics, it would be interesting to 
look closely at potential differences between these four expressions. 
 
35 I motivate this semantics for like in Section X below, based on the use of like in the expression like that. 
Note, however, that in that section, I will argue that like is ambiguous, and also has a use in which it relates 
two object individuals, as in, e.g., like John. 
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(87)  AP: such   
     3 
 DegP           A’ 
              4             4  
               soi          like 
 
 
(88) ||soi||
g = g(i) 
(89) ||like|| = ⇧k . [⇧x . x ≤ k] 
(90) ||such|| = ⇧x . x ≤ g(i) 
 
This makes for a clear parallel between such and degree constructions like that tall: the 
so in such provides a kind argument to like, just as that provides a degree argument to 
tall, assuming that tall is a relation between degrees and individuals (Cresswell 1976, von 
Stechow 1984, Heim 2000, among others).  
There is some evidence that the variable associated with such may range not only 
over kinds but also over object individuals (henceforth, objects). For instance, Angelika 
Kratzer, p.c., points out that examples like those in (91) suggest that such is associated 
with an object variable rather than a kind variable; quantification here appears to be over 
objects (i.e., particular mistakes), and such seems to co-vary with each mistake:36  
 
(91) a.  Every time a mistake occurred, we wondered whether some such   
  mistake might occur again.   
                                                 
36 These examples are puzzling, however, given that co-variation with such is in general not possible with a 
quantificational subject, e.g., the following example is true iff everyone must likes reading some contextu-
ally salient type of books: 
 
(i) Everyone likes reading such books. 
 
I am not sure how to reconcile these facts. 
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 b.  For every mistake that occurred, we wondered whether some such   
  mistake might occur again. 
 
To account for the examples in (91), I will assume here that the variable associated with 
so (internal to such) may range over either (i) kinds or (ii) objects that instantiate kinds; 
and, further, that like is ambiguous, denoting either a relation between kinds and objects 
(as in (89) above), or a relation between objects and objects, as in (92) below.37  
 
(92) ||like2||
g = ⇧x . [⇧y . there is a unique contextually salient kind k such that x  ≤ k and 
 y ≤ k  
 
According to (92), this second use of like maps an object x to the property of objects that 
instantiate a unique contextually salient that x also instantiates. Combining this second 
use of like with so produces a second semantics for such: 
 
(93) ||soi like2||
g = ⇧x . there is a unique contextually salient kind y such that g(i) 
 ≤ y and x ≤ y  
  
In the next section, I will support the analysis of such by which it is associated 
with an individual variable by looking at the semantic behavior of what is arguably its 
optional complement, the as-clause italicized in the following: 
 
                                                 
37 Again, I will motivate this ambiguity in Section 2.3, where I look directly at the semantics of like. In 
short, I see this ambiguity as analogous to the behavior of like, which may combine with a kind, e.g., like 
that, or an object, e.g., like him.  
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(94) Such women as we met yesterday are a credit to society.   (Carlson 1977b) 
 
Much of the section will focus on parallels between these as-clauses and the (apparent) 
complement clauses of other Degree words, e.g., than-clauses:  
 
(95) Smarter women than we met yesterday have made worse mistakes.  
 
2.2.4 Such-as-Relatives 
Another strategy for getting at the semantics of such is to look at the semantic contribu-
tion of what appears to be its optional complement, an as-relative:38 
 
(96) Such women as we met yesterday are a credit to society.   (Carlson 1977b) 
 
In addition to as-relatives, such may also occur with an as-phrase, in which case only a 
DP follows as:  
 
(97) Such women as Frieda are a credit to society.         (Carlson 1977b) 
 
These (putative) complements of such are in this respect like the (putative) complements 
of degree words, which may also be either clausal or phrasal: 
                                                 
38 Although these as-relatives sound antiquated in present-day English, I believe that judgments regarding 
their use are clear enough to posit an analysis for them. Further, I will show in Section 2.3 below that the 
analogous – but more informal – like-relative, illusrated in (i), behaves just like the as-relative (Landman 
2002).  
 
(i) Women like we met yesterday are a credit to society. 
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(98) a. Smarter women than we met yesterday have made worse mistakes.  
 b. Smarter women than Frieda have made worse mistakes.   
 
There is some evidence that as-relatives should indeed be construed as comple-
ments to such, even though the two are syntactically non-adjacent.39 First, the presence of 
the as-relative is clearly dependent on such. Such, may not, for example, occur with a 
relative introduced by than. Second, I will present evidence below suggesting that such 
and as-relatives can take scope together and thus form a semantic constituent. Accord-
ingly, I will assume that such and as-relatives form a syntactic constituent to the exclu-
sion of the modified noun at LF, as in (99b) (abstracting away for the moment from the 
internal structure of the as-relative, and taking without justification the as-relative to be a 
PP): 
 
(99) a. such women as there were at the party 
 
 b.                  NP 
        qp   
                 AP               NP                      
      3              g  
    DegP           A           women 
       3 g          
    Deg            PP       like 
       g     6  
     so     as there were at the party 
 
Compare this structure to analogous LFs that have been proposed for comparatives, in 
which the Degree head and a than- or such-as- relative are taken to form a constituent 
                                                 
39 Reasoning here will be similar to that of Bhatt and Pancheva (2004) for the relationships between a De-
gree head and a comparative clause.  
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(Bresnan 1973, 1975, Cresswell 1976, Heim 1985, and others); following Bresnan 1973, 
more is taken here to be the combination of er + many:40 
 
(100) a. taller women than there were at the party 
 b.                     NP 
            qp   
                 AP               NP                      
      3              g  
    DegP           A           women 
       3 g          
    Deg            PP      tall 
       g     6  
     er    than there were at the party  
 
(101) a. more women than there were at the party 
 
 b.                         NP 
            qp   
              AP/QP               NP                      
      3              g  
    DegP          A/Q           women 
       3 g          
    Deg            PP      many 
       g     6  
     er      than there were at the party 
 
 
What, intuitively, seems to be the semantic contribution of these as-complements? 
One possibility is that they directly supply such with the value of its kind variable. These 
complements, then, might be construed as a definite description of a kind (or an object 
                                                 
40 Heim footnotes that this structure is “probably wrong”. Bhatt and Pancheva (2004) propose an more re-
cent account of comparatives that accounts for the fact that than-clauses behave as if they semantically 
form a constituent with the Degree head, while remaining consistent with what is known about extraposi-
tion. I believe that an analysis of this sort could be posited for as-clauses without affecting the main argu-
ments here. 
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that instantiates a kind), analogous to some analyses of than-phrases as definite descrip-
tions of a degree in comparative constructions (Russell 1905, Cresswell 1976). An alter-
native possibility is that they provide a restriction on the variable associated with such 
(Carlson 1977b). For example, in (96), any kind assigned to such would have to also be 
the kind of woman that we met yesterday. To get a better idea of what the external se-
mantics of these as-phrases might be, I will at this point take a closer look at its internal 
semantics for clues.  
For the internal semantics of these clauses, I will motivate the structure in (102), 
in which there is covert wh-movement internal to these relatives (I abstract away momen-
tarily from the exact position from which the wh-operator moves, as indicated by the “to 
be further articulated” note; ultimately, I will posit the structure in (110) below): 
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(102) a. such women as there were at the party 
 
 
 b.                           NP   [to be further articulated] 
           qp   
                  AP               NP                      
      3              g  
    DegP           A           women 
       3 g          
    Deg            PP      like 
       g     3  
     so       P              CP 
        g        3 
      as      whi       C’ 
                             3 
                C                IP 
                               3 
                   DP              I’ 
                                 g           6 
                 there     were t1 at the party 
 
That these as-relatives contain CPs that involve covert wh-movement is evidenced by ex-
amples that show that this movement is subject to island constraints. Compare for exam-
ple, (103), (104), and (105): only in the latter, ungrammatical, examples would the wh-
operator move out of an island. 
 
(103) Such issues as John raised __ at the meeting have been resurfacing for years. 
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(104) Complex NP Island Constraint 
a. *Such issues as John made the claim that he raised __ at the meeting have 
 been resurfacing for years. 
b. *Such issues as I know the person who claimed that he raised __ at the 
 metting have been resurfacing for years. 
  
(105) Adjunct Island Constraint 
*Such issues as John laughed when I raised __ at the meeting have been 
resurfacing for years. 
 
There is some evidence that the variable abstracted over in as-relatives ranges 
over kinds.41 The argumentation here is in the spirit of Carlson (1977a, 1977b), and fol-
lows similar reasoning that has been presented for comparative clauses (see, e.g., Carlson 
1977a and Heim 1987).42  To begin with, the gap in a such-as-relative may follow there 
be: 
 
(106) Such women as there were __ at the party are a credit to society.    
         (Carlson 1977b) 
 
These relatives are in this respect like comparatives (Carlson 1977b, Heim 1987 and oth-
ers): 
                                                 
41 I believe that the same argument could be presented to show that the variable in as-relatives could also 
range over individuals. 
 
42 See also Section 4.2 below for a discussion of the interpretation of gaps following there be. 
 60 
(107) More women than there were __ at the party came to the show. 
 
In contrast, restrictive relatives do not permit a gap following there be:43  
 
(108) *Women that there were __ at the party came to the show. 
 
Heim (1987), following Carlson, explains this as due to a constraint barring individual 
variables from the position following there be – an instance of the Definiteness Restric-
tion of Milsark (1974, 1977): 
 
(109) *There be x, when x is an individual variable. 
 
Assuming that individual variables cannot occupy the position following there be, (109) 
can be explained if such as-relatives involve a narrow scope occurrence of an indefinite 
of the form k-like NP in the position of the gap, with the wh-operator binding the kind 
variable, as in the LF posited in (110b). Note that in this structure, I have posited some 
unpronounced syntactic structure, in particular, deletion of like and women, which I will 
motivate shortly below following similar reasoning that has been presented for compara-
tive clauses (see Carlson 1977a; Heim 1987, and others): 
 
                                                 
43 With the exception of amount or kind relatives (Carlson 1977a, Heim 1987, Grosu and Landman (1998), 
and others; see discussion of (163) below. 
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(110) a. such women as there were at the party 
 
 b.                           NP 
            qp   
                  AP               NP                      
      3              g  
    DegP           A           women 
       3 g          
    Deg            PP      like 
       g     3  
     so       P         CP 
        g       3 
      as    whi       C’ 
                             3 
               C                IP 
                               3 
                  DP     I’ 
                          g              rp 
        there      I          VP 
            g                   rp 
                              were2 NP     V’ 
           3         rp 
          AP             NP     V           PP 
                   3          g         g    6  
       DegP            A   women   t2              at the party 
           g             g 
                      t1           like 
 
Similarly, such-as-relatives, unlike restrictive relatives, permit gaps in the posi-
tion of predicate nominals: 
 
 (111) a. Such people as John believes those murderers are __. 
 b. *People that John believes those murderers are __. 
    (based on Carlson 1977b) 
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The contrast between these examples is again explained if the gap in the such-as-relative 
is the indefinite k-like people, while the gap in the restrictive relative is an individual 
variable, assuming that predicate nominals are interpreted as predicates, and not indi-
viduals.  
Further support for the LF in (102), and in particular treating so and the such-as-
relative as forming a constituent, comes from the behavior of these relatives with respect 
to Antecedent Contained Deletion (ACD); the reasoning here again follows that proposed 
for comparatives, in particular, that of Wold (1995) and Heim (2000). Such-as-relatives 
allow ACD when modifying a weak nominal, but not when modifying a strong nominal:44  
 
(112) Weak nominals: 
 a. I never had such problems as you do.  
b. Ruben read such books as David did 
c. John climbed such trees as Bill did. 
d. I considered several such solutions as you did. 
 
(113) Strong nominals: 
a. #I have every such problem as you do.  
b. #Ruben read most such books as David did. 
c. #John was climbing every such tree as Bill was.  
d. #I considered every such solution as you did.  
 
                                                 
44 Thanks to Uli Sauerland for suggesting I look at ACD in these clauses. 
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Interestingly, this is the opposite of the pattern observed for that-relative clauses, where 
only strongly quantified noun phrases may move (Carlson 1977a, Diesing 1992): 
 
(114) I read every/each/most books that you did. 
(115) *I read few/two/  books that you did. 
 
Diesing (1992) explains the contrast between (114) and (115) by assuming that ACD is 
resolved by Quantifier Raising, and that only strongly quantified noun phrases QR (Di-
esing 1992). But this does not explain the reversed ACD pattern for such as-relatives. To 
account for the good ACD cases with such as relatives (where the head of the relative is 
weak), a story can be told which mirrors the story Wold (1995) tells for similar data with 
comparatives (for a more recent variant of this analysis, see Bhatt and Pancheva 2004). 
Carlson (1977a) and Diesing (1992) had noted that ACD is possible in comparatives even 
if the head noun is weak (example based on Heim 2000):  
 
(116) John was climbing more trees than Bill was.  
 
Wold (1995) showed that cases like (116) can be explained by QR-ing the DegP, assum-
ing that the DegP is a generalized quantifier over degrees (that is, the DegP must move to 
resolve a type mismatch). The DegP containing the elided VP thus moves out of the ante-
cedent VP, and, in effect, the elided VP has an (appropriately) identical antecedent for 
ellipsis. The weak nominal stays in VP, and gets existentially closed: 
 
 64 
(117) [DegP -er than [CP wh1 Bill was climbing d1-many trees]] 1 John was climbing d1-
many trees  
 
The whole structure then gets interpreted as follows: 
 
(118) ||[DegP -er than [CP wh1 Bill was climbing d1-many trees]] 1 John was climbing d1-
many trees||g is true iff the number of trees that John was climbing is greater than 
the number of trees that Bill was climbing 
  
Wold’s argument can be straightforwardly used to explain the grammatical ACD cases in 
such-as-relatives. What moves is not the whole DP, but the DegP that contains the elided 
VP, so that, e.g., the LF for (119a) would be that in (119b). 
 
(119) a. John was climbing such trees as Bill was. 
b. [DegP so [PP as [CP wh1 Bill was [VP climbing k1-like trees]]] 1 John was [VP 
 climbing k1-like trees]  
 
To interpret this structure, so can here be taken to denote (the schoenfinkelized functional 
equivalent of) a relation between sets of kinds:  
 
(120) ||so||g = ⇧f<k, t> . [ ⇧g<k, t> . there is a kind k such that f(k) = 1 and g(k) = 1]   
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The so of such as a result would be treated here as ambiguous between a deictic, referen-
tial interpretation, in which case it refers to a kind or object, and a quantificational inter-
pretation, in which case it denotes a relation between sets of kinds. In this way, so seems 
to act very much the Degree word as, which also appears to have a deictic, referential 
use, e.g., He is as tall, and a quantificational use, e.g., He is as tall as Jane. Given (120), 
John was climbing such trees as Bill was is predicted to be true iff there is some k such 
that John and Bill were climbing trees of kind k:  
 
(121) ||[DegP so [PP as [CP wh1 1 Bill was [VP climbing k1-like trees]]] 1 John was [VP 
climbing k1-like trees]||
g = 1 iff there is a k such that John was climbing trees of 
kind k and Bill was climbing trees of kind k  
 
 66 
(122) a. such women as there were at the party 
 
 b.                     NP 
       qp   
                  AP               NP                      
      3              g  
    DegP           A           women 
       3 g          
    Deg            PP      like 
       g     3  
     so       P         CP 
        g    3 
      as whi               C’ 
                        3 
                  C                IP 
                              3 
                DP     I’ 
                           g           rp 
        there      I          VP 
            g                   rp 
                                 were2 NP     V’ 
                 3        rp 
        AP             NP     V          PP 
            3          g         g    6  
       DegP            A   women   t2              at the party 
           g             g 
                            t1           like 
 
 
The good ACD examples in  (112) above, then, are accounted for as the result of move-
ment of DegP. The bad examples in (113) – those that illustrate the incompatibility of 
these relatives with strong determiners – could be explained as due to Kennedy’s ban on 
movement out of a quantificational DP (Kennedy 1999, Heim 2000): in these cases, the 
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quantificational DegP cannot move out of a quantificational DP, and ungrammaticality 
results (Ora Mathushanksy and Chris Kennedy, p.c.).45 
Having spelled out a semantics for the such-as-clause, a parallel semantics can 
now be posited for such-as phrases.  
 
2.2.5 Such-as-Phrases 
Such-as-phrases occur in examples like the following, in which only a DP follows as: 
 
(123) Such women as Frieda are a credit to society. 
 
It is difficult to determine the semantics of these as-phrases, as there seems to be more 
than one way to analyze them, and it is hard to argue for one account over the other. 
There are some clues, however, and I will at least sketch an account here.  
It will be useful to first address an ambiguity that may arise with these phrases 
when they occur post-nominally. Consider, for example, the sentences in (123), which 
illustrate two, truth-conditionally non-equivalent uses of post-nominal such-as-phrases. 
 
(124) a. Cats, such as yours, have no hair. 
 b.  Cats such as yours have no hair. 
 
                                                 
45 Given this explanation, it would be predicted that such-as-relatives could never modify DP’s headed by 
strong determiners, a prediction that appears to be borne out:  
 
 (i) a. ??Sam appreciates most such comments as Maria gives. 
 b. ?*Most such examples as you presented were marginal. 
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In (124a), the such-as-phrase is an appositive, in which case an intonational break pre-
cedes and follows it. This contrasts with  (124b), where it is a restrictive modifier, in 
which case there is no intonational break. The examples are not truth-conditionally 
equivalent: in a situation in which your cat has no hair, the first could be judged false, 
while the second would be judged true. I will only be concerned with the latter, restrictive 
use of as-phrases here; note that this restrictive use seems to be the only one available 
when such precedes the modified nominal, so that the following seems to be truth-
conditionally equivalent to (124b): 
 
(125) Such cats as yours have no hair. 
 
The semantic contribution of the as-phrase appears to be that of helping fix the 
kind associated with such, which would otherwise be supplied by the context. The as-
phrase, then, can be construed as a restriction on the contextually salient kind. Accord-
ingly, I will take the as-phrase as a property of kinds, which the kind associated with such 
must satisfy.46 This property appears to be constructed from the DP object of as, which 
itself does not appear to denote a kind, but rather an individual that instantiates (or exem-
plifies) a contextually salient kind (Carlson 1977b). Consider, for example, the following:   
 
                                                 
46 Alternatively, as-phrases might be taken to denote definite descriptions of kinds. See the following foot-
note for a more spelled out version of this possibility. I have chosen the above analysis instead of this one 
rather arbitrarily, since I do not see at this point strong evidence for one analysis over the other.  
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(126) Such men as Bill/those men/my friends/?several of my friends/?all my 
friends/*some people/*lots of Africans/*everybody  
         (Carlson 1977b) 
 
As Carlson puts it, “it seems the less easy it is to take the NP as picking out some particu-
lar person or set of persons that the speaker could have in mind as examples, the less ac-
ceptable the NP.”[p. 391].  This would also explain the following contrast (repeated from 
above), which again show that the DP object of as should instantiate the kind associated 
with such:  
 
(127) a. *I want to read such books as you. 
 b. I want to read such books as those. 
c. I want to read such books as you suggested. 
 
These examples can be accounted for if as is taken to map an individual to a set of kinds 
that that object instantiates:47  
 
(128) ||as||g = ⇧x . [ ⇧k : x ≤ k ] 
  
                                                 
47 More precisely, as could be taken as a function from individuals to kinds:  
 
(i) ||as||g =  ⇧x : there is a unique salient kind in the context such that x ≤ k . 
  the unique salient kind in the context such that x ≤ k.  
 
Here also, it would be a question how exactly such would combine with the as-phrase. One option would 
be to give such an extra argument:  
 
(ii) ||such||g = ⇧k . [⇧x . x ≤ k]  
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Given (128), the as-phrase as a whole will then denote a set of kinds: 
 
(129) ||as Mary||
g = ⇧k . Mary ≤ k  
 
The question at this point is how the as-phrase semantically combines with such. One 
option is to treat the as-phrase as providing a restriction on the contextually salient kind 
assigned to such, so that the result of combining the two would be, e.g.:48  
 
(130) ||such as Mary||g = ⇧x . x ≤ k and Mary ≤ k 
 
This property could then itself combine with an NP property, so that, e.g., (131a) would 
be interpreted as in (131b).  
 
(131) a. such women as Mary 
 b. ||[DegP such asi Mary] women|| = ⇧x . women(x) and x ≤ the unique salient k  
  such that Mary ≤ k  
 
2.2.6 Summary  
Support for the hypothesis that such is associated with an individual variable comes from 
two points: (i) possible antecedents for such need to be kind-denoting or kind-
instantiating, and (ii) the behavior of such-as-relatives is analogous to that of compara-
                                                 
48 I do not see an elegant way of getting this result, but again giving such an extra argument would do the 
trick:  
 
(i) ||such||g = ⇧f<k, t> . [⇧x . x ≤ k and f(k) = 1] 
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tives – which arguably involve abstraction over degrees – in permitting a gap after there 
be, as well as allowing ACD in weakly modified nominals. Both of these properties can 
be accounted for by analyzing the gap in as-relatives as an indefinite containing a vari-
able over kinds, viz., k-like NP. The analysis of such presented here thus both supports 
NHTV, and provides an account of the parallels between degree and kind morphology. 
 
2.2.7 Restrictions on Co-occurring Determiners 
I will conclude this study of such with some comments on the restrictions such imposes 
on the types of determiners with which it may co-occur. Such may not co-occur with a 
definite determiner unless one, only, or first immediately follow the definite determiner, 
as the examples in (132) illustrate:  
 
(132) a. *the/those/John’s such ideas 
 b. the only/first/one such idea 
 
Such also blocks specific readings of singular indefinites, for example, (a) is ambiguous 
between a specific and non-specific reading of the indefinite, while (b) permits only a 
non-specific reading.  
 
(133) a. I didn’t see a spot on the floor.    specific and nonspecific 
 b. I didn’t see such a spot on the floor.   nonspecific only 
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Interestingly, the ban on definites occurring with such also appears to hold in German 
and Spanish (and potentially Irish, Jim McCloskey, p.c.). It thus appears that definite de-
terminers cannot semantically combine (at least directly) with nominals modified by 
such. It seems related to this puzzle that singular indefinites with such seem to be lacking 
specific readings. While I am not at all sure why the specific readings are absent here, I 
suspect that it related to the fact that the definite determiners cannot co-occur with such, 
either. 
  
2.3 Like that 
Such, on its kind use, is of a formal register; in more informal conversation it could be 
naturally paraphrased with the expression like that. For example, (134b) would be a natu-
ral informal paraphrase of (134a). 
 
(134) a. I have such toothbrushes. 
b. I have toothbrushes like that. 
 
Similarly, such as-phrases may be paraphrased with corresponding like-phrases: 
 
(135) a. I have toothbrushes such as his. 
b. I have toothbrushes like his. 
 
There are even counterparts to the such as-relative:  
 
 73 
(136) Such women as we met yesterday are a credit to society.   
(137) Women like we met yesterday are a credit to society. 
 
The similarity in use of such and like that raises the question of what the semantic con-
nection is between the two, and, in particular, whether like that is also associated with an 
individual variable, or rather, a property variable. I will argue here for the former, and 
posit an interpretation for like which parallels quite closely the semantics proposed above 
for such.  
 
2.3.1 Syntax of Like That 
The syntax of like is hard to peg. On the one hand, like patterns like an adjective, as it 
may occur with degree morphology:  
 
(138) a. She is really like that. 
 b. She is more like that than you are. 
 
However, unlike an adjective, and like a preposition, very may not modify like without 
the presence of much:49 
 
                                                 
49 Predicate nominals also require the presence of much with very: 
 
(i) a.  She is sometimes very much a fool. 
 b.  *She is sometimes very a fool.  
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(139) a. She is too/so/very much like that.  
 b. She is very interested. 
 c. She is very much below you. 
 
Also unlike an adjective, but like a preposition, like may take a DP complement:  
 
(140) a. She is like that.  
 b. *She is interested that. 
 c. She is below you. 
 
These sorts of facts make it hard to tell what syntactic category like belongs to. Keeping 
these examples in mind, I will go ahead and assume like is an adjective here, for con-
creteness.  
 
2.3.2 Semantics of Like That 
Given the semantics of such, it seems natural to ask whether like that also involves 
anaphora to a kind. One way of testing this is to use Carlson’s diagnostic for such: Can 
like that refer back to an antecedent that is not kind-denoting? The following sentences 
suggest that it cannot:  
 
(141) a. People in the next room…??people like that   
 b. Elephants that are standing there…??elephants like that 
 c. Men that Jan fired this morning…??men like that 
 75 
It is again important to stress here that these examples are judged unacceptable only if 
like that takes as antecedent the preceding italicized bare plural, and not some contextu-
ally salient kind. For example, if (141a) were uttered in a context where people in the 
next room were loud, this example would be felicitous if like that meant loud people, and 
not people in the next room. The important point is that like that requires a contextually 
salient kind as its antecedent; it cannot modify people to pick out the set of people who 
are in the next room.  
 
(142) I don’t like the people in the next room. People like that are obnoxious. 
 
Based on these examples, like that can be taken to be the semantic composition of 
like – a relation between kinds and individuals, as in (143) – and that, a variable that 
ranges over kinds, as in (144).  
 
(143) ||like|| = ⇧k . [⇧x . x ≤ k] 
 
(144) ||thati||
g = g(i) 
 
Assuming the syntax in (145), like and that would then combine semantically, yielding a 
semantics identical to that of such, as in (146). 
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(145)   A’: like that   
     3 
    A          DP 
                 g                  g  
               like         thati 
 
(146) ||like thati||
 g = ⇧x . x ≤ g(i) 
 
As with such, however, there is also a use of like by which it combines with an 
expression that denotes an object. Examples like (147) suggest that like takes as its first 
argument an individual that exemplifies a kind – just as Carlson observed with as in 
(126) above, repeated below. 
 
(147) People like you/Bill/him are hard to please. 
 
These examples instead suggest that like may take as its first argument an object that in-
stantiates a kind: 
 
(148)  ||like||  = ⇧x . [ ⇧y . there is a salient kind k such that x ≤ k and y ≤ k]   
 
According to this semantics, like relates two individuals that both instantiate a salient 
kind. 
Interestingly, like that appears to impose the same restrictions as such does on the 
kinds of determiners with which it may co-occur. For example, nominals modified by like 
that are degraded when headed by a definite determiner, as (149a) shows, unless one, 
only, or first immediately follow the definite determiner, as (149b) shows.  
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(149) a. ?the/that/his solution like that   
 b. the only/one/first solution like that  
 
Likewise, specific readings of singular indefinites again seem to be absent, as was the 
case with such: 
 
(150) a. Paul didn’t see a spot.    specific or non-specific 
 b. Paul didn’t see a spot like that.   non-specific only 
 
While I do not have an explanation for this pattern, the similarity in behavior to such does 
suggest that assigning them a parallel semantics is on the right track.  
 
2.3.3 Like-Relatives 
Like-relatives, as illustrated in (151), are the informal counterpart of the as-relative, as 
illustrated in (152): 
 
(151) Women like we met yesterday are a credit to society. 
(152) Such women as we met yesterday are a credit to society.   
 
In this section, I will present evidence that the variable abstracted over in these relatives, 
as in as-relatives, ranges over individuals. 
These relatives give rise to ambiguity when modifying an object NP, and so, be-
fore going further, I will try to make clear which readings I will be looking at, and which 
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I will be setting aside. Consider, for example, (153), which is three-ways-ambiguous be-
tween what I will call a conjunctive reading, a manner reading, and a kind reading: 
 
(153) She buys toothbrushes like you do.  
 a. She buys toothbrushes, and you buy toothbrushes.  conjunctive  
 b. She buys toothbrushes how you buy toothbrushes.  manner  
 c. She buys toothbrushes like the ones that you buy.  kind  
 
I will only be concerned with the kind reading in this section; the manner reading will be 
discussed in 2.5 below, and the conjunctive reading I will set aside completely. That the 
three readings are truly distinct is suggested by the fact that they are to some extent in 
complementary distribution.50 In particular, only the kind reading is available when the 
like-relative occupies a position reserved for nominal modifiers; similarly, only the man-
ner and conjunctive readings are available when the like-relative occurs in a position in 
which only verbal modifiers may occur. For example, only the kind reading is available 
when the like-relative modifies a subject nominal: 
 
(154) a. More women like we met at the party should be running this country.  
  b. It’s women like we met at the party that should be running this country.  
 
The kind reading is also the only reading available when there is no VP Ellipsis in the 
like-relative: 
                                                 
50 Thanks to Marcin Morzycki (p.c.) and Kyle Rawlins (p.c.) for pressing me to show that the kind and 
manner readings are distinct (they remain skeptical.) 
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(155) She buys toothbrushes like you buy __.  
 cf. She buys toothbrushes like you do.  
 
In contrast, when like-relatives occur in positions that nominal modifiers may not occur, 
only the manner and conjunctive readings are possible. For example, the kind reading is 
not available when these relatives immediately follow the particle (of a particle verb) as 
in (156a), as compared to (156b), which is ambiguous:   
 
(156) a. I messed several solutions up like you did.  
 b. I messed up several solutions like you did.  
 
This is expected if rightward movement of the particle makes it impossible for the like-
relative to modify the nominal several solutions. I will thus assume that the kind and 
manner readings are distinct. 
Turning now to their internal structure, there is some evidence that like-relatives 
are in fact elliptical, so that, for example, (157) corresponds to the LF in (158), in which 
the kind/one(s) is elided:  
 
(157) theories like you presented 
(158) theories like the kind/one(s) [wh1 that you presented t1] 
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Evidence for this is as follows: A unique property of restrictive that-relatives is that they 
generally disallow a subject from being relativized if the complementizer that is not 
overt, as the following contrast shows.  
 
(159) a. The guys [wh 1 that t1 live next door] are hard to talk to. 
b. *The guys [wh 1 t1 live next door] are hard to talk to. 
 
Like-relative show the same pattern, as it is ungrammatical for the subject of a like-
relative to be relativized: 
 
(160) *Guys like [wh1 t1 live next door] are hard to talk to. 
 cf. Guys like you know are hard to talk to. 
  
Based on these examples, I will assume henceforth that like-relatives are elided versions 
of their nominal paraphrases, as reflected by the LF in (158) above.   
Like as-relatives, the gap in a like-relative may follow there be: 
 
(161) a. More women like there were at the party should run for office. 
b. He wants more toys like the ones that there were at the store. 
 
This suggests that the gap in a like-relative corresponds to a weak indefinite: 
 
(162) like the women [CP wh1 there were k1-like women at the party] 
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This makes these relatives look very much like amount relatives (see Chapter 4), which 
also permit relativization following there-be: 
 
(163) The women that there were at the party couldn’t have filled a bathtub. 
 
They especially look like amount relatives if, as I am proposing, these relatives are de-
rived from structures in which they contain restrictive relative clauses, allowing for para-
phrases like the following: 
 
(164) a. More women like the ones there were at the party should run for office. 
b. He wants more toys like the ones that there were at the store. 
 
Further, like such-as-relatives and comparative clauses, they permit ACD when modify-
ing a weak nominal, but not when modifying a strong nominal:  
 
 (165) Weak nominals 
a. I never had problems like you do. 
 b. Ruben read several books like David did. 
 c. John climbed trees like Bill did. 
 d. I considered several solutions like you did. 
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(166) Strong nominals 
a. #I have every problem like you do. 
 b. #Ruben read most books like David did. 
 c. #John was climbing every tree like Bill was. 
 d. #I considered every solution like you did. 
 
Here also, it appears like-relatives may be categorically bad with strong determiners, with 
or without ACD: 
 
(167) a. ?*I’ve considered every solution like you suggested, and none seems to work. 
 b. ?*Most examples like you came up with were marginal. 
  
Again, this is the opposite of the pattern observed for that-relative clauses (Carlson 
1977a, Diesing 1992): 
 
(168) a. I read every/each/most books that you did. 
 b. I read few/two books that you did. 
 
This raises the question as to whether the analysis of as-relatives should be extended to 
like-relatives, so that ACD is in this case also resolved by movement. This would be a 
natural step, having adopting the analysis above for as-relatives, as in (169).  
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(169) a. John saw men like Bill did. 
b. ||[AP like the ones wh1 that Bill did see k1-like men] 1 John saw k1-like men|| 
 
However, there is not much independent evidence for this movement, however, and per-
haps these cases of ACD should be handled differently, or perhaps they might lead to 
abandoning the movement analysis of ACD altogether. I will leave this for future investi-
gation. In any case, like-relatives appear to behave just like such-as-relatives with respect 
to the definiteness effect and ACD. 
 
2.3.4 Summary 
In this section, I have argued that like that has a semantics very parallel to such: like 
such, like that may only be anteceded by nominals that denote properties that correspond 
to kinds, or objects that instantiate kinds, and its relatives (i.e., like-relatives) behave like 
they abstract over kinds with respect to the definiteness effect and ACD. These properties 
may be accounted for if like varies over individuals, either kinds, or objects that instanti-
ate kinds.  
 
2.4 Pro-AdvPs: Tak and So51 
Alongside pro-forms that have the distribution of adjectives, there are also pro-forms that 
have the distribution of AdvPs. For instance, the adverbial thus, repeated from (170) 
above, appears to have the distribution of an adverb, and to pick up the reference of a 
preceding adverb: 
                                                 
51 This material in this section is based in large part on Landman and Morzycki (2003); I am very grateful 
to Marcin Morzycki for first pointing out the link between such and these adverbials, and for inspiring and 
insightful discussion of this material.  
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(170) You have to dance this dance with a definite sense of pride and AdvP 
 haughtinessi, and if danced thusi/soi, the dance will be beautiful.  
 
Landman and Morzycki (2003, henceforth, LM) observe that in some languages, there is 
a close correspondence between adverbials analogous to English thus, and adnominal 
modifiers analogous to English such. As adverbials, these expressions seem to be ana-
phoric to a manner (see also Kehler and Ward 1999 for a similar adverbial use of so in 
English):52 
 
(171) a. Polish 
  On tańczył tak. 
  he  danced  so 
  ‘He danced like that.’ 
  
 b. German 
  Er hat so getanzt. 
  He has so danced 
  ‘He danced like that. 
 
As adnominals, these expressions are analogous to English such:  
  
                                                 
52 Thanks to Ania Łubowicz and Marcin Morzycki for the Polish data, and to Jan Anderssen for the German 
data. 
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(172) a. Polish 
  Taki  pies   uciekł  wczoraj w nocy.  
  such  dog    ran.away yesterday in night 
  ‘Such a dog ran away last night.’ 
  
 b. German 
  So ein Hund   ist     lezte  Nacht    davongelaufen. 
  so a    dog      is      last    night   away-ran. 
  ‘Such a dog ran away last night.’ 
 
As LM point out, these adverbial and adnominal expressions are closely related: they 
share the same morphological form (minus inflectional morphology in Polish), and both 
are anaphoric. Further, as with English such, they may occur with optional as-phrases. 
(173) illustrates this for the adnominal cases, and (174) for the adverbials. 
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(173) a.  Polish 
  Taki  pies   jak  ten    uciekł wczoraj w nocy. 
  such  dog     as   this    ran.away yesterday  in night 
  ‘Such a dog as this ran away last night.’ 
  
 b. German 
  So ein Hund wie dieser hat mal meinen Bruder gebissen. 
  so a dog as this has  once  my brother bitten. 
  ‘Such a dog as this once bit my brother.’ 
 
(174) a. Polish 
  Jan     tańczył    tak     jak  Maria. 
  John   danced    so       as   Mary 
  ‘John danced how Mary did.’ 
  
 b. German  
  Jan     hat    so      wie    Maria    getanzt.  
  John   has   thus    as      Mary     danced 
  ‘John danced how Mary did.’ 
 
In Polish, the correspondence between adnominal and adverbial uses is also reflected in 
the wh-word counterparts of tak/taki: 
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(175) a. Jaki     pies     uciekł      wczoraj    w nocy? 
  what    dog       ran.away yesterday in night 
  ‘What kind of dog ran away last night?’ 
 
 b. Jak      tańczył     Jan? 
  how    danced     John  
  ‘How did John dance?’ 
 
These modifiers, then, share several properties: they are both anaphoric, both take as-
phrases, and, in Polish, have parallel wh-words.53  
LM capture the relation between the adnominal and adverbial uses by analyzing 
these modifiers as uniformly kind-anaphoric. As in English, the adnominal cases may be 
construed as anaphoric to a kind:54 
 
 
(176) a. ||takii||
g = [⇧x . x ≤ g(i)] 
 b. ||soi||
g = [⇧x . x ≤ g(i)] 
 
                                                 
53 A similar pattern appears to occur in in Macedoninan (Slavica Kochovska 2004), Korean (Seunghun Lee 
2004) and Chinese (Wei Li 2004).  
 
54 For taki and so, there is no justification for positing an abstract internal structure, as for such, which I 
analyzed as the combination of so and like. Accordingly, I assume here that these expressions are assigned 
this semantics, and have no internal structure analogous to such. 
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Extending this analysis to the adverbial uses, these too can be taken to be properties of 
realizations of a contextually salient kind, in this case, a contextually supplied event-kind 
(on event-kinds, see also Hinrichs 1985 and Barwise and Perry 1983): 
 
(177) ||taki||
g = [⇧e . e ≤ g(i)] 
 
These modifiers then would combine with the verbs they modify by predicate modifica-
tion:  
 
(178) ||tańczył taki||
g = [⇧e . dance(e) & e ≤ g(i)]  
 
German so and Polish tak can thus be uniformly analyzed as kind-anaphoric in both their 
adnominal and adverbial uses, with ‘manner’ modeled as an event-kind. 
This analysis raises the question of what exactly the linguistic antecedents for tak 
and so are – what expression, if any, corresponds to an event-kind – and whether they are 
subject to similar restrictions as were observed for such. There are some clues for deter-
mining the linguistic antecedents for these expressions. For example, Marcin Morzycki 
(p.c.) points out that examples like the following suggest that manner adverbs – as op-
posed to full VPs – antecede these adverbials, as indicated by the underlining:  
 
(179) Maria ist auf einem Bein  gehüpft und  Jan stand so herum. 
 Maria has on one     foot   hopped and  Jan stood so around  
 ‘Maria hopped on one foot, and Jan stood around like that.’ 
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 If so were instead assigned the reference of the entire preceding VP, ist auf einem Bein 
gehüpft, the wrong result would obtain, as the sentence does not assert that Jan has done 
any standing.  
Other restrictions on possible antecedents for these expressions also can be ob-
served: Neither temporal nor locative adverbials may (generally) antecede these adverbi-
als, as the examples in (180) illustrate.  
 
(180) a. German 
*Maria hat am Dienstag getanzt und Jan hat auch so getanzt. 
Maria has  on Tuesday  danced and Jan has  also so danced 
‘Maria dance on Tuesday, and Jan danced like that too.’ 
 
 b. Polish 
*Maria tańczyła we wtorek    i       Jan też   tak tańczył. 
  Maria danced   on Tuesday  and  Jan also  so danced 
‘*Maria danced on Tuesday, and Jan danced like that too.’ 
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(181) a. German 
*Maria hat  in Minnesota gegessen und Jan hat auch so gegessen. 
  Maria has in Minnesota  eaten       and Jan  has also so  eaten 
‘*Maria ate in Minnesota, and Jan ate like that too.’ 
 
 b. Polish 
*Maria jadła w Minnesocie  i       Jan też   tak jadł. 
  Maria ate     in Minnesota   and  Jan also so   ate 
‘*Maria ate in Minnesota, and Jan ate like that too.’ 
 
Temporal and locative adverbials in general restrict a set of events to having taken place 
at a particular time or place in a given world, and as a consequence may not make for a 
very good event-kind, similar to the restrictions observed for such.  
However, as both Chris Potts (p.c.) and Mark Baker (p.c.) have pointed out, this 
restriction may just be due to the fact that there are other lexical items available in these 
languages as pro-forms for temporal or locative adverbials, analogous to English then and 
there, respectively. The existence of these words plausibly then blocks the use of so and 
tak in these cases. It remains unclear, then, what expressions may serve as the linguistic 
antecedents of these adverbials, and whether they are restricted in the same way that the 
antecedents for such are restricted. There are at least two plausible antecedents: (i) a pre-
ceding manner adverb, e.g., clumsily; and (ii) a whole VP, e.g., dancing clumsily (a third 
possibility, even, is that both of these expressions are possible as antecedents, as dis-
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cussed in 2.5). I will return to the issue of what may antecede so in the discussion of do 
so below. 
 
2.5 Adverbial Like That 
This account of adverbial tak and so can be straightforwardly be extended to adverbial 
like that, illustrated in (182). 
 
(182) He walks like that. 
 
Here, on analogy with adnominal like that, the like of adverbial like that relates an event 
kind and an individual, as in (183), and that in this case is interpreted as a variable rang-
ing over event-kinds, as in (184):  
 
(183)  ||like|| = ⇧k . [⇧e . e ≤ k]   
(184) ||that||g = g(i) 
 
Combining these two semantically yields a semantics equivalent to that proposed above 
for tak and so, repeated as follows: 
 
(185) a. ||takii||
g = [⇧x . x ≤ g(i)] 
 b. ||soi||
g = [⇧x . x ≤ g(i)] 
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It should be noted here, however, that something more would need to be said for exam-
ples like he walks like her, where her does not obviously instantiate an event-kind. This 
makes for an interesting contrast with the adnominal people like her, where her must in-
stantiate the contextually supplied kind. 
Much about the syntax and semantics of like remains unresolved. I have here tried 
to show that a line of thought that treats it as anaphoric to a kind seems to account for its 
parallels to such and its adverbial analogues. 
 
2.6 The VP Pro-form Do So 
With this analysis of such and its adverbial counterparts in hand, it is appealing to con-
sider English do so as another instance of kind-anaphora, taking do so as the semantic 
composition of main verb do and the adverbial so (Bouton 1970, building on Ross 1972;  
see also Kehler and Ward 1999). In this section, I will sketch an analysis according to 
which the English adverbial so that occurs in do so is interpreted just like German so (and 
Polish tak): as a set of events that instantiate a variable over event-kinds.55 
There are several ways in which do so behaves as if it is the combination of main 
verb do and adverbial so. For one, syntactically, the do of do so behaves like a main verb, 
as it cannot invert (186), does not escape VP-deletion (187), and cannot occur in tags 
(188). 
 
                                                 
55 Thanks in particular to Chris Potts (p.c.) and Marcin Morzycki (p.c.) for discussion of extending the 
analysis of tak and so to English do so.  
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(186) a. You did so.  
b. Did you do so?   
c. *Did you so? 
 
(187) a. You did.  
b. *Did you do?  
c. Did you? 
 
In addition, do so does not passivize or undergo clefting, suggesting that it is adverbial 
(Kehler and Ward 1999): 
 
(188) *…and so was done by Hillary.   (Kehler and Ward 1999) 
(189) *It is so which Hillary did.      
(190) *What Hillary did was so.       
 
Further support for treating do so as the combination of main verb do and adver-
bial so comes from data that show that main verb do and do so share certain semantic 
properties (Ross 1972). As Ross observes, main verb do independently occurs in the 
grammar, in examples like the following: 
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(191) Jack did  a study of bat guano.    (Ross 1972) 
    a report on marshmallows 
    research on hedonism 
    a dive from the south bulwark 
    some snark-hunting 
 
This verb, Ross observes, must take as its complement a nominal that appears to denote 
an activity:  
 
(192) *Jack did  knowledge of karate. 
 
Like main verb do, do so requires a non-stative antecedent (Lakoff and Ross 1976): 
 
(193) *The coffee is cold, but it didn’t use to do so. 
 
This would be explained if these pro-forms inherited this condition from main verb do, 
which can be taken to introduce agentivity (Rajesh Bhatt, p.c.): 
 
(194) ||do|| = ⇧x  . [⇧e . Agent(e)=x] 
  
Taking the so of do so to have the same semantics as German so and Polish tak, namely, 
a property of individuals that instantiate an event-kind, as in (195), do so can then be in-
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terpreted as the semantic composition of do and so, a set of events that instantiate a 
contextually salient kind of event, as in (196). 
 
(195)  ||soi||
g = ⇧e . e ≤ g(i) 
(196) ||do soi||
g = ⇧x . [⇧e . Agent(e)=x & e ≤ g(i)] 
 
To illustrate the analysis, the instance of do so in (197a) would be interpreted as in 
(197b), assuming that g(i) yields the event kind DANCE. 
 
(197) a. Mary dancedi and John did soi, too. 
 b. ||do soi||
g = ⇧x . [⇧e . Agent(e)=x and e ≤ DANCE] 
 
There are some difficulties, though, for this type of account, as do so is less re-
stricted than German so in the types of antecedents it may take. For example, so in Ger-
man requires a manner as antecedent, as (198) shows, whereas do so does not, as (199) 
shows.  
 
(198) German 
 Maria hat *(elegant und schnell)    getanzt und Peter hat auch so  getanzt. 
 Maria has   elegantly and quickly   danced  and Peter has also so     danced 
 ‘Maria danced *(elegantly and quickly), and Peter danced like that too.’   
 
(199)  Mary danced and John did so, too. 
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Further, so may not have a temporal or locative antecedent, as the examples in (200) 
show, while do so may, as (201) shows: 
 
(200) a. German 
 *Maria hat am Dienstag getanzt und Jan hat auch so getanzt. 
 Maria has  on Tuesday  danced and Jan has  also so danced 
 ‘Maria dance on Tuesday, and Jan danced like that too.’ 
 
 b. German 
 *Maria hat  in Minnesota gegessen und Jan hat auch so gegessen. 
   Maria has in Minnesota  eaten       and Jan  has also so  eaten 
 ‘*Maria ate in Minnesota, and Jan ate like that too.’ 
 
(201) a. Maria danced on Tuesday, and Jan did so too. 
 b. Maria ate in Minnesota, and Jan did so too. 
 
In light of these facts, R. Schwarzschild and S. Cumming (p.c.) suggest an account that in 
part resolves the issue of what types of linguistic expressions correspond to event-kinds. I 
am unsure how the account would be formalized, but an intuitive description of it runs as 
follows. They suggest that both manner adverbs as well as whole VPs may provide the 
antecedent for adverbial so, and accordingly, both may denote (or at least introduce into 
the discourse) event-kinds. So, then, may take one or the other as its antecedent; and 
which it takes as antecedent is sometimes forced by the semantic environment in which it 
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occurs. For example, in (199) and (201), the so in do so takes as its reference event-kinds 
introduced by the preceding italicized VPs. In contrast, in examples when so modifies a 
verb other than do, it picks up the reference of a preceding adverbial alone. This pattern 
might be explained if every VP may correspond to no more than one core-VP-meaning, 
and, main verb do is ‘semantically light’ in not introducing such a meaning. Thus, when 
so combines with do, it takes as its antecedent (an event-kind associated with) a whole 
VP-meaning, whereas, when it occurs with a verb other than do, it may only be anteceded 
by an adverbial.  
 
2.7 Predicative So 
There are also examples in which so make substitute for an AP, as in the following ex-
ample (repeated from (9) above):  
 
(202) I thought she would be happyi, but she certainly doesn’t seem soi.  AP 
 
Although I will not treat predicative so in detail here, I will sketch an account of this ex-
pression, according to which it too is construed as related to such. That is, I will extend 
the analysis of adverbial so to the predicative AP so.  
First, note that predicative AP so also occurs in German: 
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(203) Er sagte dass er  sich        schlecht fühle, aber er  sah      nicht so aus.  
  He said  that  he himself  bad         felt,    but   he looked not so AUS.  
 “He said that he felt bad, but he didn’t look so.” 
 
The fact that predicative AP so and adverbial so in German are morphologically the same 
supports treating them as having the same semantics.  
Further, some evidence for interpreting AP so in English in the same way as Eng-
lish adverbial so comes from the observation that in English, AP so seems to have the 
same distribution as the phrase that way, suggesting a correspondence between so and 
manner adverbials:  
  
(204) I thought she would be happy, but she certainly doesn’t seem so.  
(205) I thought she would be happy, but she certainly doesn’t seem that way.  
  
(206) ??That made Julia happy, and it made Frank that way too.  
(207) ??That made Julia happy, and it made Frank so too.  
   
This use of so certainly requires further investigation, but these examples suggest that it 
too may be part of the same paradigm, so that all of these cases involve anaphora to 
kinds, or objects that instantiate kinds.  
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2.8 Chapter Summary 
Having looked at several plausible candidates for property-anaphors in English, it appears 
that there is no strong evidence for treating them in this way. Instead, these seem to be a 
class of pro-forms related to such, all of which vary over individuals that are, or instanti-
ate, kinds. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
 
 
MOVEMENT AND VARIABLES 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The constraint I am proposing, NHTV, has implications for just those cases of movement 
that involve abstraction over variables at LF.56,57 In particular, the constraint predicts only 
a restricted set of such movement constructions to occur, namely, only those that involve 
binding of individual variables. I will argue in this chapter that if we look at the types of 
variables that may be abstracted over in A’-movement constructions at LF, NHTV in fact 
explains what does and does not occur. Data will come exclusively from English.  
To illustrate that some movement constructions have been analyzed as involving 
bound variables at LF, consider the restrictive relative clause construction, as illustrated 
by the italicized string in (208) (the semantic analysis I will adopt here is based on Quine 
1960, Montague 1974, and Partee 1975).  
 
(208) I liked the movie that Lara made __. 
 
I will adopt a syntactic analysis of restrictive relatives according to which they involve 
wh-movement (Chomsky 1977), so that (208) is represented at LF by the structure in 
(209), in which a non-overt wh-element occupies the Specifier of CP, and a variable oc-
                                                 
56 I will only look at instances of A’-movement in this work, and will have to leave for future research other 
cases of movement that may involve variables, e.g., A-movement constructions such as Raising. 
 
57 In some frameworks, movement constructions do not involve bound variables at LF – as in a variable-
free semantics, for example. Under such frameworks, the constraint would not have any bearing on what 
types of movement constructions were possible or impossible. See Section 4.5 for further discussion. 
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curs in its original position – that is, in the position of the surface gap, the position fol-
lowing made in (208), represented here as an indexed trace.58  
 
(209)          DP 
  wo 
 D                   NP 
             g           wo 
           the         NP           CP 
               g                wo 
     movie      wh1    C’ 
                 wo 
             C     IP 
                  g         3 
               that      NP    I’ 
                                    g       3 
          Lara      I           VP 
             3 
                       V         DP 
              g              g   
         made            t1 
 
 
 
Like a pronoun, the indexed trace receives its value from the assignment function – that 
is, it is a variable. Further, this variable is bound at the CP level by the moved wh-
operator, which introduces lambda abstraction, given the Predicate Abstraction rule given 
in Chapter 1. In effect, the relative clause CP is interpreted as in (210): it is a function 
that maps an individual x to true iff Lara made x. 
 
(210) || [CP wh1 that Lara made t1] ||
g = ⇧x . Lara made x    
 
                                                 
58 In (209), I represent the variable syntactically as an indexed trace. However, this is in part for ease of 
exposition, as committing to a theory in which gaps are represented as traces at LF is not essential to my 
arguments for NHTV; what is essential in (209) is that the gap is treated semantically as a variable.  
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In this way, (at least some) restrictive relative clauses – and wh-constructions more gen-
erally – have been analyzed as involving bound variables at LF.  
I will motivate NHTV by looking at – and for – potential cases of movement con-
structions in which higher-type variables might be posited, and showing that there is evi-
dence that higher-type variables do not in fact occur. Empirical evidence for this position 
will come in two forms. First, higher-type variables have been posited to account for 
cases of reconstruction; I will review arguments that have been presented against such 
accounts based on binding theory constraints. Second, I will show that NHTV correctly 
predicts the absence of certain constructions that would require higher-type variables at 
LF. In particular, I will look for cases in which the gap in an A’-construction corresponds 
syntactically to a predicative phrase (AP, VP, or AdvP), as these are potential cases in 
which higher-type variables might occur. Following work on movement constructions by 
several authors, I will argue that many cases of movement of higher-type expressions are 
in fact instances of partial or total syntactic reconstruction. In the case of partial recon-
struction, what is bound at LF is not a higher-type variable, but rather an individual vari-
able (as in wh-questions such as How tall is she?). In the case of total reconstruction, 
there is no variable binding at LF at all (as in topicalization structures such as She said 
she would win the election, and win the election, she did).  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I will review 
arguments that partial reconstruction is necessary for (at least some) cases of pied-piping. 
In Section 3.3, I will review two possible analyses of reconstruction, namely, syntactic 
and semantic reconstruction, the latter of which appeals to higher-type variables. I will in 
this section review arguments against semantic reconstruction. The discussion of recon-
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struction will pave the way for looking at gaps in A’-constructions that appear to corre-
spond syntactically to higher-type expressions, such as VPs and APs, which are the focus 
of Section 3.4: in this section, I will look at (and for) A’-constructions that have gaps 
with the syntactic distribution of higher-type expressions: topicalization structures in 
3.4.1, and wh-movement in 3.4.2. In Section 3.5, I will briefly discuss variable-free se-
mantic frameworks. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
 
3.2 Reconstruction and Pied-piping 
Reconstruction refers generally to cases where a moved constituent – or a part thereof – 
behaves as if it were interpreted in its unmoved position. Pied-piping in wh-questions, for 
example, has been observed to behave this way (Chomsky 1977, Karttunen 1977, Heim 
1987, among others). Consider, for example, the contrast in grammaticality between the 
following two wh-questions, both of which at least superficially look quite alike, in that 
both have gaps that correspond syntactically to a DP, and both of have gaps in the post-
copular position of a there-existential (these examples are based on Heim 1987, who in 
turn reports the contrast from Safir 1982):59  
 
(211) a. [CP How many soldiers] were there __ at the party (when you got there)? 
 b. ??[CP Who] was there __ at the party (when you got there)? 
 
Heim (1987) shows the contrast in (211) can be explained given independently motivated 
assumptions about both (i) what may occur in the post-copular subject position of a there-
                                                 
59 The discussion here will follow in large part the discussion of these examples in Heim 1987.  
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existential – a position known to be subject to the Definiteness Restriction (Milsark 1974, 
1977) – and (ii) how the gap in each of these examples should be interpreted in order to 
derive the right interpretations for these questions. Starting with (i), Milsark’s 
Definiteness Restriction bars certain nominals – his strong nominals, which include the 
definite nominals – from occurring in the post-copular subject position of there-
existentials, to account for the contrast in (212).  
 
(212) a. *There was the soldier at the party.  
 b. There was a soldier at the party. 
 
Heim posits as an instance of the Definiteness Restriction the constraint in (213), which 
prohibits individual variables from occupying the position following there-be, taking in-
dividual variables to belong to the strong class of nominals. 
 
(213) *There be x, where x is an individual variable.  (Heim 1987) 
 
Support for (213) comes examples like the following, which show that a bound variable 
pronoun may not occur following there be: 
 
(214) a. *Few people admitted that there had been them at the party. 
 b. *No perfect relationship is such that there is it. 
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Further support for (213) comes from the distribution of wh-gaps in there-existentials. In 
particular, if (213) holds, it predicts that a gap that is interpreted as an individual variable 
should not be permitted in the post-copular position of a there-existential. Heim proposes 
that this in fact accounts for the contrast in (211), repeated below. 
 
(211) a. How many soldiers were there __ at the party (when you got there)? 
 b. ??Who was there __ at the party (when you got there)? 
 
It can be independently argued based on the semantics of these questions that the gap in 
(211a) is not solely an individual variable at LF, while the one in (211b) is. For example, 
the meaning of (211a) corresponds (roughly) to the paraphrase in (215a): the question 
asks, for what degree d, whether there were d-many soldiers at the party. This meaning 
can be derived by (roughly) the LF representation in (215b), in which the how many-
phrase is taken to comprise two parts, the first consisting of a wh-operator (contributed by 
how) and the second x-many N’, construed here as a existential generalized quantifier 
which is pied-piped with how in the surface structure representation (Heim 1987, Cresti 
1995, Rullmann 1995, Romero 1998, Frampton 1999, Fox 1999.)60  
 
(215) a. For what degree d: there were d-many soldiers at the party. 
 b. Whd [there were d-many soldiers at the party] 
                                                 
60 For the present discussion, I will assume without argument that this interpretation is derived from an LF 
in which the indefinite x-many people syntactically occupies its base position, either by being lowered 
(Cinque 1990) or by interpreting its lowest copy (Chomsky 1995). That is, I will assume that part of the 
how many-phrase is syntactically reconstructed into its unmoved position (Heim 1987, Lebeaux 1990, 
Heycock 1995, Romero 1999, Fox 2000 and others). I will, however, motivate this assumption, and com-
pare it to semantic theories of reconstruction in the next section (Section 2.4).  
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Importantly, in order to derive this interpretation, (211a) is interpreted with a narrow 
scope occurrence of x-many soldiers. As Heim points out, if x-many soldiers were not 
interpreted with narrow-scope with respect to the wh-operator, as in (216b), the sentence 
would receive the unwanted interpretation in (216a), which could be answered by, e.g., 
Tom, Bill, and Frank, which intuitively is not an appropriate answer to (211a).  
 
(216) a. For what y such that there is a degree d and y is d-many soldiers:   
  there was y at the party  
 b. Why [ d  [d-many soldiers(y)]] [there were y at the party] 
  
This explains the well-formedness of (211a), as the gap in this question is not represented 
as an individual variable at LF, and thus does not violate the Definiteness Restriction. 
(211a) in this way contrasts with the interpretation of who questions like that in (211b), 
repeated below, which arguably do have a gap that corresponds to an individual variable 
at LF. The result is that (211b) would be assigned an interpretation like that in (217), in 
which who is represented as for what person x.61 
 
(211) b. ?Who was there __ at the pary (when you got there)? 
(217) Whx: x is a person: there was x at the party  
 
In (217), an individual variable follows there be, which results in ungrammaticality. 
                                                 
61 Heim (1987) suggests that who in some instances may also be interpreted in a way similar to how-many, 
and in this case satisfies the Definiteness Restriction. The reader is referred to that work for details. 
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To summarize, a surface gap arguably is not always interpreted as an individual 
variable at LF, although it may contain one. For example, although how-many-N-
questions and who questions both have DP gaps, they differ with respect to the LF repre-
sentations of their gaps. For the former, material that is pied-piped in the surface string – 
i.e., x-many-N – is interpreted at LF in the position of the gap. For the latter, an individual 
variable occupies the position of the gap. This explains why a gap corresponding to a 
moved how-many-N phrase may occur in the post-copular subject position of a there-
existential, while a gap corresponding to a moved who phrase may not, assuming Heim’s 
there be x constraint in (213). 
In this section, I have assumed without argument that these examples are ac-
counted for by syntactic reconstruction. There is, however, an alternative account of these 
cases that makes use of higher-type variables to capture the same contrasts, namely se-
mantic reconstruction. In the next section, I will introduce this alternative, and present 
arguments that have been given against it, and in favor of syntactic reconstruction. 
 
3.3 Syntactic vs. Semantic Reconstruction 
Several analyses have been proposed to account for reconstructed phrases; I will discuss 
two competing accounts here, namely, syntactic reconstruction, and semantic reconstruc-
tion. Recall from the previous section that how many-questions provide an example of 
partial reconstruction, in that part of the moved phrase is reconstructed in the position of 
the gap at LF, so that (218a) is assigned an LF like that in (218b).62  
 
                                                 
62 I follow Elbourne and Sauerland (2002) is using the terms partial reconstruction for a partially recon-
structed expression, and total reconstruction (a term they attribute to Aoun and Benmamoun 1998) for a 
totally reconstructed expression. My account of reconstruction, however, differs from their own. 
 108 
(218) Syntactic reconstruction 
 a. How many soldiers were there __ at the party? 
 b. Whd: there were d-many soldiers at the party. 
 
As reflected in (218b), one way of achieving a narrow-scope interpretation of part of the 
how-many phrase is to assume that the indefinite d-many people syntactically occupies 
the position of the gap that is, the indefinite is syntactically reconstructed (Heim 1987, 
Lebeaux 1990, Heycock 1995, Romero 1998, Fox 1999, 2000, among others), either by 
being lowered (Cinque 1990) or by interpreting its lowest copy (Chomsky 1995). How-
ever, there is an alternative – and semantically equivalent – way of achieving this narrow-
scope interpretation, according to which no material is syntactically reconstructed in the 
position of the gap at LF. Instead, the desired interpretation can also be achieved by as-
signing to the surface gap a higher-type variable at LF; this account is referred to as se-
mantic reconstruction (Engdahl 1986, Chierchia 1995, Cresti 1995, Rullman 1995, Ro-
mero 1998, Sternefeld 1997, 2001, Sharvit 1997). By this account, representing the sur-
face gap at LF with a variable of the same type as the expression x-many-soldiers – here, 
type <<e,t>, t> – makes it possible to interpret this constituent as if it occupied that posi-
tion syntactically. For example, interpreting the gap in (219a) as a variable of type  
<<e, t>, t>, as in (219b), produces the same semantic result as syntactically reconstruct-
ing x-many soldiers in its base position: 
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(219) Semantic reconstruction 
 a. How many soldiers were there __ at the party? 
 b. Whd  [d-many soldiers [⇧f<<e,t>,t>. there were f<<e,t>,t> at the party]] 
 
By abstracting over a variable of the same type as d-many soldiers, the constituent is in-
terpreted as if it were in its base position.  
Authors have since debated about whether there is any evidence for syntactic ver-
sus semantic reconstruction. In particular, evidence from sensitivity to LF constraints – 
binding theory constraints, in particular, assuming that these are structural constraints that 
hold at LF – have been used to determine the LF position of a reconstructed phrase (Le-
beaux 1991, Heycock 1995, Sportiche 1996, 2001, Romero 1998, Fox 1999, 2000 and 
others).63 For example, consider the following contrast (based on Romero 1998):64  
 
(220) a. *[How many pictures of John1] did he1 buy __?  
 b. [How many pictures of himself1] did John1 buy __?  
 
Given the surface syntactic configurations of these examples, these judgments are sur-
prising given the definitions of Principles C and A in (221) and (222).  
 
                                                 
63 Alternative accounts of binding phenomena have been proposed, in particular that of Reinhart (1983), 
which does not depend on structural configurations. Sharvit (1999) and Sternefeld (2001) in fact argue that 
the contrasts presented here may be accounted for on a semantic reconstruction account, given this con-
strual of binding (namely, a preference for variable binding over coreference).  
 
64 The lack Principle A violations in the examples at hand may be the result of the reflexives being logo-
phoric, and thus not subject to Principle A (as Heycock 1995 points out, based on Reinhart and Reuland 
1993). If so, then these examples would not provide support for syntactic reconstruction. See, however, Fox 
and Nissembaum 2004 for evidence (not presented here) that Principle A can in fact be used to motivate 
syntactic reconstruction. 
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(221) Principle C: An r-expression cannot be c-commanded by a co-referring 
 expression.  
 
(222) Principle A: An anaphor must be c-commanded by its binder. 
 
For example, the surface syntax of (220a) does not violate Principle C, as John, an r-
expression, is not c-commanded by the co-referential he (and thus this example would 
need to be ruled out on other grounds). Similarly, the surface syntax of (220b) does not 
satisfy Principle A, as himself is not c-commanded by its binder, John. These peculiar 
judgments can, however, be explained if the pied-piped portion of the moved how-many 
phrase – in this case, x-many pictures – is syntactically reconstructed at LF: 
 
(223) a. Whx [he1 bought x-many pictures of John1]  
 b. Whx [John1 bought x-many pictures of himself1]  
 
In these examples, Principles C and A are satisfied, respectively. In effect, these exam-
ples behave like their declarative counterparts (substituting that for how):  
 
(224) a. *He1 bought that many pictures of John1.    
 b. John1 bought that many pictures of himself1. 
 
(224a), like (223a), violates Principle C, while (224b), like (223b), satisfies Principle A.  
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A similar contrast comes from variable binding examples, as in (225) (thanks to 
Henry Davis, p.c., for bringing these examples to my attention).  
 
(225) a. *[How many pictures of [each woman]1 ] did she1 buy?  
 b. [How many pictures of herself1] did [each woman]1 buy?   
 
Assuming that a variable binder must c-command variables it binds at LF, these gram-
maticality judgments are expected if these questions are assigned the LFs in (226), in 
which the x-many N constituent is syntactically reconstructed: 
 
(226) a. Whx [she1 bought x-many pictures of [each woman]1 ] 
 b. Whx [[each woman]1 bought x-many pictures of herself1 ] 
 
In (226a), each woman does not c-command she, while in (226b), it does.  
To sum up so far, Principles C and A – assuming that these principles are struc-
tural constraints that hold at LF – provide evidence for syntactic reconstruction for how-
many questions, and against semantic reconstruction. I will adopt this account of recon-
struction here, and thus do not see how-many questions as posing a counterexample to 
NHTV. 
In addition to how-many-questions, other constructions have also been analyzed 
as instances of reconstruction. Interestingly, based on Principle C effects, several authors 
have argued that just those expressions that would require higher-type traces to semanti-
cally reconstruct in fact obligatorily syntactically reconstruct at LF (see Heycock 1995, 
Fox 1999; based on data from Cinque 1990; see also Beck 1996 in the context of how 
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many questions). In the next section, I will consider other cases of reconstruction in the 
context of non-nominal gaps.  
 
3.4 Non-Nominal Gaps in A’-Constructions  
I turn now to motivation that NHTV holds for A’-Movement. My main strategy will be to 
look for gaps in A’-constructions that correspond to higher-type expressions, in particu-
lar, VPs, APs, and AdvPs. These present potential cases in which higher-type variables 
would be used to interpret the gaps in these structures. In Section 3.4.1, I will look at 
topicalization, and in Section 3.4.2, at wh-movement. 
 
3.4.1 Topicalization 
Gaps corresponding to both VPs and APs may occur in topicalization structures, as (227) 
illustrates. 
 
(227) a. …and [VP win the election], Terry did __.   VP 
 b. …and [AP angry], Martha became __.    AP  
 
These structures, like how-many questions, have been analyzed as cases of reconstruc-
tion, and here too, both syntactic and semantic reconstruction have been proposed. By the 
former account, the gaps in these structures may be syntactically reconstructed at LF, as 
in (228) (see Cinque 1984, Barss 1986, 1987, Huang 1993, Heycock 1995).  
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(228) a. Terry did [VP win the election]    
 b. Martha became [AP angry]    
 
The alternative is to construct an LF in which the gap is interpreted as a variable of the 
same type as the moved constituents, with the result that they are interpreted as if in their 
unmoved position (see von Stechow 1991, Bittner 1994):65  
 
(229) a.  [VP win the election] [ ⇧f<e, t> . Terry did f<e, t> ]     
 b.  [AP angry] [ ⇧f<e, t> . Martha became f<e, t> ]     
 
Note that this case differs from the how-many cases discussed in the previous section in 
that here the whole constituent is reconstructed in its original position, that is, these are 
instances of total reconstruction; I flag this here because it will be relevant below for 
looking at wh-questions with predicative gaps, where total reconstruction is not possible 
(see discussion below).  
Based on Principle C effects, several authors have argued that topicalized predi-
cates obligatorily syntactically reconstruct at LF (Cinque 1984; Barss 1986, 1988; Huang 
                                                 
65 A third possibility is that these constructions involve abstraction over a nominalized individual, as sug-
gested in Potts (2002b), so that (i) is assigned the LF in (ii): 
 
(i) Win the election, Terry did __. 
(ii) [VP Win the election] 1 Terry did t1. 
 
By this account, the moved VP would denote a nominalized property, and the variable abstracted over 
would range over nominalized properties. Potts supports this account with the observation that moved pre-
dicates may extract out of weak islands: 
 
(iii) Win the election, Terry wondered whether he would __. 
 
If only individual-denoting phrases may extract, then this example can be taken as evidence for the LF in 
(ii). See further discussion in Section 3.4.3. 
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1993; Heycock 1995). Assuming that Principle C is a syntactic condition holding at LF, 
the constraint has been used to determine the LF position of the moved predicate (Le-
beaux 1990, Heycock 1995, and others). Consider, for example, the following contrast:  
 
(230) [DP Those allegations about Johni], I think hei will deny __.  
(231) *[VP Cry out for Maryi’s brother], I think shei did __. 
 
In both of these examples, a phrase that contains an R-expression is moved out of a con-
figuration in which Principle C would be violated, as examples in which these phrases are 
not moved illustrate:  
 
(232) *I think hei will deny [DP those allegations about Johni].  
(233) *I think shei [VP cried out for Maryi’s brother].  
 
The contrast between the sentences in (230) and those in (231), can be explained if 
moved APs and VPs – that is, moved predicates – obligatorily reconstruct at LF. As (233) 
shows, this would result in a Principle C violation. In contrast, in (230), the moved con-
stituent leaves an individual trace, and thus may be interpreted in its moved position, 
where it does not violate Principle C. Just this state of affairs is predicted if higher-type 
traces are disallowed, as NHTV dictates. 
To summarize, evidence from Principle C suggests that topicalization structures 
are instances of syntactic reconstruction, and thus do not involve higher-type variables.  
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3.4.2 Wh-Movement 
In this section, I will look at constructions in which wh-gaps correspond to expressions 
that are commonly taken to be of a higher-type, in particular, VPs, APs, and AdvPs. For 
each type of syntactic constituent, I will look at their behavior in three wh-constructions: 
wh-questions, restrictive relatives, and pseudo-clefts. I postpone looking at their behavior 
in non-restrictive relatives and as-appositives to Section 3.5. 
 
3.4.2.1 VP Gaps in Wh-Constructions 
In English, wh-gaps with the distribution of VPs are not possible in wh-questions, 
pseudo-clefts, or restrictive relatives. Consider for example, the ungrammatical wh-
question in (234b), which has a gap with the distribution of a VP, as comparison with 
(234a) shows.  
 
(234) a. I saw Mary [VP wash the dishes]. 
 b.  *What did you see Mary __?   
 c.  What did you see Mary do __? 
 
The ungrammaticality of (234b) indicates that the gap in a wh-question cannot have the 
distribution of a full VP. Instead, to form a wh-question for a VP, examples like (234c) 
are used, which appears to be a nominal wh-phrase combined with main verb do, analo-
gous to expressions like do so or do that discussed in Chapter 2. Similarly, VP gaps do 
not occur in pseudo-cleft constructions, as (234a) shows; instead, here too, (234b) is 
used, in which main verb do occurs with a nominal gap. 
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(235) a.  *What I saw Mary __ was wash the dishes.   
 b. What I saw Mary do __ was wash the dishes. 
 
The situation is similar for restrictive relative clauses, in which VP gaps are also absent, 
as (236a) shows (however, see discussion immediately below on what such constructions 
might mean, and where they would occur in the syntax); (236a) contrasts with (236b), in 
which main verb do occurs. 
 
(236) a. *[CP wh that I made Mary __ ]   
 b. The typing [CP wh that I made Mary do __ ] was sloppy.  
 
The absence of wh-questions and restrictive clauses with VP gaps can be explained by 
NHTV. Unlike with topicalization, total reconstruction for these examples is not possible: 
as Sauerland and Elbourne (2004) point out, total reconstruction for wh-questions is not 
possible because the wh-operator in these constructions would otherwise be a vacuous 
binder. Partial reconstruction is as a result required for wh-constructions (as opposed to 
topicalization, for example). Since these constructions require abstraction over a variable, 
and since VP meanings are usually taken to be properties of individuals, the result would 
be abstraction over properties. This, I am claiming, is the reason for the ungrammaticality 
of the (a) cases in (12)-(236) above. In order to avoid abstraction over higher-type vari-
ables, the form do what is used instead, which makes possible abstraction over individual 
variables – in particular, over variables that range over individuals that correspond to 
nominalized properties. Support for viewing the variable as ranging over individuals that 
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correspond to nominalized properties comes from the contrast between grammaticality of 
(236b) above, and the ungrammaticality of (237) below: the relative clause that I saw her 
do is grammatical only if it modifies a nominal property, e,g, in (236b). This relative 
clause cannot modify a verb, as (237) shows.66  
 
(237) *Mary typed [CP wh that I made her do __ ].  
 
There is, apparently, a sortal clash in (237), as the CP denotes a set of nominalzed indi-
viduals. This supports the conclusion that the variable in this construction is itself a vari-
able over individuals that correspond to nominalized properties. 
Returning to the hypothetical, but non-occurring case of a restrictive relative 
clause with a property-type gap, it is worth spelling out just what the semantics of such a 
constituent would be, if it were to exist. This can be illustrated by building up the seman-
tics of this constituent step by step. Consider, for example, the LF fragment in (238), 
which has a VP gap: 
 
                                                 
66 There may independent factors that rule out VP relatives. Rajesh Bhatt (p.c.), for example, suggests that 
it may be the case that relative clauses must adjoin to NPs, and that this independently rules out examples 
like (237), repeated as (i) below. 
 
(i) *Mary typed [CP wh that I saw her do __ ].  
 118 
(238)   CP 
 wo 
          wh1        C’ 
            wo 
      C           IP 
       g         wo 
    that       NP     I’ 
            g  wo 
            I  I      VP 
           wo 
          V          VP 
           g         wo  
        saw       NP              VP 
                 g        6 
             her2    t1  
 
Construing the trace as a variable over properties would yield a denotation for the above 
tree as in (239), in which there is abstraction over a variable over verb meanings.  
 
(239) [⇧f<e, t> . I saw Mary f<e, t>] 
 
This property would be a highly-typed modifier: a set of sets, i.e., type <<e, t>, t>. This 
type of modifier would not be appropriate for an <e, t>-type predicate, but rather would 
be fit for, e.g., a generalized quantifier, as it would provide a restriction on just this sort 
of expression, i.e., the characteristic function of a set of sets. This might very well explain 
in part why modifiers with VP gaps do no occur.  
 
3.4.2.2 AP Gaps in Wh-Constructions 
The situation with respect to AP gaps is a bit more complicated than that with VPs, so I 
will discuss each case in turn. 
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Starting with wh-questions, there are at least two types of AP gaps possible in 
English, as (240) and (241) illustrate. 
 
(240) a. Mary is that tall.  
 b.  How tall is Mary __? 
 
(241) a. May looks sick.  
 b.  How does Mary look __? 
 
These questions differ in that first arguably is a case of pied-piping, and involves recon-
struction – as was the case for how many-questions above – while the second is not. That 
the first involves reconstruction can be argued on similar grounds as was argued for how 
many questions. That is, the meaning of (240) may be paraphrased as in (242a), in which 
case it the question asks for a degree. It does not have the meaning in (242b), in which it 
asks for a predicate; if it did, we would expect that about six-feet would be an inappropri-
ate answer to (240a), which it is not.  
 
(242) a. For what d: Mary is d-tall. 
 b. For what f<e, t> such that there is a degree d and f is d-tall:    
  Mary is f<e, t>  
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To derive the interpretation in (242a), the question may be associated with the LF in 
(243), in which the pied-piped material, d-tall, is syntactically reconstructed in its origi-
nal position, and what is abstracted over at LF is a degree argument. 
 
(243) Whd [Mary is d-tall] 
  
Given this LF, the question does not involve higher-type variables at LF: even though its 
gap corresponds syntactically to an AP, the variable bound at LF is one that ranges over 
degrees. It should be noted, however, in addition to (b), semantic reconstruction would 
produce the same interpretation: 
 
(244) Whd [Mary is d-tall] 
 
There is no evidence from Principle C in this case against semantic reconstruction, so al-
though it is possible to show that (244) can be interpreted without appealing to higher-
type variables, there is no evidence that semantic reconstruction is not an option in this 
case. To motivate syntactic reconstruction in this, one could perhaps just assume that 
these cases work like the how-many cases. 
I turn now to the second type of AP question, as in (245), repeated below. 
 
(241) a. Mary looks sick.  
 b.  How does Mary look __? 
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This case, unlike (241), does not ask for a degree, but rather a predicate. I want to pro-
pose, however, that the gap in these cases is not a predicate, but rather has the same se-
mantics as that of the expression that way. I suggest this because there appears to be a 
correlation between the grammaticality of that way, and the possibility of an AP gap. 
Consider, for example, the following paradigm: 
 
(245) a. Mary looks sad. 
 b. Mary looks that way. 
 c. How does Mary look __? 
 
(246) a. Mary feel sad. 
 b. Mary feels that way. 
 c. How does Mary feel __? 
 
(247) a. Marc made Mary sad. 
 b. ??Marc made Mary that way. 
 c. ??How did Marc make Mary?   
 
(248) a. Marc found Mary drunk. 
 b. Marc found Mary that way. 
 c. How did Marc find Mary?   
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These data suggest that these how questions ma be analyzed as adverbial questions, the 
wh-counterparts to the adverbial pro-form, so. As a consequence, how-questions involve 
abstraction over kinds, just as so ranges over kinds (see further discussion of the seman-
tics of adverbial gaps in the next section). That AP gaps are not otherwise possible in wh-
constructions is supported by their non-occurrence in restrictive relatives, as (249a) illus-
trates, and psuedoclefts, as (249b) illustrates.  
  
(249) a. *[CP whi I made Mary ti] 
 b. ?What I made Mary was angry.    
 
As with VP gaps, the absence of wh-questions and restrictive clauses with AP gaps is ex-
pected given NHTV, since these constructions would require abstraction over AP mean-
ings, usually taken to be properties of individuals.  
 
3.4.2.3 Adverbial Gaps in Wh-Constructions 
The ungrammaticality of AP and VP gaps is not obviously due to an alternative restric-
tion that only syntactically nominal expressions may wh-move, as the wh-words where, 
when, and how in the wh-questions in (13) and free relatives in (14) are not obviously 
nominal, and yet are well-formed: 
 
(250) a.  Wherei did you put the keys __? 
 b.  Wheni did you arrive __? 
 c.  Howi did you travel __? 
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(251) a.  Matthew works [CP wherei you work __ ]. 
 b. Matthew laughs [CP wheni you laugh __ ].    
 c. Matthew sings [CP howi you sing __ ]. 
 
Wh-movement of these particular adverbials is possible because they produce structures 
in which there is abstraction over individuals: locations in (13a) and (14a), times in (13b) 
and (14b), and event-kinds (following Landman and Morzycki 2003) in (13c) and (14c).67  
 
3.4.3 Non-Restrictive Relatives 
Given that VP gaps are ungrammatical in wh-questions, restrictive relative clauses, and 
pseudo-clefts, it is somewhat surprising that they do occur in non-restrictive which-
relatives (henceforth, which-relatives), as (252a) illustrates (Jespersen 1965, Sells 1985, 
Hardt 1993, 1999, Potts 2002a, 2002b); examples are based on Jespersen 1965, via Sells 
1985). AP gaps may also occur in NRRs, as (252b) shows.68  
 
(252) Which-relatives 
 a. I can make words, which you cannot __.     VP 
 b. ?It made her feel sick, which it made me feel __ too.   AP 
 
                                                 
67 Lisa Matthewson (p.c.) asks what the status of why is. I believe that this case also may be taken to in-
volve individuals, with why gaps varying over the same type of individual that expressions like the reason 
denotes. 
 
68 Stowell and Potts present examples like (i) below as cases of AP gaps; these examples seem better 
judged than those above, however, I have chosen these particular ones because it makes it clear that we are 
not dealing with VP gaps, assuming that the auxiliary be moves up to I. 
 
(i) He is tired, which she [IP [I is] [VP __]] too. 
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Similar examples are provided by as-appositives, which also permit VP and AP gaps, as 
(253) illustrates (examples based on Stowell 1987 and Potts 2002a, 2002b). 
 
(253) As-appositives 
 a. She seemed happy, just as Theobald did __.    VP 
 b. ?It made her feel sick, as it made me feel __ too.   AP 
 
The question that arises, then, is the following: why are VP (and AP) gaps are permitted 
in non-restrictive relatives and as-appositives, but disallowed in wh-questions, wh-
relatives, and clefts? Recall that in Section 3.4.2.1, I explained the absence of VP gaps in 
the latter three constructions as due to NHTV: such constructions necessarily involve wh-
binding, and are ruled out because they would require higher-type variables, construing 
APs and VPs as properties. Given that VP and AP gaps are possible in which-relatives 
and as-appositives, then, it seems that one faces (at least) three possible explanations for 
these facts: (i) which-relatives and as-appositives do not involve movement, (ii) both 
which-relatives and as-appositives involve abstraction over individuals (contra Potts 
2002a,b), or (iii) NHTV does not hold for movement constructions. I will suggest here 
that it is (ii) that explains the grammaticality of AP and VP gaps in as-appositives, that is, 
both of these constructions involve abstraction over individual variables. This is a depar-
ture from the analysis of Potts (2002a,b), who argues that which-relatives and as-
appositives differ in the semantic type of their gaps, and so I will review his arguments 
for that position in the following, to make clear the consequences of departing from his 
analysis of these constructions. I will argue that his conclusion that these constructions 
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differ in the semantic types of their gaps is not a necessary one, given the data he pre-
sents.  
As a first point, it should be established that which-relatives and as-appositives 
truly involve wh-movement, as one potential explanation for the difference in the behav-
ior of these two constructions on the one hand, and wh-questions, restrictive relatives, and 
pseudo-clefts on the other, would be that the gaps in the former are not instances of wh-
movement, but rather, ellipsis. Potts (2002a,b) – building on the work of Stowell (1987) – 
argues that they do, by showing that these constructions do not display properties of el-
lipsis, but do show properties of movement. More specifically, Potts (2002b), following 
Stowell (1987), takes the gaps in as-appositives and which-relatives to be produced by 
wh-movement, so that the as-appositive in (254a) is assigned the structure in (255b), in 
which a wh operator occupies the specifier of the CP complement of as, which is ana-
lyzed as a preposition, and the which-relative in (255a) is assigned the structure in (255b) 
(based on Potts 2002a), in which a wh-operator occupies the specifier of the CP:  
 
(254) a. Ames stole important documents, as the FBI said he had __ . 
 b. [PP [P as] [CP wh1 the FBI said he had t1]] 
 
(255) a. Ames stole important documents, which the FBI said he had __ . 
 b. [CP which1 the FBI said he had t1] 
 
Potts supports this analysis by showing that although as may be separated from the gap 
by more than a single clause, as (256) shows (example based on Potts 2002b), as may not 
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be separated from the gap by a syntactic island (as I will show in the following para-
graphs). He presents the examples in (257) - (260), which show that as-appositives are 
sensitive to island boundaries (Potts attributes the original observation to Ross 1973; see 
also McCloskey 1989, Lapointe 1991, Postal 1997). The (a) examples involve CP-as, the 
(b) examples Predicate-As:  
  
(256) a. James left early, just as I thought he might __. 
 b. James left early, which I thought he might __.   
 
(257) Relative Clause Island 
 a. The earth is round, just as we (*spoke with someone who) claimed __. 
 b. John left the country, just as we (*know someone else who) will __.   
 
(258) Adjunct Island 
 a. Jim sells cars, as (*they smiled politely when) Bill announced __ last night. 
 b. Jim couldn’t stop laughing, just as (*they smiled politely when) Bill couldn’t  
  __ last night.   
 
(259) Subject Island 
 a. *The earth is round, just as his announcing __ made everyone giggle. 
 b. *He sells cars, just as his announcing he does __ made everyone giggle.   
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(260) Complex DP Island 
 a. The earth is round, as (*we made the claim that) everyone knows __. 
 b. He felt happy, as (*we made the claim that) he should __.  
 
The same pattern holds for which-relatives, which also do not permit which to be sepa-
rated from the gap by an island boundary:69 
 
(261) Relative Clause Island 
 a. The earth is round, which we (*spoke with someone who) claimed __. 
 b. He left early, which we (*saw someone who) did __ too.   
 
(262) Adjunct Island 
 a. Jim sells cars, which (*they smiled when) Bill announced __ last night. 
 b. Jim couldn’t stop laughing, which (*they smiled when) Bill couldn’t __ either.  
 
(263) Subject Island 
 a. The earth is round, which (* his claiming) __ made everyone giggle. 
 b. He left early, which (* his claiming we did) __  made everyone giggle.   
 
                                                 
69 As Potts points out, additional evidence that which-relatives involve movement comes from examples 
like (i), which show that which may pied-pipe a preposition; this can be taken to be diagnostic of wh-
movement (see also Stowell 1987):  
 
(i) a. The earth is round, which we are well are of __. 
 b. The earth is round, of which we are well aware __.  
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(264) Complex DP Island 
 a. The earth is round, which (*we made the claim that) everyone knows __. 
 b. He felt happy, which (*we made the claim that) he should __ more often.  
 
As Potts points out, island sensitivity makes these constructions unlike VP Ellipsis, which 
is insensitive to islands, as the examples in (265) - (268) illustrate; this supports the con-
clusion that the gaps in as-appositives and which-relatives are the product of movement. 
 
(265) Relative Clause Island 
 John left the country, and we know someone else who will __ too.   
 
(266) Adjunct Island 
 Jim couldn’t stop laughing, and they smiled when Bill couldn’t __ either.  
 
(267) Subject Island 
 He left early, and his claiming we did __  too made everyong giggle.   
 
(268) Complex DP Island 
 He felt happy, and we made the claim that he should __ more often.  
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In sum, both which-relatives and as-appositives – unlike ellipsis – obey island con-
straints, and this motivates the conclusion that there is wh-movement internal to these 
clauses.70  
Having established that the gaps in these constructions are due to movement, I 
turn now to the interpretation of these gaps. Potts (2002a) argues that which-relatives 
have individual-denoting gaps, while as-appositives have higher-type gaps (I abstract 
away here from the external semantics of these constructions, which does not matter for 
my purposes here.)71 Potts argues that treating the gaps in non-restrictive relatives as in-
dividual variables, and as-appositives as having higher-order variables accounts for cer-
tain differences in their behavior. I will ultimately conclude that this is not a necessary 
conclusion, however, given his arguments. He provides three arguments for this position, 
which I will review in turn.  
First, Potts follows Stowell (1987) and Postal (1994), in claiming that the con-
structions differ in the syntactic type of their gaps. In particular, these authors show that 
the gap in a which-relatives has the distribution of a DP, while the gap in an as-appositive 
has the distribution of a CP. Evidence comes from examples which show that the gap in a 
which-relative may only occur where a DP can, and, similarly, the gap in an as-appositive 
may only occur where a CP can. For example, (269) shows that the gap in a which-
                                                 
70 It should be noted, however, that German and Spanish, which do not permit VP ellipsis at all, also do not 
permit VP gaps in which-relatives and as-appostives, but instead only permit a VP pro-form. This suggests 
a possible correlation between the acceptability of VP ellipsis in a language, and the possibility of having 
VP gaps in non-restrictive clauses.  
 
71 Sells’ (1985) analysis of which-relatives is similar to that of Potts (2002a,b) in that Sells analyzes which 
as a variable over individuals: by Sells’ analysis, which is a pronoun just like the pronoun it, only it ranges 
over nominalized properties (Sells adopts Chierchia’s (1984) proposal that VPs and APs may correspond to 
individuals, as well as properties.) Interestingly, Sells claims that the antecedents for which correspond to 
those syntactic categories that denote individuals, and he concludes that “…[which] anaphora gives us clues 
as to what individuals we should posit in our semantic representation” [p. 305]. 
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relative behaves like a DP, in requiring the presence of of when occurring as the argu-
ment of the adjective aware.  
 
(269) a. We are well aware (*of) that the earth is round. 
 b. The earth is round, as we are well aware (*of). 
 d. *The earth is round, of as we are well aware. 
  
The gaps in as-appositives show the opposite behavior, as (270) shows: these examples 
show that the gap in an as-appositive may not occur with of. 
 
(270) a. We are well aware *(of) the fact that the earth is round. 
 b. The earth is round, which we are well aware *(of). 
 d. The earth is round, of which we are well aware. 
 
The same pattern occurs with respect to the complement of verbs like boast and comment 
(Postal 1994), which do not allow DP complements, but instead require CP complements, 
as (271) shows.  
 
(271) a. *Albert boasted/commented/complained that. 
 b. Albert boasted/commented/complained that the results were fantastic. 
 
Correspondingly, these verbs permit as-appositive gaps in their object position, but not 
which-relative gaps (Postal 1994):  
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(272) a. ??The results were fantastic, which Albert boasted/commented/complained. 
 b. The results were fantastic, as Albert boasted/commented/complained. 
 
Stowell (1987) also supports the contrast between which-relatives and as-appositives us-
ing raising verbs, which also take CP, but not DP complements, as the following exam-
ples show: 
 
(273) a. It appears (*a fact) that the earth really is round. 
 b. The earth is round, {as/*which} it appears. 
 
Potts, assuming a close connection between syntactic category and semantic type, takes 
the difference in syntactic gap to indicate a difference in semantic type of the gaps. He 
proposes that which-relatives have individual-denoting variable, while as-appositives 
have gaps corresponding to propositions, construed as properties of worlds. He then ex-
tends this analysis to cases in which which-relatives have VP or AP gaps, as in (252), re-
peated from above. That is, the gaps in these examples, he claims, also are represented at 
LF as individual variables, in particular, individuals that correspond to nominalized prop-
erties. 
 
(252) Non-Restrictive Relatives 
 a. I can make words, which you cannot __.     VP 
 b. ?It made her feel sick, which it made me feel __ too.   AP 
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However, the conclusion is somewhat puzzling, given that there is no evidence for these 
cases that the gaps here are syntactically nominal. If anything, it seems that they are not, 
since nominals of course may not occur where a VP occurs: 
 
(274) Non-Restrictive Relatives 
 a. *I can make words, and you cannot that.     VP 
 b. *It made her feel sick, and it made me feel that too.   AP 
 
I conclude that the argument that syntactic category determines semantic type is not a 
particularly strong one here. Both which-relatives and as-appositives may be taken to in-
volve abstraction over individuals. 
The second argument Potts presents comes from the behavior of as-appositives 
and which-relatives with respect to extraction of out weak islands. The main observation 
is that the wh-operator in an as-appositive may not move out of a weak island, while 
which may (based on Ross 1984):  
 
(275) a. ?He was a spy, which they asked whether we knew __. 
 b. *He was a spy, as they asked whether we knew __. 
 
Potts points out that this contrast can be explained given his assumptions about the se-
mantic types of the gaps in these constructions, in conjunction with the assumption that 
only individual-level phrases may escape islands, as has been proposed by in work by 
Cinque (1990), Frampton (1991), and Cresti (1995). However, as Szabolcsi (1998, 2002) 
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discusses in detail, there are several types of data that are not amenable to the claim that 
only individual-level phrases may escape islands. Given that the status of the generaliza-
tion is not clear at this time, I do not take the data in (275) as indicative of the semantic 
type of the gap in which-relatives and as-appositives.  
To summarize, Potts argues that which-relatives have individual-denoting vari-
ables, while as-appositives have higher-order gaps, based on the syntactic distribution of 
their gaps, and the possibility of extraction out of weak islands. I am not convinced, how-
ever, that these arguments show conclusively that the gap in an as-appositive differs in 
semantic type from that of a which-clause, and in particular, that his arguments show that 
as-appositives necessarily have higher-order gaps.  
However, as Potts (p.c.), points out, if these arguments do go through, one con-
clusion that might be made is that NHTV does not in face hold for instances of move-
ment. This would require a conception of movement according to which it does not in-
volve variables. I will briefly discuss this possibility in the final section of this chapter.  
 
3.5 Variable-Free Semantics 
In light of the behavior of non-restrictive relatives and as-parentheticals, one route to take 
would be to give up the assumption that movement structures are interpreted as involving 
abstraction over variables. This has been argued for in variable-free frameworks (Jacob-
son, Szabolcsi 1989, among others). Giving up the treatment of gaps as variables would 
be one way to account for the differences between which-relatives and as-appositives dis-
cussed in the previous section. By shifting the focus away from movement and binding, 
the constraint would fall to free variables or their equivalents in a variable-free system. It 
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would then be possible to say that NHTV is actually about what kinds of context depend-
ency we find in natural language.  
Taking this route, however, would also mean giving up any explanation of why 
VP and AP gaps are not possible in certain wh-constructions (as argued in Section 3.4.2), 
as NHTV would not apply to movement constructions. Further, it would mean giving up 
what appears to be the same constraint applying to both movement, as well as pro-forms 
(namely, NHTV).  
 
3.6 Chapter Summary  
According to NHTV, gaps produced by movement involve variables of a type no higher 
than that of an individual. I have argued that this is the case in English based on (i) recon-
struction, and (ii) possible gaps in A’-movement constructions. In particular, where total 
reconstruction is possible – as in topicalization structures – VP and AP gaps are possible 
because these structures involve no variables at all. In contrast, where partial reconstruc-
tion is necessary – as in wh-questions – we find abstraction over individuals that corre-
spond the properties, as in the case of VP questions and AP questions and adverbial ques-
tions.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
ELLIPSIS AND VARIABLES 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I focused on the interpretation of gaps produced by movement; in 
this chapter, I will focus on the interpretation of gaps of a different nature: those that are 
cases of ellipsis. In particular, I will look at ellipses that have the distribution of VPs or 
NPs, as illustrated in the following examples (where Ø represents an elided phrase, and 
underlining signifies co-reference): 
 
(276) If Jane leaves, Bill will Ø too.     VP 
(277) I’ll wash these dishes if you wash those Ø.     NP 
 
Approaches to the interpretation of VP and NP ellipsis fall into at least two camps:72 
those that posit fully articulated syntactic structure for the elided phrase at LF (see, e.g., 
Wasow 1972, Sag 1976, Williams 1977, Hankamer 1979, Haik 1987, Tancredi 1992, 
Chomsky and Lasnik 1993, Fiengo and May 1994, Wilder 1995, Romero 1998, Fox 
2000, Kennedy and Merchant 2000, Merchant 2001, 2005, Kennedy 2003, Goldberg 
2005, Frazier and Clifton 2005, Elbourne 2005, among others) and those that treat the 
ellipsis as a variable – a higher-type variable, assuming that VPs and NPs are interpreted 
as properties – and thus on a par with pronouns such as him (see, e.g., Bach 1977, 1979, 
                                                 
72 Many of these analyses concentrate on VP ellipsis; whether NP ellipsis should be interpreted just like VP 
ellipsis remains an open issue, but seems to be assumed in, e.g., Merchant 2001 and Johnson 2004 (both 
building on Lobeck (1995), as well as Elbourne 2005. See Section 4.3 for further discussion of the interpre-
tation of NP ellipsis. 
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Bach and Partee 1980, Rooth 1981, Partee and Bach 1984, Klein 1987, Dalrymple et al. 
1991, Jacobson 1992, Kehler 1993, Hardt 1993, 1999, Hendriks and de Hoop 2001, 
among others).73 I will refer to the former type of account as the deletion account, and the 
latter type as the pro-form account.74 Clearly, my constraint supports the deletion account, 
but not the pro-form account. The question, then, is whether a case can independently be 
made for one account over the other.  
There is a long-standing debate, however, over which of these accounts is supe-
rior on theoretical and empirical grounds, as both accounts enjoy a good measure of em-
pirical success, and both accounts face empirical problems that the other does not (see, 
e.g., comparison of the two accounts in Kennedy 2003, Johnson 2001, Hardt 1993). My 
aim in this chapter, as a result, will not be to try to resolve this debate, but rather to show 
that a deletion view of ellipsis is a viable possibility, and to make clear the consequences 
– both good and bad – of adopting such a view of ellipsis.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, I will review 
the deletion view of ellipsis, that is, the view of VP ellipsis by which it is represented at 
LF as a fully syntactically articulated VP, as illustrated in (278), where the strikethrough 
font designates unpronounced syntactic structure. 
 
(278) Whenever Jane laughs, Bill does laugh too.     
                                                 
73 There are actually two variants under this first approach: the first generates the elided VP with fully ar-
ticulated syntactic structure, which is at some point deleted or not pronounced (see, e.g., Tancredi 1992, 
Fox 2000, Merchant 2001, among others), and the second generates the elided VP as an empty node, which 
at LF is interpreted by copying an antecedent VP (see, e.g., Wasow 1972, Williams 1977, Lobeck 1995, 
among others). The differences between these two variants of the first approach will not matter here. 
 
74 I call the first type of account the “deletion account” for lack of a better name; as noted in footnote 2, 
however, there are two versions of the this account, one of which involves not deletion but copying. I treat 
both as the same here, as both involve a fully articulated representation of a VP at LF. 
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In this section, I will review empirical arguments for this view of ellipsis, and address in 
particular one major argument against it, that presented by so-called sloppy readings of 
VP ellipsis (Hardt 1997, Schwarz 2000). I will conclude from a brief review of these ex-
amples that how best to account for them is still up for debate, given that there are cur-
rently multiple competing accounts of these examples (e.g., Tomioka, to appear, El-
bourne 2005), at least one of which does not make use of higher-type variables (namely, 
Elbourne 2005).  
In Section 4.2, I will look at NP Ellipsis and one-anaphora. I will adopt the dele-
tion account for NP Ellipsis, so that it has internal syntactic structure like that of an overt 
NP, as in (279). 
 
(279) I’ll wash these dishes if you wash those dishes.     
 
Further, following Llombart-Huesca (2002), I will argue that one-anaphora is an instance 
of NP Ellipsis, with one a Num head that immediately precedes an elided NP. For exam-
ple, the DP the little ones in (280) is represented syntactically as in (281). 
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(280) I’ll wash the big dishes if you wash the little ones. 
 
(281)            DP 
          wo 
        D                NumP 
         g                 wo 
       the       AP                       NumP 
               g                       3 
            little             Num              NP 
              g         g  
                 ones     dishes 
 
By this analysis, one(s)-anaphora is not a counterexample to NHTV. 
 
4.2 VP Ellipsis 
NHTV supports the deletion view of ellipsis, that is, an analysis of VP Ellipsis by which 
it is represented at LF as a fully syntactically articulated VP, as illustrated in (282).  
 
(282) Whenever Jane laughs, Bill does laugh too.     
 
An alternative analysis – at odds with NHTV – views VP Ellipsis as a variable; this can 
be represented by the LF in (283), in which ∆ represents a property variable, i.e., a vari-
able over VP meanings.  
 
(283) Whenever Jane laughs1, Bill does ∆ 1 too.     
 
Researchers have long sought to resolve which of these analyses better accounts for the 
behavior of VP ellipses, and good arguments for both accounts have surfaced. Evidence 
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for the deletion account, for example, comes from examples that suggest that syntactic 
constraints, e.g., island constraints, are active in the ellipsis site (Hardt 1993, 1999 and 
Kennedy 2003); if VP Ellipsis were analyzed as a variable – and thus with no internal 
syntactic structure – it would be expected not to be sensitive to such constraints. I will 
review data suggesting that syntactic constraints are active within the ellipsis site in Sec-
tion 4.2.1. 
Evidence for the pro-form account of VP Ellipsis comes from examples that ap-
pear to be instances of sloppy readings of VP Ellipsis. If sloppy readings are best ana-
lyzed as bound variables, these examples potentially provide good support for treating 
them as variables. I will review these data, and accounts that have been proposed to ac-
count for them, in Section 4.2.2.  
 
4.2.1 Structural Constraints That Hold within the Ellipsis Site 
At least two types of syntactic constraints have been observed to hold within elided VPs: 
(i) island constraints and (ii) binding theory constraints; I will review each in turn.75  
 
4.2.1.1 Island Constraints 
Wh-movement is possible out of an ellipsis site, as the examples in (284) show (based on 
Chao 1987, Tancredi 1992, Hardt 1993, Schwarz 2000, Johnson 2001, Kennedy 2003). 
 
                                                 
75 Kennedy (2003) argues that the picture is a little more complicated than this. Building on previous work 
of his with Jason Merchant (Kennedy and Merchant 2000), he shows that structural constraints that make 
reference to the interface between the syntax and phonological component do not hold within an ellipsis 
site, although they may hold for a pronounced VP. See references for further details. 
 140 
(284) a. I know who1 Mary likes t1 and who2 Kim doesn’t Ø.   
 b. The problems wh1 you can see t1 are easier to deal with than the ones wh2 you  
  can’t Ø. 
 c. Hazelnuts, wh1 I like t1; peanuts, wh2 I don’t Ø.    
 
Strikingly, this movement is subject to island constraints, as the examples in (285) show 
(Haik 1987): each of these examples contrasts with those in (284) in that in them, the wh-
phrase moves out of a restrictive relative clause island.76 
 
(285) a. *I know who1 Mary likes t1 and who2 Bill wrote a whole song that he does Ø.  
 b. *The problems wh1 that you can see t1 are easier to deal with than the ones wh2 
  you wrote an article that explained Ø. 
 c. *Hazelnuts, wh1 I like t1; peanuts, I never made a pie that had Ø. 
 
The ungrammaticality of the examples in (285) is expected if elided VPs have internal 
syntactic structure, and thus behave just like an overt VP, assuming that island constraints 
are defined over structural configurations (and not, e.g., semantically).77 Further support 
                                                 
76 Sensitivity to island constraints sets VP ellipsis apart from sluicing, which is not sensitive to islands 
(Chomsky 1972, Lakoff 1972, Baker and Brame 1972, Chung, Ladusaw, and McCloskey 1995, Lasnik 
2001, Merchant 2001), as the following examples show (from Merchant 2001): 
 
(i) a. They want to hire someone who speaks a Balkan language, but I don’t remember which __.  
 b. *I don’t remember which Balkan language they want to hire someone who speaks __. 
 
I do not, however, see this as affecting the argument that VP ellipsis involves internal syntactic structure 
(see, e.g., Merchant 2001 for an account of the difference in behavior between VP ellipsis and sluicing).  
       
77 Jacobson (1992) and Hardt (1993) (the latter citing Lappin and McCord 1990), however, analyze exam-
ples like (284), in which a wh-phrase has moved out of the VP ellipsis site, as instances of pseudo-gapping. 
Under that account, these examples would be predicted to obey island constraints. See, however, Haik 
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for the conclusion that elided VPs are fully articulated syntactically comes from the be-
havior of the expressions do so, do it, and do that, which do not permit wh-binding, as the 
examples in (286) show (based on Johnson 2001).  
 
(286) a. *I know who1 Mary kissed t1 and who2 Kim didn’t do so/do it/do that.  
 b. *The problems wh1 that you can see t1 are easier to deal with than the ones wh2 
  that you can’t do so/do it/do that. 
 c. *Hazelnuts, wh1 I like t1; peanuts, wh2 I don’t do so/do it/do that.  
 
This is expected if these expressions are just the combination of main verb do and a pro-
form (see Section 2.5), and thus do not support wh-movement. 
To summarize this section, the contrast between (286) on the one hand, and (284) 
and (285) on the other, follows if VP Ellipsis has the internal structure of a garden-variety 
VP, while do so and do it do not.  
 
 4.2.1.2 Binding Theory Constraints 
Assuming that Binding Theory constraints are evaluated over structural configurations 
(but cf. Reinhart and Reuland 1993, as discussed below), sensitivity to these constraints 
has also been used as evidence of syntactic structure. For example, the ill-formedness of 
(287a) suggests that Principle B is active within an elided VP (from Kennedy 2003): 78 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1997), Kennedy (1997, Tomioka (2001, and Johnson (2001) who present empirical problems for pseudo-
gapping analysis of these examples. 
 
78 Some speakers of English find (287) acceptable, in which case this argument would not hold. 
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(287) a. ??Kim takes care of him1 because he1 won’t Ø. 
 b. Kim takes care of him1 because he1 won’t take care of him1. 
 
The ill-formedness of (287) can be accounted for if the ellipsis is syntactically articulated 
at LF, and if Principle B is assumed to be a structural constraint that holds at LF, as 
(287b) shows. Further, minimal pairs with do so, do it, and do that instead of VP Ellipsis 
are grammatical, which is again expected if these expressions are just the combination of 
do and a pro-form:  
 
(288) Kim takes care of him1 because he1 won’t do it/do so. 
 
That (288) contrasts with (287a) would be expected on the deletion view of ellipsis, since 
do it and do so would not incur violations of Principle B.  
It should be noted, however, that Hardt (1997) – defending a pro-form account of 
VP Ellipsis – accounts for the ill-formedness of (287a) by assuming that Principle B is a 
semantic – and not a syntactic – constraint, following Reinhart and Reuland (1993). That 
is, assuming that predicates with two co-indexed arguments must be reflexive-marked, 
the examples in (288) would be bad because the predicate in VP Ellipsis is not reflexive 
marked.  
 
4.2.2 Sloppy VP Ellipsis  
The previous two sections provide positive evidence for the deletion account of ellipsis. 
In particular, the observation that wh-extraction out of VP ellipses is sensitive to island 
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constraints provides strong evidence for this account, assuming that there is good reason 
to take island constraints to be syntactic. There are, however, also certain examples that 
have been posited as problematic for this view of ellipsis, which have been argued to 
support the pro-form account of ellipsis. These are examples of what appear to be sloppy 
readings of VP Ellipsis, illustrated in (289) and (290) (from Hardt 1997 and Schwarz 
2000; see also Sauerland 2004, Elbourne 2005, and Tomioka, to appear, for discussion of 
these examples):  
  
(289) I’ll help you if you want me to Ø. I’ll kiss you even if you don’t Ø.  
     (Hardt 1997, (16), attributed to Gawron/Pollard, p.c.) 
 
(290) When John had to cook, he didn’t want to Ø. When he had to clean, he didn’t 
 Ø, either.       (Schwarz 2000) 
 
In (289), the elided VP may be interpreted as “want me to kiss you”, and in (290), the 
elided VP may be interpreted as “want to clean”. Both Schwarz and Hardt liken these ex-
amples to sloppy readings of pronouns in ellipsis sites. Importantly, sloppy readings of 
pronouns have been accounted for by analyzing the pronouns as bound variables (Keenan 
1971, Sag 1976, Williams 1977, Reinhart 1976, Lasnik 1976), and Schwarz extends this 
analysis to the sloppy VPs in (289) and (290), with the result that his account crucially 
makes use of variables over VP meanings (that is, higher-type variables). To make clear 
the account, let me review at this point analysis of sloppy readings of NPs (the more clas-
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sic cases) as bound variables. Consider, for example, (287), which is ambiguous between 
a sloppy reading, and a strict reading. 
 
(291) John loves his mother and Bill does too. 
 
On one reading, (291) is true iff John loves his (own) mother, and Bill also loves John’s 
mother; this is the so-called strict reading. On a second reading, (291) is true iff John is in 
his (own) office, and Bill is in his (own) office; this is the so-called sloppy reading. The 
ambiguity has been analyzed as an ambiguity between referential and bound (see refer-
ences above). The strict reading, for example, can be represented by the LF in (292), in 
which the pronoun his in the elided VP co-refers with John.  
 
(292) John1 loves his1 mother and Bill2 does love his1 mother too. 
 
The sloppy reading, in contrast, can be accounted for by treating the pronouns in both 
VPs as bound variables, as in (296).79  
 
(296) John [⇧x . x is in x’s office] and Bill [⇧x . x is in x’s office] 
 
                                                 
79 Hardt actually argues against the analysis of sloppy readings as cases of bound variables, and instead 
analyzes them in a different framework as shifts in the discourse center: A sloppy pronoun can shift its 
interpretation because it refers to the discourse center, the most prominent entity currently under discus-
sion. See further discussion on this below. 
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Schwarz extends this analysis to the VP cases, by treating the sloppy VP as a bound vari-
able. He assigns to (290), for example, the LF in (294), in which the sloppy VP is ana-
lyzed as a variable bound by an overt VP that fronts at LF.  
 
(293) When John had to cook, he didn’t want to Ø. When he had to clean, he didn’t 
 Ø, either.       (Schwarz 2000) 
 
 (294) [VP cook]1 ⇧1 [when he had to t1, he didn’t want to t1] 
 [VP clean]1 ⇧1 [when he had to t1, he didn’t want to t1] 
 
By Schwarz’s account, then, sloppy VPs are instances of bound VPs, and thus provide an 
argument for the pro-form (or variable) account of ellipsis.  
There are, however, several problems for this analysis (as observed in, e.g., 
Schwarz 2000, Hardt 2003, Sauerland 2004, Elbourne 2005, and in particular Tomioka, 
to appear). For one, sloppy VPs may have wh-traces inside them, as (296) illustrates 
(Schwarz 2000, Sauerland 2004, Tomioka, to appear):80 
 
(296) A: Why are you so upset with Fred? He bought the books wh1 that he was 
 supposed to t1, right? 
 B: Yeah, but then he READ the books wh1 that he WASN’T supposed to read t1. 
        (Tomioka, to appear) 
 
                                                 
80 See Tomioka (to appear) for discussion of how (296) controls for certain problems with Schwarz’s origi-
nal examples of this sort.  
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This makes the pro-form analysis of these cases look puzzling, as wh-movement out of 
ellipsis sites can be taken as evidence against the variable account of ellipsis (and in par-
ticular, that such movement is sensitive to island constraints).  
A second problem for this account is illustrated by (298), which shows that pro-
forms like do so or do it do not permit sloppy readings: 
 
(296) When John had to cook, he didn’t try to. When he had to clean, he didn’t do it 
 either.      (based on Hardt 1999, Schwarz 2000)  
 
If VP ellipses are analyzed as pro-forms, then it is unexplained why overt pro-forms like 
do it and do so do not permit sloppy readings.  
A final problem is noted by both Schwarz and Hardt: If the sloppy VP is con-
strued as a bound variable, we expect there to be a binder in the antecedent VP (which 
then appears in the elided VP). In order to get the right configuration for this, Schwarz, 
for example, QRs the embedded VPs, so that (295) is associated with the LF in (296). 
 
(295) When John had to cook, he didn’t want to Ø. When he had to clean, he didn’t 
 Ø, either.       (Schwarz 2000) 
 
 (296) [VP cook]1 ⇧1 [when he had to t1, he didn’t want to t1] 
 [VP clean]1 ⇧1 [when he had to t1, he didn’t want to t1] 
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As both Schwarz and Hardt observe, the problem with this analysis is that QR should not 
be possible out of an island. For example, when the universal everyone is embedded in a 
when-clause, as in (297), it may not bind the pronoun he; this can be explained by a re-
striction on QR as being clause-bound. 
 
(297) When everyone left, he said goodbye. 
 
Interestingly, Schwarz and Hardt point out that this a problem for all sloppy readings, not 
just those cases of sloppy VPs: Sloppy readings of NPs are also possible even when they 
are not bound in the antecedent VP (also observed in Westcoat 1989, Rooth 1992, Tomi-
oka 1997). Consider, for example, (298), in which the antecedent NP for the first instance 
of her occurs in an island (example based on Schwarz 2000); as (299) shows, in order to 
analyze the sloppy reading of the ellipsis as containing a bound variable, the antecedents 
must QR out of when-clauses. 
 
(298) When Karen wins, we congratulate her. When Sarah wins, we do, too.  
 
(299) Karen1 ⇧1 [when t1 wins, we congratulate her1] 
 Sarah1 ⇧1 [when t1 wins, we congratulate her1] 
 
Given these problems with the bound variable approach to these examples, sev-
eral alternative analyses of sloppy readings have appeared. Hardt (1993, 1999, 2003), for 
example, concludes that sloppy readings should not be treated as involving bound vari-
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ables, and proposes a fundamentally different analysis, according to which sloppy read-
ings instead involve shifts in the discourse center. I will not go into the specifics of 
Hardt’s account here, except to say that although the analysis does not analyze sloppy 
VPs as bound variables, it does crucially treat them as variables. Tomioka (1999), in con-
trast, argues that problematic cases of sloppy identity involve E-Type pronouns – implicit 
definite descriptions. Schwarz notes that an analysis along these lines might be imple-
mented for the VP cases. See also Elbourne (2005) and Tomioka (to appear) for further 
alternatives, the latter making use of higher-type variables, the former not.  
I will conclude here that the best analysis for these examples remains an open is-
sue, and thus until a stronger account of them can be proposed, it is unclear whether they 
do or not provide strong evidence against NHTV. 
 
4.2.4 Summary 
To summarize this section, I have tried to show that there is ample independent support 
for treating VP Ellipsis as having fully articulated internal syntactic structure at LF, and 
thus does not make use of higher-type variables. I have also tried to make clear potential 
problems that come along with adopting this view of ellipsis, in particular, it is presently 
unclear whether sloppy readings of VP Ellipsis are a challenge to the deletion account of 
ellipsis, given that there are presently multiple competing accounts of these examples, 
including Elbourne (2005), which does not make use of higher-type variables. 
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4.3 NP Ellipsis 
NP Ellipsis is illustrated in the following examples, in which an NP following a posses-
sive determiner – his in is the (a) example and Max’s in the (b) example – is absent 
(based on Jackendoff 1968, 1971, Perlmutter 1970): 
 
(300) a. My shirt is the same as his Ø. 
 b. Bill’s story may be amazing, but Max’s Ø is virtually incredible. 
 
Following Elbourne (2002), I will assume that NP Ellipsis may follow almost any deter-
miner, as the paradigm in (301) shows (examples based on Elbourne 2002); I assume that 
the determiners a, possessives such as my, or no alternate as one, mine, and none, respec-
tively, when followed by NP Ellipsis, as (e) – (g) illustrate (Perlmutter 1970, Stockwell, 
Schachter and Partee 1973, Elbourne 2002). Only two determiners may not precede an 
elided NP, namely, the and every, as (h) and (i) show (however, as discussed in Section 
4.5, Elbourne takes the to surface as it before an elided NP, as suggested in Postal 1966.) 
 
(301) a. I’ll wash these dishes, if you wash those Ø . 
 a. Sue bought two books, and Mary bought three Ø. 
 b. Most people bother Joe, but he does like some/a few Ø. 
 c. The boys came to the party; each/both/neither Ø brought presents. 
 d. Many went south; few/most/all Ø returned. 
 e. Your kids are taller than mine/*my Ø.  
 f. Two heads are better than none/*no Ø.  
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 g. I wanted to read a book, so I bought one/*a Ø. 
 h. *Sue only bought one book, but Mary bought every Ø. 
 i. *I wanted to read the best book in the store, so I bought the Ø. 
 
Less attention has been devoted in the literature to the interpretation of NP Ellipsis than 
to that of VP Ellipsis, but here too, the issue arises whether the elided constituent is best 
analyzed as fully articulated at LF, or rather, as a variable over NP meanings, that is, a 
higher-type variable, assuming NPs denote properties of individuals. In the following 
sections, I will look at whether there is evidence favoring one account over the other by 
(i) trying to determine whether syntactic constraints hold within the ellipsis site, and (ii) 
looking at potential cases of sloppy readings of NP Ellipsis. Again, I will try to make 
clear the consequences – both good and bad – of adopting a deletion account of ellipsis, 
as this is the account that NHTV supports. 
 
4.3.1 Structural Constraints That Hold within NP Ellipsis 
As with VP Ellipsis, we can ask whether there is any evidence of internal structure in NP 
Ellipsis by observing whether syntactic constraints are active within the ellipsis site. One 
way of testing this is to check whether wh-movement is possible out of NP Ellipsis, and 
further, whether this movement obeys island constraints. Testing this, however, is made 
difficult by the fact that many examples in which wh-phrases move out of a DP are de-
graded. For example, movement out of a DP with a strong determiner (e.g., a possessive) 
is judged worse than movement out of a DP with a weak determiner, as the following 
contrast illustrates:  
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(302) a. ?Who does Mary want a picture of t1? 
 b. ??Who does Mary like her pictures of t1? 
 
Trying to control for this factor, the examples in (303) suggest that wh-movement out of 
an elided NP is judged ungrammatical.81 In (303a), for example, who has moved out of 
the elided NP, picture of t2, resulting in ungrammaticality. Compare the improved (303b), 
in which the same NP is not elided, as well as (303c), in which the head noun is elided 
(gapped), but the PP out of which who moves crucially is not (recall that a alternatives 
with one when followed by an elided N or NP).  
 
(303) a. *I know who1 Mary has a picture of t1, and who2 John WANTS one   
  picture of t2. 
 b. ?I know who1 Mary has a picture of t1, and who2 John WANTS a   
  picture of t2. 
 c. I know who1 Mary has a picture of t1, and who2 John WANTS one   
  picture of t2. 
 
These examples suggest that wh-movement is not possible out of an elided NP, and thus 
potentially provide evidence against the deletion account of ellipsis. However, given the 
awkwardness of the non-elided versions of these examples (as in (303b), for example), 
these examples perhaps should not be taken to have too much bearing on issue of how 
                                                 
81 Chisholm (2003) claims that whether movement is possible out of an elided NP cannot be tested, because 
he argues that NP ellipsis is only possible in DPs that have a possessive determiner. I am unconvinced, 
however, by his arguments for that position, which are largely based on whether or not NP ellipsis may be 
pragmatically controlled. See Chisholm (2003) for further details. 
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best to analyze NP Ellipsis. Moreover, puzzlingly, unlike a wh-operator, a quantifier can 
bind into a deleted NP, as the example in (304a) show. 
 
(304) a. Each prisoner1 suspected that that Al Jazeera would publish most pictures  
  of him1, but that CNN would only publish a few pictures of him1. 
 b. *Each prisoner1 suspected that that Al Jazeera would publish most pictures of  
  him1, but that CNN would only publish a few pictures of him1. 
As (304b) shows, binding is not possible when the pronoun is overt. I do not at this time 
know what to make of this data, except to conclude that when and why binding into the 
ellipsis site is possible or not is unresolved. 
 
4.3.2 Sloppy NP Ellipsis 
As with VP Ellipsis, sloppy readings of NP Ellipsis are possible (Elbourne 2005), as 
(305) shows. 
 
(305) When Bill wanted some advice, I gave him some. When he wanted some money, 
 I didn’t give him some money. 
 
The same problems that arose for analyzing sloppy readings of VP Ellipsis as bound vari-
ables over VP meanings, however, also hold for analyzing sloppy readings of NP Ellipsis 
as bound variables over NP meanings. In particular, in order to create a binder for the 
bound variable (over NP meanings) in the elided VP, the NP might be QR-ed as (306) 
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shows; this however, violates the clause-bound restriction on QR, as the NP is fronted out 
of a when-clause.  
 
(306) [NP advice]1 ⇧1 [when Bill wanted some t1, I gave him some ∆1] 
 [NP money]1 ⇧1 [when Bill wanted some t1, I didn’t give him some ∆1] 
 
Here too, I will conclude that it is presently unclear whether sloppy readings of NP Ellip-
sis are a challenge to the deletion account of ellipsis, given that there are competing 
analyses of these examples, and in particular that the analysis of Elbourne (2005) does 
make use of higher-type variables, but rather assigns to these cases fully articulated syn-
tactic structure at LF. 
 
4.4 One(s)-Anaphora  
One, as used in (307), has previously been analyzed as an NP pro-form (Ross 1967, Jack-
endoff 1977, Hornstein and Lightfoot 1981, Stockwell, Schachter and Partee 1973, 
among others). The analysis is based on two observations, both illustrated in (307): (i) 
one appears to have the distribution of an NP – occurring in a position following a deter-
miner and adjective – and (ii) semantically it seems to pick up the reference of a preced-
ing NP. 
 
(307) I’ll wash the big dishes if you wash the little ones.  
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Llombart-Huesca (2002), however, presents several arguments against analyzing one in 
this way. She proposes instead that one is phonological support (in the sense of do-
support) of a number affix that is stranded as a Num head in certain cases of NP Ellipsis, 
when an empty Num head cannot be licensed. In the following section, I will review 
Llombart-Huesca’s arguments against the pro-form account of one, and the basic aspects 
of her account. 
 
4.4.1 One as Num 
Llombart-Huesca (henceforth, LH) presents several problems for an analysis of one as an 
NP pro-form. First, one(s)-anaphora cannot pick up the reference a mass noun, as the fol-
lowing examples show (Jackendoff 1971): 
 
(308) a. *John had some chocolate cake, and Mary had some vanilla one(s). 
 b. *He drank a lot of beer, but I didn’t drink much one(s). 
 
If one is simply a variable over properties, it is unclear why it should be restricted to 
count nouns only. Note that NP Ellipsis, in contrast, is not subject to this constraint 
(Jackendoff 1971):  
 
(309) a. John had some cake, and Mary had some Ø, too. 
 b. He drank a lot of beer, but I didn’t drink much Ø. 
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Second, one may not simply appear wherever an NP may; it may not, for example, occur 
following a quantificational determiner unless an adjective follows the determiner, as 
(310a-b) show.  
 
(310) a. *Jack bought a few cupcakes. I bought several ones too. 
 b. Jack bought a few yellow cupcakes. I bought several pink ones. 
 
Again, if one is simply an NP pro-form, it is unclear why it should not appear exactly 
where an NP may. The situation is similar for the definite determiner: one may not occur 
with the definite determiner the unless a restrictive modifier – e.g., an AP or PP – also 
occurs, as the following contrasts show:   
 
(311) a. *Ella likes the car and I like the one, too. 
 b. Ella likes the blue car and I like the pink one. 
 
(312) a. *Ella likes the car near the door and I like the one too.  
 b. Ella likes the car near the door and I like the one near the deck.  
 
If one was an NP pro-form, it would be need to be explained why it does not occur in 
environments like *the one. 
LH proposes to account for these observations by analyzing one not as an NP pro-
form, but as phonological support for a morphological number affix that occupies the 
Num position, in the same way that do provides phonological support for a tense affix in 
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I, when I is not adjacent to V. By LH’s account, one(s)-anaphora is an instance of NP El-
lipsis, so that, for example, the pink one in (313a) would correspond to the LF in (313b) 
(I assume that AP left adoins NumP):  
 
(313) a. I like the green toothbrush better than the pink one. 
 b.   DP 
          qp 
         D       NumP 
     g     qp 
        the AP   NumP 
       g  qp 
    pink         Num            NP 
      g          g 
               one       toothbrush 
 
LH motivates her analysis from a number of perspectives, which I will review here in 
turn. First, she provides some support for this syntax from Italian. Italian has a process 
like English one(s)-anaphora, by which uno/-a (‘one’) appears to substitute for a previ-
ously mentioned NP, so that (314b) can be used to mean the same as (314a), in a context 
in which auto is previously mentioned (data from LH, based on Rizzi 1990): 
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(314) a. un’auto enorme sarebbe meglio. 
  an/one enormous car would-be better 
 b. una enorme sarebbe meglio 
  an/one enormous would-be better 
 c. *un’enorme sarebbe meglio 
  an/one enormous would-be better 
 d. un’altra sarebbe meglio 
  an/one enormous would-be better 
 
Interestingly, phonological reduction of una can occur in (314a), but not in (314b), as 
(314c) shows. LH points out that this can be explained if it is assumed that auto is elided 
in (b), thereby blocking una from reducing due to a following vowel-initial word. Further 
support for this analysis comes from (314d), where una is followed by a vowel initial 
pre-nominal adjective, and phonological reduction is in this case possible; this can be ex-
plained assuming that reduction is not blocked in this case, because the ellipsis follows 
the adjective. 
Second, she proposes that one does the semantic work of a Num head, which she 
identifies as having the semantics of a classifier. Spelling this out along the lines of 
Krifka (1995) and Kratzer (2005), Num (and in effect, one) here could be construed as a 
function from kinds to the properties of individuals that exemplify them (thus, one here is 
taken as doing the semantic work of Kratzer’s null classifier): 
 
(315) ||[Num one]|| = ⇧x . [⇧y . x ≤ y] 
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(316) ||toothbrush|| = TOOTHBRUSHk 
(317) ||one toothbrush|| = ⇧x . x ≤ TOOTHBRUSHk 
 
This, she proposes, accounts for the count noun restriction on one: because one has the 
semantics of number morphology – which is only compatible with count nouns – it nec-
essarily results in a non-mass interpretation.  
Finally, LH motivates the construal of one(s)-anaphora as an instance of NP El-
lipsis by showing that the two constructions are largely in complementary distribution, 
with one surfacing in just those cases that Num would otherwise be stranded. Specifi-
cally, Num, she proposes, is stranded when two conditions hold: (i) it cannot merge with 
N because the N has elided (as in the case of NP Ellipsis) – this is similar to tense mor-
phology in I, which cannot merge with V when V has elided (as in the cases of VP Ellip-
sis) (Halle and Marantz 1993, Bobaljik 1994, Lasnik 1995), and (ii) it is not licensed by a 
determiner with strong features. Following Lobeck (1995), LH assumes that certain de-
terminers have strong features and as a consequence may license an empty Num head; 
determiners that have strong features are possessive Ds (e.g., mine), quantificational de-
terminers (e.g., most) and plural demonstratives (these, those).82 Determiners that do not 
have strong features are the, every, and this. Further, she proposes that the element hold-
ing the strong agreement feature must immediately c-command the empty Num in order 
to license it. To illustrate her analysis, consider the following three structures, in which 
the null Num head is licensed by a determiner with strong features: a possessive deter-
                                                 
82 LH’s analysis is a departure from Lobeck’s however, in that LH assumes that only functional heads must 
be liscensed. That is, for LH, empty lexical heads need not be licensed, as is the case for Lobeck. 
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miner in (318), a plural demonstrative determiner in (318), and a quantificational deter-
miner in (319).83  
 
(318) a. Some birds flew south, but many birds stayed behind. 
 b. [DP many [NumP [Num [+pl] ] [NP birds]]] 
 
(319) a. I like these phones, but not those phones. 
 b. [DP those [NumP [Num [+pl] ] [NP phones]]] 
 
(320) a. Your kids are shorter than mine kids. 
 b. [DP mine [NumP [Num [+poss] ] [NP kids]]] 
 
For the three above cases of NP Ellipsis, the empty Num is licensed, and one-support is 
not required. In contrast, there are two main cases in which an empty Num would not be 
licensed, and one surfaces. First, adjectives block a strong determiner from licensing 
Num, which explains the need for one to surface in (321). 
 
                                                 
83 LH’s syntactic trees are slightly different than those above, in that she assumes that quantificational de-
terminers occur as heads of QP, and possessive determiners occur in the specifier of DP. The simplifica-
tions I have made above do not affect her arguments presented here.  
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(321) a. I like some green toothbrushes, and most pink ones toothbrushes. 
 b.   DP 
          qp 
         D       NumP 
     g     qp 
      most AP   NumP 
       g  qp 
    pink         Num            NP 
      g          g 
              ones       toothbrush 
 
Second, determiners that do not bear strong features, such as the singular demonstrative 
or the definite determiner must occur with one:84  
 
                                                 
84 It is unclear, by LH’s analysis, why *the one is ungrammatical, given that the does not bear strong fea-
tures. The absence of *the one could, however, be account for by assuming that the followed by NP ellipsis 
is phonologically realized as the pronoun it (as proposed in Elbourne 2002, based on Postal 1966.) 
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(322) a. I like the car over there, but I don’t like the one by the counter. 
 b.   DP 
          qp 
         D       NumP 
     g     qp 
        the NumP    PP 
            ei        6 
        Num              NP       by the counter 
       g            g 
     one               car 
 
In (322), the does not bear strong agreement, and thus may not license the number affix 
in Num. 
Although one(s)-anaphora are largely in complementary distribution, there are 
some environments in which some speakers permit both one and NP Ellipsis to occur. In 
particular, some speakers permit both following the singular and plural demonstrative 
determiners, as illustrated in (323) and (324) ((323b), in particular, is prescriptively bad). 
 
(323) a. I like these glasses but I don’t like those. 
 b. ?I like these glasses but I don’t like those ones. 
 
(324) a. ?I like this hat and you like that.    (Johnson 2005)   
 b. I like this hat and you like that one. 
 
LH suggests for the plural cases that there some dialectal parameterization regarding 
which determiners are specified with strong features (and thus can license an empty Num 
head).  
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If NP Ellipsis and one(s)-anaphora both are instances of NP Ellipsis, then we 
should expect them to behave identically with respect to some of the diagnostics for syn-
tactic structure internal to the elided site. This seems to be borne out, as shown in the fol-
lowing sections. Like NP Ellipsis, wh-movement is not possible out of one(s)-anaphora, 
as (325a) shows, although quantificational binding into one(s)-anaphora is possible, as 
(325b) shows. 
 
(325) a. I know who1 Sarah has a good picture of t1, and who2 Ralph has a bad one __  
  *(?of). 
 b. Each prisoner1 hopes that Mary3 will publish her good pictures of him1, and  
  that she’ll burn her bad ones __. 
 
Similarly, as with NP Ellipsis, sloppy readings do seem to be possible for one(s)-
anaphora, although the examples are more complicated to construct with one. For exam-
ple, the elided VP in (326) below perhaps may be interpreted as meaning “want a big 
kiss”. 
 
(326) When she wants a hug, I give her a big one. When she wants a kiss, I don’t.  
 
The same problem, however, arises for deriving sloppy readings of one here, if such read-
ings are derived by treating one as a bound variable: in order to create a binder for one, a 
kiss would have to QR out of a when-clause in order to bind a variable in the elided VP. 
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To sum up, LH presents arguments against treating one as a NP pro-form, and in-
stead for treating is as phonological support for stranded number morphology in a Num 
head. Any theory that posits one as a pro-from must explain why it does not have the 
same distribution as an ordinary NP, and why it is (largely) in complementary distribu-
tion with NP Ellipsis. LH’s explains the restriction that one can only pick up the refer-
ence of count nouns, as the result of one having the semantics of number morphology, 
which only is compatible with count nouns, in the same way that only count nouns – and 
not mass nouns – may be pluralized (see, e.g., Chierchia 1998 and references therein).  
If LH’s arguments go through, and one-anaphora is an instance of NP Ellipsis, 
and if, in turn, if the interpretation of NP Ellipsis does not involve variables, then one-
anaphora does not provide a counterexample to NHTV. 
 
4.5 E-Type Pronouns as NP Ellipsis 
In the context of NP Ellipsis, it is worth observing that Elbourne (2002) argues that e-
type pronouns – which have previously been analyzed as involving a covert property 
variable – should be construed as instances of NP Ellipsis. In this section, I will briefly 
review the motivation for his account.  
The problem of e-type pronouns is illustrated in (327); these pronouns sometimes 
display co-varying readings without being c-commanded by any obvious potential binder.  
 
(327) Every man who owns a donkey hugs it. 
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One solution to this problem is to treat the pronoun like a disguised definite description, 
as in (328) (Evans 1977, Cooper 1979). 
 
(328) Every man who owns a donkey hugs [the donkey he owns]. 
 
The account has been implemented by treating the descriptive content of the definite de-
scription as provided by a free variable over relations, that is, a higher-type variable 
(Cooper 1979). For example, in the version of the account in Heim and Kratzer (1998), in 
which e-type pronouns are represented at LF as in (329).  
 
(329) [the [R<i,<e,et>> pro<j,e>]] 
 
Assuming that (329) corresponds to the pronoun it in (327), the relation variable R would 
pick up the salient donkey-owned-by relation, and the individual variable pro would be 
bound by the subject, every man. In effect, (327) would be true iff if every individual x 
such that x is a man who owns a donkey beats the donkey owned by x. Elbourne proposes 
instead that e-type pronouns are actually definite articles whose complements are subject 
to NP-deletion, as in (330a). Building on Postal (1966), he assumes that when the is fol-
lowed by NP Ellipsis, it is pronounced as it, so that (330a) is pronounced as (330b).  
 
(330) a. Every man who owns a donkey beats the donkey he owns.  
 b. Every man who owns a donkey beats it. 
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Elbourne supports his analysis of e-type pronouns as instances of NP Ellipsis by showing 
that the descriptive content of an e-type pronoun behaves like elided material. For exam-
ple, NP Ellipsis is not possible in examples like (331b), in which hers would mean her 
guitar, the elided NP (i.e., guitar) being inferred from the meaning of the preceding sen-
tence, Mary is a guitarist.85 
 
 (331) a. Mary has a guitar. She should bring hers. 
 b.  Mary is a guitarist. *She should bring hers. 
 
Elbourne refers to such cases as ‘inferable antecedents’. E-type pronouns are subject to 
the same restriction, as the contrast in (332) shows (Elbourne 2002, based on Heim 1982, 
1990). 
  
(332) a. Someone who has a guitar should bring it. 
 b. *Some guitarist should bring it. 
 
If all that was required to recover the descriptive content of an e-type pronoun was a sali-
ent property, the relation married to should be made salient in (332b). This data thus sup-
ports the construal of e-type pronouns as instances of NP Ellipsis.86 
                                                 
85 However, it is possible for NP Ellipsis to be pragmatically controlled, that is, it does not require a lin-
guistic antecedent (I follow Elbourne in disputing the judgments of Lasnik and Saito 1992, who claim that 
NP Ellipsis cannot be pragmatically controlled.) For example, in a context in which someone reaches for a 
pair of gloves on the table which happen to be Sue’s, it is acceptable to say “No, those are Sue’s!”, without 
having mentioned “Sue’s gloves”, as long as they are contextually salient. 
 
86 Note that one(s)-anaphora behaves the same way, that is, it does not permit inferable antecedents either: 
 
(i) a. Mary has a guitar. She should bring that one.  
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4.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I have adopted analyses of VP and NP ellipses according to which they 
have internal syntactic structure just like that of an over VP or NP at LF, and thus are 
consistent with NHTV. I have reviewed arguments that have been presented in support of 
this view of ellipsis, as well as certain examples that may be problematic for this view. I 
have also adopted the analysis of one(s)-anaphora according to which it is an instance of 
NP Ellipsis, following Llombart-Huesca (2002), and thus does not pose a counter-
example to NHTV. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 b. Mary is a guitarist. *She should bring that one. 
 
 
This is further support for treating one(s)-anaphora as a case of NP Ellipsis.    
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
In this brief chapter, I would like to summarize the thesis proposed and also outline some 
paths for future research.  
The main claim of this thesis is that variables in the LF representations of natural 
languages range only over individuals. While this makes very restrictive predictions 
about the inventory of constructions that involve variables, these restrictions seem to hold 
for the cases I have looked at, namely, the pro-forms such, adverbial so (and thus), do so, 
predicative so, and A’-constructions such as topicalization and wh-movement. 
Put in a broader context, I see this thesis as bringing together three lines of re-
search: (i) investigating the syntax-semantics of non-nominal anaphora; (ii) exploring po-
tentially universal semantic constraints on possible variables; and (iii) studying the syn-
tax-semantics of morphology that involves reference to kinds, and its parallels to mor-
phology that involves reference to degrees (as in Bolinger 1972).  
There are several paths that one might take from here, to pursue this research fur-
ther, which I will outline in the following three paragraphs.  
First, I have motivated this constraint based primarily on data from English, Ger-
man, and Polish, and one would certainly want to test the cross-linguistic validity of the 
constraint as a potential semantic universal. In particular, one would want to look at types 
of non-nominal clitics (in, e.g., the Romance languages), as well as possible non-nominal 
resumptives (in, e.g., Hebrew). If higher-type pro-forms are possible, we might expect 
both of these types of expressions to occur. 
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Second, I have not looked in this work at propositional pro-forms such as that in 
She knows that. I see no immediate problem in viewing such pro-forms as ranging over 
individuals that correspond to propositions. However, further investigation of these pro-
forms remains an area for future research. 
Finally, the similarities in syntax and semantics between such (and its related 
forms) and degree morphology (such as how and degree so) raises the broader question of 
why, in English and across languages, expressions that make reference to kinds and de-
grees seem to share morphology, e.g., such, so, as, and how (as pointed out in Bolinger 
1972). This sets as a direction for future research further investigation of the theoretical 
and cross-linguistic links between kind and degree morphology.  
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